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INTRODUCTION
Natural Resources utilized and put to the service of man
are fundamental to economic and social development. In order
to grasp the full spectrum of options in the field of natural
resources it is of particular importance to formulate an
integrated approach, both short and long term, to their
development and utilization as there are many interdependent
problems in their management and control.
There does not seem to be any single legal definition
of Natural Resources. However it may be said in simple terns,
that natural resources are a gift of nature, sometimes in the
form of raw materials, which skilled hands and discerning
minds can turn to the improvement of the human lot. In the
Havana Charter,1 natural resources wsre defined as;
"primary commodity, any product of farm or fisheries
which can undergo such processing as is customarily
required to prepare them for marketing in substantial
volume in international trade".
The above definition conveys the idea that natural resources
as a primary commodity can be divided into two categories:
(a) Renewable i.e. agricultural resources;
(b) Non-renewable i.e. mineral resources;
In this study attention is directed only to non-renewable
natural resources.
1. Havana Charter Art. 5<> - See Parliamentary Paper XVIXI,
1947-48, p.56.
2* A classification of natural resources was made country by
country in a League of Nations study, Doc. II, 1928,
p. 3b (Financial and Economic Series).
ii.
Minerals, as non-renewable natural resources, contrast
sharply with, renewable resources such as agriculture and
sivilculture and they can themselves be sub-divided into
two further categories:
(a) Non-recyclable: those which are largely destroyed
or converted into a form in which they cannot be recovered,
into this category fall petroleum, coal and mineral pigments.
(b) Recyclable: these include those minerals that are
capable of being used several times, such as gold, iron, and
lead. This is possible because when the article in which
recyclable metal has been employed becomes obsolete, it
can be sent back to the furnace as scrap and the metal can
be reprocessed for reuse. Apart from that, the mining of
iron ore or limestone leaves only a hole in the ground. There
is no second crop of mineral after the first deposit has
been exploited. The significance of this classification is
that the characteristics of minerals influence states'
legislation and bargaining positions with the companies,
and also lead to more stringent controls imposed on foreign
citizens exploitation of such resources.
Another peculiarity is that minerals are unevenly
distributed among nations, both in volume and variety. No
nation is endowed with the full range of minerals. This
situation often leads to conflicts between the mineral
iii.
exporting and mineral importing countries. In some cases
the unequal distribution of minerals necessitates International
co-operation and coordination over the use of one particular
mineral product.
In Africa, which is the main concern of this study,
mineral exploitation has gone through many stages and taken
many forms. For example, before the advent of Europeans in
the continent, African nations were controlling the minerals
in their own system until they lost the control of these
resources to the foreign powers that colonized them. These
Powers tentatively assumed effective control over natural
resources. When African nations were advanced to the status
of statehood they strove to regain the lost right to control
natural resources in various ways - modifying the previous
colonial laws regarding exploitation of mineral resources,
renegotiating any left-over contracts on their own terras,
and in some cases nationalizing some of the concessions,
though leaving the previous investors with their acquired
rights.
Presently mineral resource exploitation in Africa is
subjected to the acquisition of rights from state authorities,
usually in the form of concessions, or leases, preceded in
some cases by licences or permits. Although in many cases
they are required for operation by nationals to the same
extent as for operation by foreign citizens states grant
iv.
permits, licences, leases and concessions as an important
means of controlling the acquisition of zights by foreign
citizens and their extent, in their natural resources.
haws which in effect limit rights and prescribe the
conditions which may be negotiated with private persons by
appropriate governmental authority, sometimes require
legislative approval for' particular grants and indicate
ways in which legislatures of various countries consider
that the sovereign rights and national Interests In natural
resources may be best preserved* Typically legislation
limits the governmental authorities' discretion only with
respect to maximum rights, and minimum obligations, and allows
wide latitude for negotiation of terms favourable to states.
It can be seen that sovereignty is a prerequisite for
effective control of natural resources. The more dependent
a country is, the less opportunity it has to exercise control
over natural resources. Xn such cases independence conveys
the right of effective control and is in itself a manifestation
of sovez'eignty. However, this study is concerned mainly
with examining the system of mineral control prevailing in
Africa, prior to the advent of foreign coiqpanies, then
during the colonial regime, and lastly after the nations
V
attained political independence. The variety of machinery
and instruments African states employed to control their
natural resources domestically and internationally will be
examined.
The nethod used in this research is purely inductive.
In other words available materials, both original and primary,
state practice, and Judicial decisions were relied on.
However, it must be added that because of the wide scope
of the subject, and the secrecy which states and companies
attach to their agreements and transactions, the materials
used in this work may not be entirely exhaustive; it is
hoped however, that this study has opened the way for future
research on similar controversial issues of international
importance, as, in a continent like Africa, much more about





Pre colonial African life was sustained by the exploitation
of natural resources. Thus the most essential foodstuffs were
obtained by exploiting the natural environment - hunting,
gathering of vegetables, and rav materials by simple mining
of mineral resources. With the food producing economy trade
also became far more important, for many requirements of more
complex economy and material culture had to be met from other
sources available locally.
While such items as skins and grains were a significant
part of inter-village trade,1 the exploitation of basic mineral
rav materials, for example copper, and salt, was responsible
above all for the development of complex inter-regional bartering
netvorks, vhich were based on a comparatively steady but
informally structured demand for rav materials. This chapter
vill therefore examine the systems of and legal controls over
exploitation of natural resources prevailing in Africa prior
to the colonial period, and then vithin the colonial period
itself, vith a viev to finding the general attitude of Africa
tovards natural resources, and the impact, and after effect of
foreign investment.
1. M.P. Miracle Plateau Tonga entrepreneurs in historical
inter-regional trade Rhod. Livingstone Journal Vol. XXVI
1959 PP. 3^-50.
2.
The first phase deals with the African approach to the
working of natural resources, and all the mechanisms with which
the operation was carried out. The second phase is concerned
with the genesis of foreign involvement in the natural resources
industry of the African continent; which started with the
early European companies. Finally the third phase examines
the colonial regime and the various laws relating to exploitation
of natural resources.
I• The African Phase
A. The Concept of Ownership of Natural Resources
The earliest concept of natural resources in Africa was
indistinguishable from land ownership. The land belonged to
the community, likewise hunting grounds, forests, and their
products, wells, springs, salt lakes and flint deposits were
held by the group in communal ownership. The above facts are
supported by the general exposition of Viscount Haldane in the
2
case of Amodu Ti.lani v. Secretary Sourthern Nigeria. In
3
delivering the judgement of the Privy Council, he saidt-
'The next fact which it is important to bear in mind
in order to understand the native land law is that
the notion of individual ownership is quite foreign
to native ideas. Land belongs to the Community, the
village, or the family, never to the individual. All
the members of the community, village or family have
an equal right to the land, but in every case the Chief
of Headman nf the Community or village or head of the
2. [1921 ] 2 A.C. 399.
3. Ibid at p. 40. See also Dr. Elias Nigeria Land Law
1971 P. 72.
3.
family, has charge of the land and in a loose mode of
speech is sometimes called the owner, He is to some
extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds
the land for the use of the community or family. He
has control of it, and any member who wants a piece of
it to cultivate or build upon, goes to him for it. But
the land so given remains the property of the community
or family. He cannot make any important disposition of
the land without consulting the Elders of the community
or family, and their consent must in all cases be given
before a grant can be made to a stranger. This is a
pure native custom along the whole length of the coast...'
How did the communal ownership operate within African
nation in the pre colonial period? Natural resources were held
in communal ownership in the sense that there were no individuals
who could claim ownership of them; at least in the sense
that ownership is used in Western legal systems. The peculiar¬
ity of the African concept of ownership of natural resources
was its complexity, in that the right of individuals and those
of gr-oup-members of the nation ^i.e. collections of various
tribes) co-existed within the same social context. Thus when
communal ownership of natural resources was spoken of, it
implied the resources in which the individual members of the
nation held recognised rights, and those over which no claim
or right had ever been made or asserted whether by groups or
4
individuals.
4. In most African countries, some forests land water are
dedicated to gods, Those resources also come under
communal ownership.
4
The communal ownership of natural resources was limited In
two ways J-
(a) When an Individual had got a place allocated to
him by the Chief, he became the owner of such products as he
won therefrom by his own labour*
(b) The Chiefs or Headman had no right whatsoever of
continuous control or detailed supervision over the resources
which had been allocated to a group or an individual except
where there existed an abuse of right.
The above situation reveals that in pre colonial Africa,
there was no concept comparable to the English/Western idea
5
of a fee single absolute in possession of natural resources*
B. The Right Vested in Chiefs
The early research identified the African continent with
Chieftaincy or a monarchial type of society. This society
was characterised by the existence of a centralized authority,
administrative machinery and judicial system, all three of
which constitute the criteria by which any human society can
be regarded as possessing a government. In the type of society
that flourished in Africa, the Chiefs represented the administr¬
ative and judicial powers* The right to oontrol natural resources
was vested in them. In other words the Chiefs were charged
Under the English law, the Crown is the only true owner of
land and its resources until Individual is granted the
right of exploitation - Cheshire The Modern Law of Real
Property 1944 pp. 116-117.
c
with the responsibility of administration of the allocation
of sites to the nation. They controlled the resources as
caretakers or trustees. In either case, the Chiefs were
the representatives of the nation, through whom every trans-
6
action related to natural resources passed.
The principle of the representative character of the
Chiefs with regard to natural resources was almost universal
7
in Africa. There were two aspects to the rights vested in the
Chiefs:- the negative and the positive. The former consisted
of the Chiefs legal incapacity to treat the resources as his
personal property. This accounted for the existence of councils
of Elders and Notables, who acted as a sort of cabinet and
ensured that the Chiefs' dealings did not exceed the accepted
g
proprieties.
The latter concerned the Chiefs as recognised representatives
of the nation, who could act as middle men between their people
and third parties in any issue involving the exploitation of
natural resources. Xt is not surprising that in certain areas
6. The early agreement which is dealt with in the 2nd phase
of this study was concluded between the African Chiefs and
European Companies. See footnotes nos. 34, 33*
7. Dr. Elias op. cit. p. 84.
8. C.O. 879/35 No. 6,5 • Xn almost all the agreements concluded
between the Chiefs and foreign companies, there were
witnesses to see that the Chiefs had not exceeded their
right. This agreement can be seen in Microfilm in the
Public Records Office, London.
6.
the position of a Chief or King as a caretaker took another form;
in the sense that real estate was vested in the absolute ruler;
who owned the resources as part of his patrimony or divine
right. Such an idea of ownership of natural resources culminated
9
at an early stage in the rights of the Pharoes of Egypt.
C. Control exercised by the Chiefs
The Chiefs wielded political powers and influence, and
so incurred corresponding responsibility. The control
exercised by the Chiefs was evident in the allocation of sites
and the organising of the native working of natural resources.
Dr. Gertzel, who studied the activities of British merchants
and their relations with African Chiefs observes that:
"The two largest of the Chiefs on the coast, Nna-na of
Wari and King Jaja of Opobo had commercial organisation,
which stretched over considerable areas of the country
and which employed several thousand people in various
capacities - canoe men, traders, labourers, warriors
and local buying agents. No European agents, even if
prepared to emjp^oy Kru labour on a vast scale, could
have done so".
The control of natural resources by the Chiefs was also
manifested in their persistent efforts to resist encroachment
by unauthorised persons or companies by exploiting natural
resources without prior agreement.^ The Chiefs succeeded in
doing so by limiting the operation of the companies to specific
9. Flavn, Mineral Resources 1966 P» 150.
10. Journal of African History III 2 1962 pp. 361-366 -
Relations between Africans and European Traders in Niger
Delta, see also Dr. Dike Trade and Politics in Niger Delta
1956.
11. F.O. 84/148 No. 14.
7.
areas. The first such case arose in Delta, It involved the
12
West African Company (Manchester) and others.
In fact King Jaja drove Messers Alexandre Muller Brother
and Co • Ltd, (Glasgow) from his territory because they wante^
to exploit the resources without asking permission or obtaining
an agreement to do so from the Chiefs, In his explanation to
Consul Herwett King Jaja maintained that:
"This country is mine, I do not want any white
traders or companies here. If anybody wants to
trade with me, he is free to do so at port of
Opobo",
Restrictions and controls imposed by the African Chiefs
were much felt by the early European companies. The consular
dispatches for the years 1880-1884 clearly demonstrated that
the British companies viewed some of the African Chiefs controls
of natural resources with alarm, and- were more concerned with
the task of eliminating them than stemming possible French and
14
German intervention.
A study of some of the requests for annexation prior to
1884 would show that foreign companies felt that African natural
resources were being controlled through the Chiefs.
In February 1882 John Holt appealed to the Foreign Office
to protect Mr. Watts, who he claimed was the victim of African
Chiefs. He suggested that the annexation of the Coast from
12. The Companies involved in exploitation of natural resources
of the African Continent at early stage were Messrs.
Alexandre Muller and Co. Ltd., the Central African Company
based in London, V. Regis Anne Naselle based in France, and
James Pinnock based in Liverpool.




Lagos to the Cameroons was the only safeguard for British
1 *5
companies, In June 1883 Consul Hawett, writing to Lord
Granville, stated that his reason for urging the annexation of
the Cameroons was to enable the British companies to obtain
the influence in the interior then exercised by the Chiefs
- the sole administrators of natural resources. He added that
the annexation would enable the companies to push into the
interior and get rid of the services of the Chiefs as middle
16
men.
Were the African nations exploiting mineral resources in
the pre colonial period? It has often been thought that
before the advent of the European companies, Africans were
only engaged in subsistence farming - gathering wild fruits,
17
and vegetables etc. Long before the Christian era, in the
seventh Century B.C., the native working of gold in Ethiopia
was known to the seafaring races on the shores of the Indian
1 8
Ocean. When Machouland was invaded during the Matabele
war, it was discovered that extraction of gold by the natives
had been going on since before 1890, and the belief that rich
deposits would be found in old diggings acted as a stimulus
19to the early pioneers of South Africa. In Northern Rhodesia,
15# E.O. 84/1630 from Holt to Granville 16th February 1882.
16. F.O. 84/1630 from Holt to Granville 16th February 1882.
17* Pre-Colonial African Trade, ed. by Riphard Gray and
Birmingham 1970 p.1,
18, Nicholas De Kun Mineral Resources of Africa 19^5 P» 31•
19. Roger Summer Ancient Mining in Rhodesia, National Museum
Memoir No. 3 1969 p.5.
9.
there were ancient mining sites which served as a guideline
to the prospecting team sent from BulwaiXro in 1899» which
discovered the Kinshasi mine and located larger copper
20
deposits in Katanga, Workings of considerable antiquity
and undoubted pre-European date were seen and described by
Carl Munch and Hartely - two early European geologists who
visited Rhodesia. These workings undoubtedly gave credence
to the legends of the Empire of Monomotapa in Central Africa
as did copper, gold, and iron workings, which were found in
21
the tribal land of the native inhabitants.
On the West Coast of Africa, the indigenous inhabitants
22
had extracted gold and worked tin for a long but unknown period.
The exploitation of the existing West African gold and diamond
23
field followed upon the discovery that diamonds in Tarkwa
and gold in Guinea were worked by the natives. The same was
24
true of tin deposits in Nigeria. From the above facts, one
can conclude that the natives were exploiting mineral resources
in pre colonial period.
20. National Archives of Rhodesia Public Record Office
M3/7/6/3; M9/4/1/ f M13/4/1/1; RH/9/1/5? M4/7/11
M9/4/1$ MW/2/1/1. These files contain information on old
mining claims, see also Lord Hailey An African Survey
1938 p. 1485.
21. Ecology and Economic Development in Tropical Africa
Research Series No. 9 I965.
22. Archelogia Zambiana 111 1963 P* 34.
23. Roger Summer op. cit. p. 16.
24. Geological Survey of Nigeria Occasional Paper No. 9 1951*
10
The importance attached to natural resources for the
well-being of the African nation, necessitated rigid control.
In the first place, they formed the bulk of food stuffs for
the people. They were the medium of exchange in what was
25
essentially a barter economy. Copper, for example, was
used for a long time as a medium of exchange. It also had
social and decorative values,'^'
For these reasons the resources were controlled by the
Chiefs. A point worth emphasising is that most of the non
renewable resources were used as the medium of exchange. Thus
the purchasing power of the nation depended not only on the
availability of those resources, but also on their efficient
management; hence the stringent control through the Chiefs.
Evidently control of natural resources through the represent¬
atives of the nation, was necessary not only for monetary
security, but also to maintain steady barter trade with the
25. See especially the extensive documentation provided by
Lans Sundstrom, The Trade of Guinea I965 PP» 74-5, 80,
86-93. See also Paul Einzig Primitive Money in its
Ethnological Historical and Economic Aspects 1966
pp. 110-131. 141-2, 151-52. See also AFC Ryder Benin
and European 1485-1897 1969 pp» 95-6, H.M, Krik - Green
The Major Currencies in Nigerian History Journal of
Historical Society of Nigeria 11, 1960 pp. 132-50,
J. Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and
South Guinea in Awnsham Churchill, A collection of
Voyages and Travels 6 Vols. 1732 v. 117 pp. 382-465.
26, Africans used copper as objects of personal adornment and
emblems of status and Kingship. In 1554 Richard Eden wrote
of the Women of Mina in Gold Coast now (Ghana)
"And albeit they ape in maner all naked, yet are many of
them especially women laden with collars bracelets hoppes
and chains either of gold, copper or ivory ... Some wear
also on their leggs great shackles of bright copper which
they think no lessee comely".
See Eugenia Herbert - The Use of Copper in Pre-colonial
West Africa - Journal of African History XIV 2 1973 P» 182.
In some societies the exchange of copper rings and bracelets
was restricted to bride price. Ibid p. 181.
11.
outside world. One may perhaps better appreciate the line
of action taken by the African nation to control foreign
exploitation of natural resources, if one just thinks in terms
of monetary sovereignty of modern states, by which each
country controls and protects its currency from counterfeiting,
or acts against any economic ventures that could inflict
danger to its gold reserve and its balance of payments.
Finally it must be added that the control of natural
resources through the Chiefs indicated the consciousness
of the people of their right over their own natural resources.
Moreover the exploitation of these resources by the natives
was not only significant for its historic interest, but it
also afforded a guideline for early European mineral prospectors.
The above account Justifies the conclusion that the African
Chiefs and nations not only exercised effective control over
their natural resources, but looked upon them as their currency
and above all as their natural heritage and means of livelihood
worthy of protection, and efficient management,
IX. Foreign Companies Phase
A, Forms of Agreement between the African Chiefs and
the European Companies
6
The first economic contact between the African nations
27
and Metropolitan countries" was promoted by the chartered
companies - trade association with quasi governmental functions -
27, C,0. 2 No, 1 Commerce with the interior also in Public
Record Office London,
12
representing the major industrialised countries of Europe
- Britain, Belgium, France, and Germany. The companies were
interested in acquisition of raw materials in Africa. At
that time the need for raw materials in Europe was intensified
by the industrial revolution.
The first phase of the transactions between the African
rulers and foreign companies were peacefully conducted by
the conclusion of agreements. The conclusion of agreements
with the Chiefs or Kings was the first step the companies
took to respect the right of African nations over their
natural resources. The agreement concluded between the
Chiefs and the foreign companies were exclusively of a commercial
nature. The Sultan of Sokoto, King of the Musslimans of the
Sudan, concluded such agreements with a National African
28
Company. Similar agreements were concluded between Ossyeba
29
Chiefs and French Companies; and the Sultan of Zanzibar
30
and an East African German Association.
28. The main text of the agreement concluded between the
Sultan of Sokoto and the National African Company is
as follows
Art. 1 For the mutual advantage of ourselves and our
people, and those European trading under the name of
the National African Company Limited, I Umoru King of
Mussulmans of Sudan, Sultan of Sokoto, with the consent
and advice of my Council grant and transfer to the above
people or others with whom they may arrange my entire
rights to the country on both sides of the river Benue
and river flowing into it throughout my dominions for
such distance from its and their banks they may desire.
Art. 2 We further grant to the above mentioned company
the sole right, among foreigners to trade in our territories
and sole right among foreigners to possess or work places
from which are extracted articles such as lead and antimony.
Art. 3/
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Art. 3 We further declare that no communication will
be held with foreigners coming from the rivers except
the above mentioned company.
Art. 4 These grants we make for ourselves, our heirs,
and successor for ever and declare them irrevocable.
Art. 5 The above named European Company (National
African Company Limited) agree to make Umoru Sultan
of Sokoto a yearly present of 300 bags of cowries in
return for the above.
See Nigeria pamphlet No. 3 in Commonwealth Office
formerly the Colonial Office Library. See also Pam.
30/27/70 Confidential No. 5051 Enclosure No. 284 p. 83.
of treaties concluded between African Chiefs and the
above named Company - copies are available in the
Public Record Office in London.
29. P.S. de Brazza on behalf of the French Companies concluded
agreements with the African Chiefs and Kings. Typical
of such treaties was the following:
Art. 1 The Ossyeba Chiefs of the country which extends
on the right bank of Invindo, some distance into the
interior between the confluence of Ouah and Foulah rivers
being free from any other agreement, declare that they
place their territory under the sovereignty and protection
of France. They undertake on behalf of themselves, and
their people of whom they are recognised Chiefs to raise
the French flag to the exclusion of other than France.
Art. 4 The present treaty which has been discussed freely
with the said Chiefs translated, and explained, commented
upon and consented to by everyone with full knowledge of
the fact is valid from this date. It will not however be
considered definitive until after it has been ratified by
the Commissioner General and the French Government to whom
it shall be transmitted as soon as possible.
See - Liste des Documents Concernant les Traites passes
entre Les Marchands et Les Chefs Africains au XVTIIe et
XIX eme Sielles et conserves dans les Archives du Ministers
des Affaires Entrangres Paris.
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fol. Ill - 113 V° Depeche "»u Ministere de la Marine au sujet
de la tentative d'un navire anglais a renoue des relations
commerciales a Portendick (Juin 1862) Annexes (1)
Extrait d*un rapport de M. Moll, Lieutent de vaisseau
Commandant l'Archimede (17 mai 1862) 2 copie d'une lettre
du gouverneur du Senegal (17th mai 1862) "II parait que
le capitaine de ce navire a vollu donne au Chef de
Portendick une lettre addressee au roi des Trarza pour
1'engager a recevoir l'annee prochaine deux batiments
de Commerce anglais qui Viendraient sur la cote dans le
but d'y etablir une escale ou deux" (fol. 112 V ).
14.
fol. 118-122 Depeche du Ministere de la Marine au sujet
d*une oPPre de cession a* la Prance d l'ile Matacong
(26 novembre 1863) Annexe; (1) rapport de M. Poisson
lieutenant de vaisseau capitaine de L'APricaine
(2) extrait d'une lettre du gouverneur du Senegal (25 niai
1863) "Matacong fut achete il y a environ 40 ans par
Stephan Gabbidon, negociant a Sierra Leone. Son Pits
William herita de cette ile, I'occupa et enfin l'hypotheque
on Pareur de MM. Ride et DorPoa, negociants de Sierra
Leone M. Isaacs 1*achete sur la demande de M. Gabbidon ...
Outre le titre qui M. Isaac possedait et qui etait de
chaucum des ChePs indigenes qui avaient encore quel
ques pretentions de propriete sur Matacong. II le Pit
d'abord pour s'assurer de bonnes relations de commerce
avec ses ChePs, ensuite pour etablir de la 'Paeon la
plus ePPicace ses titre de propriece.
M.D. APriaue 4*7
Pol. 123-133 V Reponse du Ministere des APPaires
Etrangeres (28 novembre 1863)«
Pol. 124-127 Depeche du vice-consul de France a Bathurst
sur la praise de possession de L *ile Boulam par les
Anglais (20 decembre I863) "Lrile de Boulam de l'archipel
des Bissagos ... Put achetee vers 1700 au roi des
BiaPares par le Francais Andre Brue gouverneur du
Senegal et directeur de la compagnie des Indies. II
envoya dans cette ile un certain nombre de colons
Prancais et des etablissemerits se creerent peu a peu
a Boulam, Bissao, etc, pays occupe depuis presque
completement par la Portugais. Peu de temps apres le
paix de Versailles vers 1786 ou 17^7 les Anglais
essayerent de creer de establissements dans l'ile de
Boulam ... A leur tour, les Portugais, depuis longtemps
etablis dans la se negambie merdionale ... reprirent
l'idee abandonee par le? Anglais .,. et depuis cette
epoque y current des Pactoreries dont 1'importance
alia toujours s'augmentant."
Pol. 224-225 Copie d'une lettre addressee au gouverneur du
Senegal par le capitaine du castor (14 octobre I865)
"J'ai l'honneur de vous dresser les renseignements".
Pol. 224-225 Copie d'une lettre addressee au gouverneur
du Senegal par le capitaine du Coster (14 octobre 1865)
"J'ai l'honneur de vous addresser les renseignements
que vous demander sur L'aPPaire de MM, Noque et Franz,
negociants etablir dans La Mellacoree,..
M.D. APrique 5^
Pol. 147-150 V Extrait d'un rapport addressee par le
capitaine du Renadin au Commandant de la Division navale
des cote occidentales d'APrique (28 octobre 1859)
"En 1854 avant 1 *establissement d'acune raaison Prancaise,
le Consul Campbell, de concert avec quelques negociants
15.
anglais, Sardes et hambourgoers, fit signer au roi
locemo un traite de commerce qui fut considere comme
applicable a tous les negociants europeans presente
et a ve nlr, a 1*arrives de la maison Regis, il lui
fut di qu'ette pourrait compter sur les conditions de
garantles dudit traite (fol. 147 V° 148 V°)
M.D. Afrique 55
fol. 151 V - 154 V° Note sur la meme sujet
fol. 244 V° - 245 V° Copie d'un accord passe entre le
roi Docemon les negociants et les subre cargues des
naxires mouilles dans la rade de lagos (23 mars 1854
annex a la lettre du Cdt. Didelot du 6 mars I863).
fol. 367 V° - 370 V° Extrait d'ime lettre du capitaine du
Phaetou au sujet de la praise de possession les Anglais
de l'ile de Boulam (1 er septembre 1864, annexe a la
depeche envoyee par le ministre de la Marine aux
Affaires Etrangeres le 21 Novembre 1864) En 1792...
un connnercent avec un Chef de la rive opposee (qui
a ce que disent les portugais n'avant aucum droit de
le faire) se fit ceder Boulama et les iles environment.
Le traite fut ratifie en 1827 par le gouvernement
Anglais" (fol. 367 V° - 368 V°)
See also Le probleme des Chefs en Afrique noire Documentaries
— 2509. 1959 translated by Pierre Alexandre. Notes and
Studies, are semi official documents publised under the
direction of the Prime Minister's Secretariat.
30. A similar right to exploit natural resources was conferred
on the German East African Association by the Sultan of
Zanzibar.
Art. VX His Highness (Sultan of Zanzibar) grants to the
Association the exclusive privilege to search for and
work or to regulate lease or assign in any part of His
Highness territories within the limit of this concession
any mines or deposits of lead, coal, iron, copper, tin,
gold, silver, precious stone or any metal or mineral
or mineral oil, whatsoever also the exclusive right to
trade in the same, free from all taxes and dues excepting
such moderate royalty on minerals only, not exceeding
5$> on the first value of th. article less the working
expenses as may be hereinafter agreed by the Association
- to be paid to His Highness, also the right to use all
forests, trees, and other woods and materials of any kind
whatsoever for the purpose of the works afore said and
also for trade but the wood used for building and burning
commonly known as borti - may be cut on the mainland by
others as now by payment of such dues to the Association
as they agreed upon, but no such dues shall be required
for* wood cut for His Highness use.
See Hertslet - Map of Africa by Treaty Vol. XI reprinted
3rd Ed. 1967 p. 697.
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The salient provisions of these agreements could be summed
up as follows
The Sultan and Chiefs granted exclusive rights to the
companies and their governments. These rights were also
transferable to the heirs of the companies and their govern¬
ments. The agreement equally conferred an exclusive right
to various European companies to exploit natural resources
within the territory of the Chiefs or Sultan with whom the
agreement was concluded. In some cases the agreements required
ratification by the Commissionare General.
Apart from the European forms of concluding business
transactions, there was also a binding form of contract in
Africa itself; which did not require an exchange of
agreements as in the Vest* ^ was nonetheless an effective
bond, to which, from the African point of view, the customary
law of pacta sunt servanda applied. This form of contract or
31
agreement was known as the ceremony "blood brotherhood.
31. The ceremony of blood brotherhood ran thus: The Chief*s
brother or one of the principal men or Elders would stand
forth take his spears, his shields, and his sword, hold
them above his head, and swear upon them, in the name of
friendship eternal with the whiteman representing the
company as follows: My hut is yours, by day or by night,
my country shall welcome you as the son of the soil. If
you were in trouble I and my warriors would be at your
service to help you defeat your enemies, you could share
with others the fruit of the soil. This was one part,
then the European or the company*s director would stand
as the contracting party. His favourite would be held
over jjis head, and his interpreter would stand forward
and repeat his pledge: That I will be friend to those
people, that my men shall not molest them, that if any
crop/
17.
Most of the early European agents in Africa, preferred it
to the Western written agreements in their dealings with the
African Chiefs, because its formal binding nature was well
understood by the African nations. This view was supported
by Lord Lugard, who in a paper delivered at the Royal
Geographical Society in 1892 stated that:
"The nearest equivalent possible to our idea of contract
is the ceremony of blood brotherhood. It is held in
Africa among the most savage and civilised tribes as
the most solemn and binding contract. The right is
performed in various ways always with ultimate
solemnity and empressment, the most important aspect
is that the Europeans were welcomed as the sons of the
soil (i.e. the citizen of the nation) who did not come
to oust the Chiefs from their Kingdom.
Undoubtedly the European companies in the first instance
exploited the resources only under agreements concluded with
the Chiefs. There was no evidence to show that the African
people had lost control of their natural resources before
their contract with the Europeans. Thus any acquisition of
the right to work natural resources other than by agreement
must have been against the will of the people i.e. the African
nations. The validity of these statements is evidenced by
is stolen, or any attack near my camp, I will help him
(the Chief). He (the Chief) shall look to European as
his brother whom he has to obey, but who has not come
to oust him from his Kingdom and so on.
After the pledge, by the whiteman, the Chief would
then produce two pieces of meat either of fox or goat.
A piece would be eaten by both the Chief and the whiteman
the blood brotherhood took place. The basic idea of
sweai-ing with the sword above the head, was the 3imple
belief that, if either of the parties turned a traitor
or violated the contract, his sword would turn against
him. This accounts for the solemnity with which the
ceremony of blood brotherhood was observed as a binding
contract or bond.
32. Proceeding of Royal Geographical Society 24th Nov. 1892
P. 817.
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the testimony of treaty makers themselves. Thus the French
view was expressed by the Commandant Toutee - one of the
most successful of all French treaty makers, as follows:
Quand un etat ou une tribu negre peu importe, a commis
1*imprudence grande de donner l*hospitalite a un
voyageur blanc, ce dernier n'a rien de plus presse
que de sortir de sa poche un traite d1alliance tout-
imprime, et de ses cantines un petit drapeau national,
Le voyageur signe le traite pour son propre compte
et prie le roitelet, plus ou raoins colore d*ajouter sa
signature a la sienne.
Si le potentat negre ne sait pas signer, comme ce
dernier cas se presente neuf foirs sur dix, la haute
partie contratante et civllisee signe pour la deuxieme
supposes sautage et le tour est joie.
II est arrive meme quelquefois que le voyageur blanc
s*il est anglais surtout a oublle de demander sou non
au negre signataire, mais le vice de forme n'a jamais
ete considere„comme une cause serieuse de nullite
du contract.
Equally significant was the reason given by Lord Lugard
in connection with an agreement concluded on the behalf of
Royal Niger and National African Companies (although the
latter company was called National African Company, it was
a foreign company incorporated in Britain), for his refusal
to use the companies forms while making an agreement with
Eiyeki Waiyaku a Kikuyu Chief, he said:
X now presented him with a flag and explained its
use. I also made treaty, but as I do not believe in
the printed forms of the companies, by which a man
gives land and the right to rule to the company in
exchange for their government and protection, I made
out my own treaty form. This Company treaty is an
utter fraud. No man, if he understood would sign it,
and to say that a Chief has been told that he has ceded
his right to the company in exchange for nothing is an
obvious untruth. If he has been told that the companies
would protect him against his enemies as an ally, he has
been told a lie, for the company bftve no intention and
no force to do it, if they wished.
33. Lord Lugard Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa
with introduction by Perham 19<>5 P» 16.
3b, Lord Lugard Diary Vol. I p. 318.
19.
When an extract of a company*s agreement is compared
with the ceremony of blood brotherhood, many differences
emerge. The ratification clause in a typical company
35
agreement was non existent in the ceremony of blood
brotherhood. Perhaps the equivalent of ratification was
the requirement of presence of Elders and Headmen as witnesses
o /T
at the latter ceremony. In some of the companies agreements,
37
there was provision for the right of inheritance in the
event of death of a signatory. This in effect was contrary to
the African concept of ownership of natural resources; where,
if an individual died, his tenure reverted to the nation.
It is worth remarking that it is difficult to different¬
iate between the privileges and obligations, when the companies
agreements are compared with the ceremony of blood brotherhood.
The only clause conferring what might be thought of as privileges
and obligations was that in the pledge, by which the European
was acknowledged to be a son of the soil (i.e. citizen of the
nation by the African concept) who could not therefore oust
the Chief from his Kingdom. He, the European, could enjoy
the same privileges as other members of the nation.
35. Art. 7 of the agreement between the Ossayeba Chiefs
and French Companies, see footnote no. 29.
36. See footnote 8 (C.O. 879/35 No. 65).
37. Art. 1 of the agreement between the African National
Company and the Sultan of Sokoto, see Footnote 28.
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In certain agreements, clause requiring payment of a
Og
certain amount to the Chief was stipulated. One might
think such payment represented a royalty for the granting
of the concession but to some Chiefs, it amounted to a tribute
which every son of the soil has to make regardless of his
rtq
possessions. In the light of the above comparison, one
can see the different legal systems involved in African
nations and companies early economic transactions. However
there were a lot of loopholes in these agreements compared
to modern contracts, but apart from this criticism, it served
the need of the time.
B. The Legal Significance of Agreements Concluded Between
African Chiefs and the European Coiapanie s
The importance of the control of natural resources by
the African people (i.e. nation) through the Chiefs was
manifested in the companies transactions with one another.
In the first instance, the agreements which were concluded
between the Chiefs and European Companies, were considered
necessary to gain international recognition for concessional
claims, and as evidence to refute rival claims. Secondly,
in the negotiations between European Companies themselves,
38. Ibid, Art. 5.
39* Chief Lobengueala applied
disputed Rudd concession,
Ruled Africa" 1936 p.29.
the same tactics over the
See G, Padmoore "How Britain
21 .
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such agreements were also useful for bargaining purposes.
One type of bargaining advantage was that the agreement
endowed the particular resources with an exchange value. Any
concession obtained by an agreement could be ceded to another
company in return for a counter concession. Thus the agree¬
ment was recognised by third parties.
Another kind of bargaining advantage was derived from
the use of the agreement in border negotiations. The land
claimed could sometimes be extended by reference to the
existing borders of an African nation with whose Chis f the
company claiming the disputed land had entered into an
agreement. An example of such a situation was shown in making
the map of the border between Kenya and Tanganyika near Mount
Kilmanjaro. In that region, British and German companies
agreed in 1866 and subsequently confirmed 1890 to specify
their respective border line between Tevata and Chagge. In
construction of the map showing the British border line between
Tevata and Chagge, the companies relied on the agreements
which Harry Johnson obtained from the African Chiefs; whereas
the German companies based their construction of boarder line
in the same region on the agreement obtained by Karl Peters
,
^ Examination of treaty right was accoarded much attention*
by the Niger Commissioner charged with negotiating
Anglo-French boundaries in West Africa. See G.P. Crooch
and Temperly in British document on the origin of the
War 1927 pp. 138-140.
22.
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from the Chiefs. Great Britain and Germany adopted similar
42
methods in settling their border differences in the Cameroons.
In 1823 in an international arbitration between Great
Britain and Portugal, regarding Delagao Bay, Great Britain
contested the legality of Portugal's claim thereto on the
basis of a treaty concluded between Great Britain and the
43
native Chiefs.
Generally speaking agreements between Chiefs and companies,
such as the Royal Niger Company, and the Comite Special du
Katanga, not recognised in international law as members of
the family of nations i.e. states, are not in a strict inter-
44
national legal sense treaties or conventions. On the other
hand, contracts of this nature are not wholly void of indirect
effects in situations governed by international law. They are
nonetheless evidence of which the law must in the circumstances
take account.
III. The Colonial Phase
A. The Demise of Native Control of Natural Resources
The exploitation and disposal of the natural resources
of African Kingdoms entered its third phase, when foreign
governments became involved and gradually replaced the
chartered companies. The whole mechanism, by which the
Chiefs controlled the resources, was disrupted. The working
41. British and Foreign Papers LXVII p. 1130*
42. John Keltie, The Partion of Africa 1895 p. 19^.
43. British Parliamentary Papers LXXX III 1875 p. 137#
44. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Art. 2i(a) 19^9.
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of natural resources changed hands from the less Industrie1-
ised African Chiefs and their nations to the well organized
and industrialised European Communities.
The issue of the exploitation of natural resources and
raw materials of the African territories came to be regarded
as vital only to the issue of security, if not as part of the
security itself - How was the industrial state to assure
itself of a constant supply of raw materials; if it did not
control the territories in which there were assured deposits,
it would be at the mercy of its rivals, who might decide at
any time to strangulate its industrial life. International
control of the supply of raw materials was not believed to
be within the range of practical statesmanship. Therefore
the contending major states - Great Britain, the NethexTands,
Prance, Germany and Portugal relied on their political strength
to give them the assurance they needed. Contrary to the
pledge made by the companies not to oust the Chiefs from
their Kingdoms, by 189^ almost all African Kingdoms had become
colonies of one foreign state or the other. Thus the power
to conclude agreements which previously was the prerogative
of the Chiefs passed on to the new sovereigns.
B. Ownership of Mineral Rights
On the assumption of control of natural resources by
the colonial powers, the concept of ownership of mineral,
rights changed drastically. The idea that the resources were
the property of the nation to be used for common good gave
24
way to the concept of state ownership. The law defining
property in mineral rights in most cases followed the pattern
45of the colonial power concerned,
Most colonial legislation provided for the customary
rights of natives to exploit minerals and prohibited the
grant of concessions in areas where this right was exercised,
but the natives were not treated as the owners of the subsoil
k6
rights. It was however clear that these mineral resources
could not have been mined by the natives in quantities comparable
tc those extracted under modern colonial conditions. The
legislative intention was therefore to maintain the status
45. The law in the Belgian Conge (now Zaire) vested all mineral
rights in the State, since the annexation by the Belgian
government any mineral concession had under the law of
Oct. 18th 1908 required the quthorization of the home
government, See Decree of 8th June 1888.
In the French colonial territories, the State reserved to
itself the rights to minerals, which were expressly
excluded from any concession of land made. See Decree
of 6th July 1899* See also The Mining Laws of the British
Empire 1920 Vol. 1.
46. French Decree of 5th July 1899- Oct. 22nd 1926, Oct.
13th 1933» (French West Africa) and July 8 1926, Dec.
23 193^ (French Equatorial Africa), In Transval and
the Orange Free State, the natives were allowed to reserve
a portion of the land for mining on their own account and
received a share of the licence fees paid by claim and
stand-holders.
See Act 31 of 1898, and 16 of 1907, (Cape) Act 43 of
1899 (Natal) Ordinance 3 of 1904, and 8 of 1904 (Orange
Free State) Act 35 of 1908 (Transval). In the Katanga
region of the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) special authori¬
zation was necessary for prospecting on land in native
occupation, and the native working of mineral resources
in Ruanda-tJrindi were protected. See Decree of 1888,
1893 later repealed in 1937«
25.
quo ante and not to invest in natives any wide power of or-r
mining, especially at a time when mineral raw materials first
acquired commercial value.
The existence of a system of state ownership, or of
governmental rights akin to state ownership of mineral rights,
had obvious consequences in the fields of legislation and
administrative regulation. The concession issued by the
state was usually a temporary right to exploit a mine or
reservoir, the ownership of which remained with the state
after the concession expired.
C. Systems of Mineral Control
The measures taken by the colonial powers to control the
mineral resources of the African territories depended upon
many factors. Two of these factors played an important role
in the formulation of the African mineral legislation.
(i) Each power wanted to establish for itself a monopoly
of (the use of) minerals of the subsoil;
(ii) The non-renewable character of mineral resources
necessitated restrictions and control.
The first approach the colonial powers adopted in African
territories to ensure that the state controlled the minerals
of the subsoil was to declare vast areas unoccupied by the
47
natives as Crown Lands. While grants of land under this
47. The United Kingdom of Great Britain adopted the method of
declaring vast areas of unoccupied land in its African
territories as the Crown Land, See Land Act of 19*8 No. 7
Also G. Stone The Mining Law of the British Empire 1920.
The French legislation of land acquisition did not differ
from that of Great Britain, Art. 713 of the French Civil
Code/
26.
system were made to the settlers through the colonial governors,
the system was used and originally devised largely to control
non-indigenous acquisition of* land from the natives; at the
same time the locals were not allowed to sell their lands to
foreigners. No land transactions could take place without
the approval of the Colonial Governors or the Conservateur
48
de titres Fonciers. Under the new system of control by
which the Chiefs were eliminated, any occupier of land must
obtain a certificate from the colonial governor. Such a
certificate granted to the holder the right of occupancy.
Where foreigners were allowed to own land, they must also
obtain a certificate from the governor, but such certificates
were usually limited to leasehold, and did not confer on the
holder rights over the minerals of the subsoil. The ~tate
reserved the right to enter upon any land sold or leased under
code stipulated that goods without an owner belonging to
nonspecific individual belong to the state. See Decree
of 28th September 1926, See also Decree 55—580 of 25th
May 1955 Tor the French Equitorial Africa.
An identical method prevailed in Belgian African
territories. Ordinance 1st July 1885, Decree of 14th
September 1886, See also Rapport de la Commission des
Colonies No. 87 1936.
48. In Belgian African territories, land registration was done
by Conservateur de Titre Fonciers Decree 14th Sept. 1886
Arret 8th Nov. 1886. The French Government had similar
procedure called immatriculation - See Decree of Jan. 5th
1923. For the United Kingdom of Great Britain practice,
see Mines Manual of 1916, which went through a series
of amendment up til 1948 cap. 13^ P» 96 8 (1). The
Residence of each province was empowered to handle land
matters subject to some cases to the approval of the
Governor General.
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any act to search for minerals, to mine, and to remove any
4o
minerals.
It is noteworthy, that despite the differences in the
constitutional and economic policies adopted by various colonial
powers in their African territories, there were similarities
in control of the mineral resources through land legislation.
In other words, it was common colonial practice to keep mineral
exploitation under strict control.
(iii) The recognition that minerals are a wasting asset
necessitated a vast range of measures designed to restrict
foreign participation in the domestic mineral industry of the
50
colonial territories. The reasons for such restrictions
49. British Land Act 1918 No. 7 s.21(1)-(3). All alienation
of Crown Lands contained reservations of minerals to the
Crown. See Precious Stone Act of 1927. In French African
Colonies, the State reserved to itself the right to
minerals, which were expressly excluded from any concession
of land made.
See Lord Hailey An African Survey 1938 p. 1520.
50. For the most part mining rights come under the general
provisions of commercial treaties defining the right of
nationals of each contracting party. See for example the
Agreement concluded between Great Britain and the French
Government of 1920, See League of Nations Treaty Series
No. 22. The two governments agreed to support their
nationals in any common negotiations for securing
concessions. In the same treaty, it was agreed that
the British nationals would participate to the extent
of one third in oil concession in French colonies; and
the British government allowed the French nationals the
same proportion in the Crown colonies.
For detailed discussion of the said agreement see Rawles
William P. Minerals in International Agreement - Political
Science Quarterly Vol. 48, 1938 p. 514. Great Britain
concluded a group of treaties with Denmark, Greece,
Norway, Portugal, and Sweden in 1920, 1921 concerning
capitulation in Egypt, whereby the nationals of each of
these states- received the promise of the same rights as
those enjoyed by the British nationals in Egypt for several
matters including mining privileges. Ibid, p. 530.
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varied from place to placet but common among them was the
fear of future shortages, the fear of being put into a
disadvantageous commercial position by the nations, the desire
to maintain supplies in case of war. Equally significant was
the desire to get as large a return for the colonial powers as
was possible from the development of natural resources and the
smelting and manufacturing processes were therefore also
51
designed for the profit of the powers concerned.
Another method adopted by the colonial powers to control
mineral resources, was the issuance of prospecting and mining
licences in the form of concessions. This advanced approach
to the working of natural resources was non existent in early
African period of control. It was tine that the natives worked
natural resources, but no distinction was made between prospecting
and mining.
The direct influence of States on mineral development was
seen prominently in the conditions laid down for the prospecting
and mining of metals, and the claims made on the product whether
by way of royalty or taxation. Regulation of this type had a
profound effect on prospecting, and mining, the more so as they
also determined whether development should be in the hands
of the small prospectors or of the large financial organisations.
Their character was shaped to a great extent by the system of
tenure applied to mining rights.
51. C.K. Leith ¥orld Mineral and World Politics 1931 P. 80.
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The duration and the extent of* prospecting rights differed
in colonial territories. In some countries the prospecting
right was valid for one year in an area of 8 square miles in
respect of ferrous metals, and in a two square mile area in
52
the case of precious metals. In other places, the prospecting
right was granted over an area of five or ten square kilometres
and was valid for two years, renewable up to six years, the
second renewal being granted only if the holder of the licence
had spent a specified amount of money in the first area of
53
operation,
A raining concession, like a prospecting licence, took
various forms. Some colonial powers preferred to give the
54
concession to big mining corporations in perpetuity. Others
52. The United Kingdom practice varied. In some places the
area and years of prospecting was defined for example in
Nigeria - See Law Cap. 39 and Mineral Amendment Ordinance
1927. One finds again that no limitation as to the area,
and duration was imposed upon concessions obtained before
1895# but Ordinance of 1900 restricted the area to 5 square
miles in the case of gold,
53. The French Government had specified procedure by which
any renewal application must accompany the account of
approximately 20,000 spent on the previous prospecting
area, See Hailey op. cit. p, 1528,
54. The sole right to exploit mineral resources of Katanga
extending over 1500 Kim. was assigned until 1990 to the
Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, Campagnie des Chemis des
Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains, See
T. Hayse and H. Leornard Regime de cession et concession
de terres et de mines du Congo Beige 1932, p. 324.
30.
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preferred a concession to run from 75 to 99 years. Apart
from these limitations certain colonial powers stipulated that
three quarters (^) of the personnel of any directorate of mining
57
concerns must be of their nationality. When examined
thoroughly, the various devices of restricting the size of
operations of concessionaires, and in some cases the term or,
if granting to citizens, rights in perpetuity had the purpose
of bringing each operation or exploitation of natural resources
under state sclrutiny, for, as the owner of the mineral resources,
the state had a proprietary interest to protect frora damage or
abuse by the concessionaire.
Another impact of state control of natural resources was
on revenue, by taxation of mineral resources enterprises. The
financial relation between the colonial powers and the mineral
industry was distinguished by the special feature that where a
state had assumed ownership of mineral resources, it in addition
claimed a share of the proceeds, representing the public interest
in the asset on which the industry was drawing. The areas where
55. Tn French Colonial system the holder of a permis d1
exploitation (Permit for exploitation might be granted
as concession for 75 years with the right to renew for
a further twenty five years at the annual rental of
,050 francs per hectare for the first six years and
5 francs thereafter, see Hailey op, ext. p, 1528,
56. The agreement which conferred the monopoly to Sierra
Leone Selection Trust Diamond Company was granted for
99 years by the British Government, The agreement was
concluded on 5th October 173^ and was repealed in 19^6,




royalty was taken, a variety of forms prevailed. One method
59
was to levy a fixed sum per unit of production. The colonial
powers also taxed the profit of various enterprises, as part
of their perogative.^
The above investigation has disclosed that the colonial
powers managed the exercise of subsoil rights, which were
however owned by the state. Mineral and petroleum exploration
and exploitation by nationals or foreigners were in most
countries subject to grant by the state of right embodied in a
58. In examining the methods by which the toyalty was taken by
the colonial powers, it must be noted that in certain areas,
it was not available to the state. In Northern Rhodesia
(Nyasaland) or older concessions held in South African
protectorate or Malioland of Bungenda. This was the case
because in 1893 the British South African Company received
from the Commissioner and the Consul General in British
Central Africa certificates of claim for 2,855,000 acres
in Tanganyka district of Northern Rhodesia. It proceeded
to make grants on the strength of these certificates and
the agreement with the Chiefs and although its authority
to do so was open to doubt, its action was subsequently
recognized by the British Government. For details of the
concession issued by the above named company by virtue
of the certificates, see North Charterland Concession
Inquiry, Colonial 73, 1932.
Again in Belgian Congo, the state had preferred retaining
shares in the profit of the company to receiving' royalty.
See Hailey, op, cit, p. 1530.
59• See the Imperial Institute Study on Royalty and Mining
Rents in British Empire 1936.
60, The Belgian Government based its tax system on the ratio
between profit and capital. See Decree of 1937 which
later extended to Ruanda Urundi.
There existed various forms of assessment of tax on profit
in British overseas territories, In its African territories
for example on iron ore in Sierra Leone, 5 per cent of the
assessible profit was payable. The rate on diamonds is
5$ of net profits and on export duty of 6^o. In Gold
Coast (Ghana) 27^%
See Diamonds Tax Proclamation No. 29 of 1931*
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permit, licence, lease or concession. Usually subsoil rights
were deemed to be separate from rights to surface deposits,
and were declared either to be owned by the state or to be
subject to governmental authorization regardless of ownership.
The mining of mineral deposits was generally granted to the
discoverer who could prove financial competence. In some cased
the concession did not require the holder to pay to the state
any royalty related to production. The concession was in
some cases granted in perpetuity and provided a security of
tenure approaching that of a freehold.
The state reserved the right to maintain public order
and to expropriate private goods for public utility on payment
of compensation according to the principles of international
law; the right of approval of operational plans to ensure that
exploitation was rational and not wasteful. The state also
controlled safety plans and measures. On these bases, state
intervention was therefore frequently justified from a legal
view point by the need to protect state property, rather than
on the mere illusory basis of public policy or exercise of
police power,
XV. CONCLUSION
The importance of natural resources in African economic
life was realised before the advent of the European in those
territories. This was evidenced not only by the communal
ownership of the resources, but also by the strict control
exercised by the Chiefs, which prevented foreign economic
intrusion. Further evidence of the control by the Chiefs
was evidenced by the agreements by which the companies acquired
33.
the rights to work natural resources. The control exercised
by the Chiefs not only manifested itself in the administration
of native working of natural resources, but also in the
settlement of disputes and acceptance of responsibility
regarding the exploitation of these resources. The right
of Chiefs as the sole administrators of natural resources,
which formed the basic medium of exchange, continued until
certain changes were introduced which were soon intensified
by the needs for raw material in Europe.
The changes which began with the involvement of foreign
European chartered companies were later superceded by state
takeovers of the administration of the natural resources
industry in African territories i.e. by the states in which
the original companies vere incorporated. These takeovers
by the foreign states brought changes in the mineral industry*
further resulting in increased participation by the colonial
powers in all aspects of the mineral industry - exploration,
development, production, and marketing of mineral products
both in domestic and in foreign fields, receiving royalty
and imposing taxation.
Finally, it must be said that the various control devises
employed by the colonial powers in their African territories
resulted in a highly chaotic and shifting situation, which
provoked an awakening in the Metropolitan countries to the
value of mineral or natural resources to the national economies,
and to the fact that the mineral desposits were wasting assets




THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE UNITED NATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The previous Chapter disclosed that the control of
natural resources of the African territories by the African
Nations, was interrupted, when they became colonies of foreign
states. On attainment of independence, the African States
sought to re-establish their sovereignty over natural resources.
The venue chosen to put their case at a global level was the
United Nations, The issue was raised in 1952 at the eighth
Session of the Human Rights Commission,
In that Commission, delegates of the developing countries
were preoccupied with seeking international recognition of
their right to control natural resources for public purposes.
In their view the best way was by nationalization or state
takeover of foreign assets in the natural resources industry*
The delegates of developed countries were not opposed to this
right provided that in carrying it out, the developing countries
abided by the principles of international law requiring the
payment of adequate and prompt compensation.^
61. U.N. Doc. A/AC 97/S.R.22 at 6, the delegate from Sweden
noted that while the transfer of ownership was possible
through legislation, it should be in conformity with
generally recognized principles of international law,
which prescribe that compensation should be paid to the
dispossessed owners. See also U.N. Doc. A/AC 97/S.R.30
at p.7» U.S.A. Delegated view.
35.
The developing countries argued that having achieved
political independence, it was necessary for them to control
their resources, and utilise them for the benefit of their
people. In which case they upheld the right to expropriate




The high point of disagreement was reached, when a draft
resolution emphasizing the unlimited sovereign right of all
countries to exploit and dispose of their natural resources
as a constituent element of the right of economic self-
determination was passed in the Committee on Human Rights
iT o
in the following terms:-
•bearing in mind the need for encouraging the
underdeveloped countries in the proper use and
exploitation of their natural resources.
Considering that economic development of the under¬
developed countries is one of the requisites for
strengthening universal peace.
62. Prof. Gillian White - Nationalisation of Foreign Property
1961. B.A. Wortley, Expropriation in the Public Inter¬
national Law 1959 P« 25. Sacks, Les reclamation
diplomatique contres les Soviets 1939 P. 20. Kunz,
Mexican Expropriation contemporary phaphlets series 5
1940 pp. 54-55. S. Friedmann, Expropriation in Inter¬
national Law 1953 p. 1142. Expropriation for public
utility is supported in Judicial decisions for example
in Walter Fletcher Smith a U.S. citizen*s land was
expropriated by the Cuban Government, The presiding
Judge disqualified the Cuban Expropriation because it
was not based on public utility, which Art. 32 of the
Cuban Constitution itself advocates. See Whiteman -
Damages in International Law Vol. 2 pp. 1408-1412, See
also 2 U.N. R.I.A.A. p. 901 Goldenberg Case, for the
views expressed by the arbitrator see p. 909. See also
P.W. Shefeldt v. the Government of Guatemala 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.
at 1079 P. 1095.
63. G.A, Res. 5th Feb. 1952.
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remembering that the right of the people freely to
use and exploit their natural resources is inherent
in their sovereignty.
recommends member states to maintain proper respect
for the rights of each country freely to use and
exploit its natural resources as a necessary factor
in its progress and economic development and therefore
to refrain from the use of any measures such as might
Jeopardise the execution of a programme of integrated
economic development or economic stability of tinder-
developed countries gjjd economic cooperation amongst
the world at large••
The value of the above proposition is dependent on the status
of self-determination in international law.
A. Legal Nature of Self-determination
An argument was put forward by the developed countries
that the principle of self-determination was a political and
65
not a legal right. It was also maintained that such a
principle had no place in covenants on Human Rights. One may
agree with the above views, if one relies on the fact that
before the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, the
principle of self-determination as a legal right, cannot be
said to have existed, although it was often the basis of many
movements for independence and succession. For instance in
Aaland case between Sweden and Finland, which was all about
whether the Islanders who were under Finnish jurisdiction
could opt to join Sweden in the exercise of the right to
64. U.N. General Assembly Official Record 9th Sess. 3rd
Committee A/C 3/SR 570#
65» U.N. ECOSOC Council Official Record 32nd Sess. 1178th
meeting at 172.
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self-determination, especially in the view of the fact that
Finland itself obtained Independence from Russia in recognition
of that right# Sweden wanted the people to decide their
future in plebiscite, but Finland insisted the demand was
interferring with its domestic Jurisdiction# The Committee
of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League of Nations
to examine the case found thatI
'••••Positive International Law does no# recognise
the right of national groups as such to separate
themselves from the state of which they form part
by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it
recognises t£p right of other states to claim such
separation*•
At the initiative of Soviet delegates at San Francisco
the principle was inserted in Art# 1(2) of the Charter of
the United Nations#^ The article enumerates as one of the
purposes of the Charter, the development of friendly relations
among nations, based upon respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of the peoples. On the same
Issue of self-determination Judge Nervo said in the South West
Africa case that concepts of equality and freedom regardless
of colour 'will inspire the vision and conduct of the peoples,
the world over until the goal of self-determination is reached'.
He stated furthers
66, League of Nations Official Journal Special Supplement
no, 3 1920 p.5.
67# Russel and Muther History of United Nations Charter
1958 P. 811#
68# ICJ Report 1966 p. 457•
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...•the sacred trust of civilisation (the mandate
system) is a legal principle and a mission whore
fulfillment was introduced to more civilised nations
until a gradual process of self-determination makes
the people of the mandated territories able to stand
by themselves in the strenuous conditions of the
modern world,* J
It was on this basis that developing countries argued that
the enjoyment of every other Human Right stems from the
principle of self-determination,
B, Self-determination in the United Nations
In the practice of the United Nations, there has been
a consistent affirmation of the principle of self-determination
as a legal and basic human right. At the fifth Session, the
Assembly recognized the principle of self-determination as a
70
fundamental human right. At the sixth Session It directed
the Committee on Human Rights to include in draft of the
71
covenant on human rights an article on self-determination,
72
This, the Commission implemented. The article adopted by
the Commission included the concept of sovereignty over natural
resources — a concept which has been accepted as a constituent
69• Ibid, pp, 465-6,
70, G,A. Resolution 421 (V).
71, Ibid 565 (VI).
72, See Report of the 3th Session of the Commission on Human
Rights U.N, ECOSOC 14th Session Supp. No. 4 E/2256 of 19 52.
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element of self-determination. It is concerned with the
sovereignty of a state to control and dispose of its natural
resources subject to some limitations. The article so adopted
received the approval of the Commission in 1955# On a sub¬
sequent occasion, the General Assembly reaffirmed the principle
7k
of self-determination generally' and in relation to specific
75
non-self-governing territories. The Security Council of
the United Nations also recognised the principle of self-
determination.'''^
Evidently the argument that self-determination is a
political and not a legal right has been rejected by the
77
United Nations. In fact Rosalyn Higgins is of the opinion
73. G.A. Resolution 131*1 12th Dec. 1953.
7*1. Ibid, 1188 (XII) G.A. Resolution 637A (VIIl).
75• For the detailed study of occasions on which the General
Assembly invoked the principle of self-determination,
see the following - G.A. Res. 5*i5(Vl)j 1188(XIl)j 11th
December 1957» 637A (VIl) 16th December 1952,
On specific territories see G.A. Resolution 1819 (XVTl)
of 18th Dec. 1962 on Angola, Resolution 1573 (XV) of
19th Dec. on Algeria, 1951» Resolution (XVIIl) of 11th
Dec. 1955 on Fiji, Resolution (XVIII) of 11th Dec. 1963
on British Guinea, Resolution 1807 (XVTl) 14th Dec.
1962 ibid. XVIII 11th Dec. 19^9 on Aden. Resolution
(XVIII) 1952 11th December 1963 Northern Rhodesia.
76. Security Council Resolution of 9th June 1961 - U.N.
Security Council Official Record 18th Supp. April-June
S/4835 of 31st July 19*>3. See also Security Council
Official Record July-September S/5380 and Cor. 11 on
former Portugese Colonies.
77. China U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 9th Sess, 3rd Committee
135/A/C.2/SR570); France ibid 3rd Committee 1I6/A/C.3/SR556.
Report on 10th Sess. of Commission on Human Rights
U.N. ECOSOC Official Record 18th Sess. Supp. No. 7
36/E/25/73 195*1.
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that declarations taken together with so many years of evolving
practice by the U.N« Organs provide ample evidence that there
exists a legal right to self-determination which within certain
limits does not admit of reservations of Art. 2(f),
The United Nations has passed resolutions on Cyprus,
Morocco, Tunisia, and other territories which ultimately made
their impact on administering powers. In fact Portugal has
Just implemented the resolution by granting independence to
79
its former colonies of Mozambique and Angola.
C. The Views of Publicists
As for the validity of the concept of self-determination
in international law, the opinion of Jurists differ. For
example Professor Schwarzenberger is of the opinion that 'the
principle of self-determination is a normative principle of
great potency, but not yet part and parcel of international
80
law*. On the same issue, L.C. Green said that it is not a
right under international law; customary international law
does not recognize such a right, and as yet there are but few
78. Higgins, Rosalyn — The Development of International Law
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations
Organisations I963 p.104.
79. By advancing the dependent nations to independence, the
former major administering Powers have given firm
recognition to the principle of self-determination in
regard to colonial people. See International Legal
Materials, Vol. 13 1974 P. 1467.




treaties that concede it. On the other hand, legal writers
from the Communist bloc uphold self-determination as a principle
of international law, since it is a precondition for peaceful
82
coexistence. Levin argues that "the principle of self-
determination of nations expresses the law, consciousness of
the masses. It has also become a primary international legal
principle,"8^ Lachs maintained that the Charter of the
United Nations merely restated the existing law. Further
he maintained that, all the Charter provision did, was to
conform and lay down in writing a principle that had long
been growing and maturing in international society, until it
gained general recognition thus giving expression to (one
of the elements of) international law of our time. In one
of his articles, he contended that "self-determination is a
definite legal principle" and it is laid down in the Charter
of the United Nations, the most solemn document, which is
binding on ,,, states of the world today. On this very principle
other elements are built. From it emanates both right and
81
duties in international relations".
81, Report of the 47th Conference of International Law
association 1956, P«5®»
82, Vyskinsky The Law of Soviet State 1948 p, 249•
83, Levin The Principle of Self—determination of Nations
in International Law - Soviet Yearbook of International
Law 1962 p,48.
84, Lachs — The Law in and of the United Nations Organisation
- Indian Journal of International Law 1961 P» 432,
85, Lachs, Some Reflections on the Problem of Self-determination
- Review of Contemporary Law 1957 P«2. See also Babrov,
R.L, Basic Principles of Present Day International Law in
(Tunkin — Edited) Contemporary International Law 1969 P.51#
Baratashvili D, International Law and the States of
Asia and Africa 1968 p, 35,
In the Western World, there is convincing evidence that
self-determination has been recognised as a principle of
international law, despite its lack of precise definition.
As far back as 1920, P.M. Brown admitted that self-determination
was a fundamental principle of international law and order,
though undefined, and though no rules for its application had
been formulated. Whatever may be the difficulty in its
application, he maintained that only in self-determination
characterised by coiranon consent rather than coercion was to
be found the freedom, prosperity, and happiness of Central
86
Europe and the whole world. Quincy Wright looks at the
principle from the same perspective as Brown, as an emerging
principle resulting from the modern feeling for internationalism
directed chiefly at decolonisation, respect for which obligation
is undertaken under the Charter; but he added that "Whether
it can be reduced to rules of law sufficiently precise to
R*7
admit of Judicial application is doubtful." Ross admits
that it is quite impossible to define by any precise or
88
rational criterion the group to which this right belongs.
86. P.M. Brown, Self-determination in Central Europe -
American Journal of International Law Vol. 14 1920
P. 235.
87. Quincy Wright; The Role of International Law 19^1 P.28.
88. Ross, Constitution of the United Nations, 1950 p.135.
*3-
Elihu Lauterpacht is of the view that international law
acknowledges the principle of self-determination, thus providing
the meeting point of customary law and democratic principle.
Indeed, it is in this area of self-determination that (so far)
the development of human rights in the international sphere
as governed by customary international law has made its
89
greatest progress, Rosalyn Higgins suggests that it is
inescapable that self-determination has developed into an
international right and is not an essentially domestic matter
but the extent and scope of the right is still open to some
90
debate, S.J. Starke points out, that there is now "a wider
general recognition of the right of self-determination and
of the correlative duty of states administering dependent
91
territories to transfer power to the people thereof".
Ian Brownlie states unequivocally that 'self-determination is
92
a legal principle.' Among the writers from the developing
countries self-determination as a legal principle has been
acceptedj thus Umozurike concludes that 'the legal nature
89. E. Lauterpacht, Some Concepts of Human Rights, Harvard
Law Journal, 1965 PP» 270-1.
90. Higgins, R. op. cit. p. 103 (note 78).
91. S.J. Starke - An Introduction to International Law 1967
p. 116 (6th ed.)
92. Brownlie, Principles of International Law 1966 p. k8k
(1st ed.)
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of the principle of self-determination, though rejected by-
some, is receiving a wider acknowledgement by the text writers
of the world.1^
The International Commission of Jurists which is concerned
with the development of law in response to changes in human
relations resolved at a Congress held in Athens in 1955 as
follows:-
(a) The recognition of the right to self-determination
being one of the greatest achievements of our time, and one
of the fundamental principles of international law, its non-
application is emphatically condemned.
(b) Justice demands that people or ethnic or political
minorities be not deprived of their natural rights and especially
of the fundamental rights of man and citizens or of equal
treatment for reasons of race, colour, class, political
g/j.
conviction, caste or creed.'
There was no doubt as to the legality of the principle
of self-determination during the time the Pacific Charter was
93* Umozurike 0., Self-determination in International Law
1972 p. 80. See C.N. Okeke - A Controversial Subject
of International Law 197^ P» 111 •
9k, International Commission of Jurists Congress held in
Athens in 1955 Resolution 3, Committee on Public Law
Resolution 3$ See also the Rule of Law and Human Rights
Principle and Definitions (international Commission of
Jurists- Geneva 1966), See also Yearbook of International
Law 197^ Vol. II Part One p.7.
45.
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drawn in 1954, and by the Conference of Non-aligned States
held in Belgrade in September 1961 and in Cairo in October
1964^^ (forty seven States). The first World Conference of
Lawyers on World Peace through the Law, in their declaration
of general principles for a World Rule of Law adopted a
Resolution to this effect:
"In order to establish an effective international legal
system under the rule of law which precludes resort to
force. ¥e declare that ... a fundamental principle of
the international rule of law is that of self—determination
of the people as proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations."
In the light of the above evidence, it is observed that
the views of writers on the principle of self-determination
are not identical. Regardless of the fact that the majority
of writers favour the practice of the United Nations - i.e.
accept the principle of self-determination as law - there are
others whc doubt the legality of self-determination in inter¬
national law because there are as yet few treaties that concede
98
it. The latter view can be contested on the examination of
95• This Charter was proclaimed in Manila by Austria, France,
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Phillipines, Thailand, United
Kingdom, and United States of America. They agreed to
uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of the peoples and they will earnestly strive by every
peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure
the independence of all countries, whose people desire
it and are able to undertake its responsibility - see
Umozurike op. cit. p. 186 footnote no. 37.
96. Indian Journal of International Law Vol. 4 1964 p. 599.
97. American Journal of International Law Vol. 58, 1964,
at 143 PP. 138-151.
98. See above footnote No. 81.
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state practice. For example the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on
99
Sudan, granted self-determination to the Sudanese people.
Again the France-Algerian Treaty of Evin 1962, though concluded
with dependent territory, had a character or international
treaty and was regarded as such by the party. It dealt with
self-determination for Algeria with the view to creating new
state. It must be added that the U.N. Charter %M A treaty
to which many states are party. By ratifying the Charter
states have undertaken under Article 1 and 55 to develop
friendly relations among: 'nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of the people.
Under Art. 56 all members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the organisation for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Art. 55#
In the above circumstances, it is possible to state that
the weight of opinion and authorities for regarding self-
determination as a legal principle have increased.
The second phase of the disagreement between the capital
importing and capital exporting countries started, when the
Commission on Human Rights decided in the third committee of
the General Assembly Ninth Session to include an article on
the right of self-determination to read:
99. U.N.T.S. Vol. 161 p. 157 Agreement between Egypt and
Great Britain concerning self government and self-
determination for the Sudan.
100. American Journal of International Law Vol. 56 1962 p. 116.
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"The right of peoples to self-determination also
includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence on th^0^rounds of rights that may be claimed
by other states".
The above proposition was criticised by industrial nations
as being imprecise and also containing threats likely to
102
impede international economic cooperation.
After lengthy exchanges of views by both parties, the
Committee decided to appoint a Working Party composed of
various representatives to revise the text of the above Art. 1.
It was significant that the Working Party was made up mainly
103
of representatives from the developing countries. However,
the Working Party attempted to reconcile the opposing views,
and reported to the Committee recommending a modification of
the previous text of Art. 1. In the new operative paragraph,
the principle of permanent sovereignty was implicitly maintained,
and it read thus t
"the peoples may for their ends freely dispose of
their natural resources without prejudice to any
obligation arising out of international economic
cooperation based on the principle of international
law. In no case may a^g^ople be deprived of its own
means of subsistence."
101. U.N. Document £.2573 Annex 1 (Commission on Human Rights)
102. Ibid A/3077 (Report of Third Committee) p.24.
103. The Working Party was made up of the following represent¬
atives:- Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Greece, India,
Pakistan, Poland, Syria and Venezuela.
104. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/1. 489 Cor, 1 and 2.
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The reference to obligations arising out of International
economic cooperation, and based on international law, was
meant to allay any fears regarding foreign investments in
developing countries. Although the latter text won a majority
of votes, there was still a feeling that it ought to include
an explicit provision against expropriation without adequate
105
compensation. The latter case was dealt with by a Commission,
which was set up to study the status of Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources.
II. The Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resoiaamaa
Intypduotj,^
The focal point of the work of the Commission on Permanent
Sovereignty was basically whether a nation's sovereign right
over its natural resources, is a qualified right i.e. limited
by the obligations and responsibilities arising out of inter¬
national law. In the Commission, one group of states mainly from
the Socialist bloc, advocated an unrestricted right to nationalise
foreign private property, and in pursuance to this submitted
the following proposal to*-
MConfirm the inalienable right of peoples and nations
to the unobstructed execution of nationalization,
expropriation and other essential measures aimed at
the protecting and strengthening of their national
sovereignty" •
105. See United States Mission to U.N. Press Release 2301
of November 29th 1955.
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Notwithstanding the above proposition, the sane bloc further
suggested that any paragraph dealing with nationalisation
should embody the proposition that j-
(States) unreservedly support measures taken by the
people and states to establish or strengthen their
sovereignty over natural resources and consider
inadmissible acts aimed at obstructing the ore^^on
defence and strengthening of that sovereignty.
Delegates from 2 developing countries proposed an
107
amendment, which reflected the same sentiments. Another
group of states, mainly from the capital exporting countries,
argued that there should be restrictions on the exercise of
sovereignty. After lengthy arguments and exchanges of views,
the capital exporting countries won the exclusion of the
paragraph beginning "unreservedly supports" on the ground that
it upset the balance delicately struck in the Ninth Commission*s
108
text between sovereign rights and obligations. Accordingly
operative paragraph 4 of the Resolution provides, in the event
of nationalisation, for payment of appropriate compensation.
106. U.N. Doc. A/AC.97 L.2 and Rev. 1. The Soviet delegate
opposed Chilean draft on the ground that it did not
contain an inalienable right of the people to nationalize
and expropriate property in a general interest. See
U.N. Doc, A/AC,97.SR.32 pp. 7-8,
107* United Arab Republic and Afganlstan felt that the
Resolution lacked factual data a|| the method of
indigenous participation and financing of exploitation
of natural resources • U.N. Doc, A/AC,97 L,4,
108. See above footnote 104,
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Despite the defeat of the Soviet proposal on (the issue
of) nationalisation the United Nations (Study Group) Commission
109
produced other proposals. The United Nations General
Assembly alsovcommented on many Resolutions.Of all the
Resolutions perhaps the most important, from a legal point
of view, was Res. 1803 (XVXl), usually referred to as the
declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources.
It was adopted in the form of eight principles, which can be
analysed as follows*
A« Congep.t
1. The rights of States to control and utilise natural
resources.
In paragraph 1 of the Resolution it is stated that the
right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their natural resources must be exercised in the interest of
the national development and veil-being of the people concerned.**'
In this respect, the declaration emphasizes the importance
of natural resources in the life of every state} and their
role in the development of economic stability and adequate
living standards for the citizens of each State.
109. U.N. Doc, A/AC.97/5/R©v. 2, U.N. Docs, E.5170 and A/8058.
(The resolutions deal on the Status of Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources),
110. Resolutions 626 (VIII) of 21 December 1952* 1515 (XV)
of 15th December 1960j 1803 (XVII) of 14th December 1962j
2158 (XXI) of 12th Nov. 1966| 2356 (XXIII) of 19th Nov.
1968| 2692 (XXV) of 11th Nov. 1970| 3016 of 18th Dec.
1972| 3167 (XXVIII) of 17th Dec. 19731 3171 (XXVIII)
of 5th Feb. 197^ and 3201 (s-VTl).
111. G.A, Res, 1803 XVII paragraph 1.
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2. Respect for State rights
The declaration similarly stresses, in paragraph 5, that
the beneficial and free exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of states
sovereign rights of stat es over their natural resources will be
enjoyed equally by all, consistent with the general principles
of international law. In this context, legal equality in the
exercise of sovereignty over natural resources may be under¬
stood to mean equal protection by international law, of the
rights of states over natural resources, equal and identical
application and interpretation of the respective rules by
international courts and tribunals, notwithstanding the factual
economic inequalities of states.
Xt also means that no obligation may be imposed upon
sovereign states without their consent, direct or indirect,
general or particular, given in advance or ad hoc. The
requirement of respect of equal sovereignty in the control of
natural resources is supported by Professor Schwarxenbergsr who
maintains that t-
"In a legal system which is composed of more than one
independent state and is dominated by an individualistic
outlook on the part of its members, equality is ths only
practical working basis. Only en this footing can a
number of sovereign states oo-exist in one and the same
international society; viewed from this angle equality
of state*.is the corollary of the coexistence of sovereign
states." J
112. Xbid, paragraph 5*
113. Prof. Schwarzenberger, International Law, 3rd Ed. Vol. 1
based on their sovereignty
112
This presupposes that ths
p.125
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On examining the Declaration one finds many interesting
stipulations. For example in paragraph 7 the Declaration
states that violation of the right of peoples and nations over
their natural resources is contrary to the spirit of the
United Nations Charter and hinders the development of inter-
114
national cooperation.
The linking of the observance of the principles of the
Declaration to that of the Charter of the United Nations
indicates its importance to the members of the international
community and the vorld at large. in that respect the dis¬
regard of states sovereign right over their natural resources
is not only contrary to the U.N. Charter but also a violation
of the principles of international lav, and peaceful co-existence
of members of the international community - rich and poor,
developed and developing. It is also a non-recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
ail members of the family of nations as the foundation of
freedom, Justice and peace in the vorld.
B. hxerclse of the rights
The Declaration not only indicates the aims of the exercise
of sovereignty over natural resources, but goes further in
suggesting the method of implementing such undertakings. Thus
in paragraph 2 it is stated that the exploration, development
114. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII) paragraph 7
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and disposition of such resources should bo in conformity with
the rules and conditions which people and nations freely consider
to be necessary or desiraole with regard to the authorisation,
115
restriction or prohibition of such activities.
In the first place* the ei^hasis is on the exploitation
of the resources on freely agreed terms by the parties. On
the other hand it stresses the duty of states to refrain In
their international relations from military, political, economic
or any other form of coercion aimed against the political
independence or territorial integrity of any state. Since
any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and the
letter of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, it
also leads to a situation which puts world peace and economic
relations in Jeopardy.
In this respect the resolution seeks to avoid the sort
of intervention that typified American policy in South
American States during the latter part of the nineteenth century
- a situation which today would undoubtedly be treated as
contrary to the spirit and the principles of the Charter and
hindering the development of international economic co-operation
and maintenance of world peace.11^
115* Xbid, paragraph 2.
116. Uaosurike op. cit. p. 209 (note 93)*
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2. The taking of private property for valid reasons.
Concerning the saiae issue of implementation of the
principles of sovereignty over natural resources* the early part
of paragraph 4 states that nationalization and expropriation
shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security
or national interest which are recognised as overriding
purely individual or private Interests, both domestic and
foreign.
In the above case, the Declaration advocates that state
takeover of private property should not be embarked upon
arbitrarily, but for valid reasons of public purposes, or ths
security of the nation, or national interest. Before examining
the prerequisites for state taking of private property, as
enumerated by the Declaration, it should be observed that the
Declaration has extended the motive for state takeover of
private property beyond what used to be the orthodox limitation
i.e. public utility.
U) PMW.c Purpope?
This principle ie defined in section 1 above, which deals
with the concept of the resolution. The salient point in
this case Is that the state taking of private property should
*
not be discriminatory, although it may be for the well-being
of the citizens of states concerned. Under contemporary
international law, the arbitrary or discriminatory taking of




to In various Judicial decisions. For example in the
Oscar Chan Case the Permanent Court of International Justice
said that:
"the form of discrimination which is forbidden is
therefore discrimination based on nationality, and
involving different treatment by reasons of their
nationality, as between persons belonging to different
groups" .
Unlawful discrimination includes both legal and de facto measures
which have the effect of undermining equality in law or in fact
between nationals and foreigners. Xt is obviously impossible
to speak of equality in law, whenever the law though in
general terms, is interpreted or applied in a manner calculated
either to favour or to injure one particular social group as
compared with others.
Another case of unlawful expropriation is when it is
carried out in contravention of a treaty. On the question of
relevance of the purpose of expropriation to question of
international responsibility, it has been recognised that
119
expropriation is legitimate for reasons of public utility.
117. P.C.I.J. Series A/b No. 63 1 93^ P-87. See also Art. 5
of the Draft Convention on the Responsibility of States
for Injuries Done in its Territory to the Person or
Property of Foreigners. A state has a duty to afford
to an alien means of redrsss for injuries which are not
less adequate than the means of redress afforded to its
nationals.
118. P.C.X.J. Series A/B No. 63.
119. The Permanent Court of International Justice in Polish
Upper Silesia (Merits) Case cook the position that
expropriation for reasons of public utility, Judicial
and similar reasons was lawful, P.C.I.J. Series A
No. 7 P* 22. See Prof. O. White, Nationalisation of
Foreign Property 1961 p.5.
5i>
In the Goldenberg arbitration public utility- was mentioned ae
120
one necessary element of legal expropriation* It follows
therefore that expropriation other than for public utility
could be an unlawful measure. Illegality thus arises from
discrimination.
(li) Security
The unequal distribution of natural resources on earth,
especially mineral resources, has in the history of man led
to economic inequality, wars of conquest, and colonisation.
Although the Declaration does not specify security, one may
think in terras of military seourity and economic stability.
The importance of security in the life of a nation is to
avoid intervention in its affairs whether in the form of
military operations or economic embargo.
The importance of minerals in national security has made
many countries intensfy the control of this particular natural
121
resource even in the war and peace time. It is only when all
122
the countries feel secure that real world peace will emerge.
The importance of national security in terms of production of
resources can be seen from the fact that metals of all kinds are
120. 2 U.N. R.l.A.A. 1928, p.909*
121. C.K. Leith. World Mineral and World Peace 1931, P» 138.
122. Ibid, p. 147.
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consumed in vast amounts during wartime; and the drain
of world reserve of mineral fuels is then increased many times
in order to keep factories producing at maximum capacity and
to propel military ships, planes and other vehicles. In short
a country with the most industrial potential is one with the
military power, and this is dependent on the amount of natural
resources it controls.
In fact the necessity for security has been emphasized
124
in many African laws. For example Art. 99 of the Mining
Code of Somali, stipulates that:
"In the event of war duly declared, the Secretary shall
have the right of pre-emption of all minerals under any
permit, licence, or lease, and all products thereof and
shall have the right to take control of the mining
operations from the holder for such time as the state of
war exists.**
Security, in terms of economic stability, gives rise to the
desire to attain self-aufficioncy* Many countries are already
125
aiming at this, or have partially achieved it.
125. Leitli C.K. The World Iron and Steel Situation in its
hearing on French Occupation of the Ruhr, See Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 1 1923, pp. 13<$-151 ♦
124. Libyan Oil 1954 - 1971 p. 14, published by the Ministry
of Petroleum Libya Arab Republic. See also Somali Law
No. 77 22nd Nov, 1970 Art. 99-
125. In certain minerals, some countries are self-sufficient, for
example oil and gold can be found in abundance in V.S.S.R. '
Iron ore in France, and Britain is aiming to be self-
sufficient in oil in 1980.
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(ill) National Interest
National interests differ Just as much as the states
themselves. Only states can determine their national interest,
any form of taking of foreign property to attain it, which is
not discriminatory is within the lav. This view was expressed
hy the arbitrator in the P.V. Shufeldt Case which arose out
of a Guatemalan Decree of Hay 22, 1928 nullifying a concession
given in 1922 to Shufeldt, a United States citizen. The
Decree whereby the concession was nullified gave the following
reasons:
(a) the contract was harmful to national interest
(b) it was within the legislative attribute of that
state to disapprove such contracts. The arbitrator, having
considered reasons (a) and (b) above, said:
"It is within the competence of the Government of
Guatemala to enact any decree they like and for any
reasons they felt and such reasons are no concern of
this Tribunal. But this Tribunal is only concerned
where such a decree, passed even on.the best of grounds,
works injustice to alien subjects.4*
In most African state practice, specific land areas of national
interest are specified wherein no exploration or prospecting
127
should be carried on. In some cases, a state agent is
empowered to take any land for public works regardless of
128
whether a concession is granted on it or not, but this
form of taking is always indemnified*
126. 2 U.N. R.X.A.A. 1079 at p. 1095.
127* National Congolese (Zaire) Mining Legislation No. 1
Statute No. 67-231 11th May 1967. Section IV Art. 46(a)
(1) and (2).
128* Tennessee Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, 21 at March,
1962, XV Schedule Art. 29, reads - "notwithstanding the
rights conferred on the Lessee, use of land under this
lease, the Minister shall have power at any time to require
that any area or areas of the leased area which may from ,
time to time be required for villages, new village extensions!
water/
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c* UJ&J&JAm 9B exercise of p.pverelfflty
1 • Payraoiit pi comp«mptttiftn
Hie latter part of paragraph k states that In eases of
taking of private property an appropriate compensation should
be made in accordanoe with the rules in force in that State
and in accordance with international law. Obviously the
agreement of domestic and international rules on the appropriate-
ness of compensation is the ideal situation, giving rise to
no legal controversy. On the other hand, though it is incumbent
on the national law to decide the appropriate measure„ such
measures must be Judged in accordance with international
practice.
The unresolved lesue in this area of international law
is what is the adequacy and appropriateness of compensation.
As for the form and standard of compensation, there has been
a divergence of views concerning the form payment should
take. For example the Soviet doctrine maintains that inter¬
national law does not have a uniform practice or generally
recognised rule obligating states to pay compensation to the
owners of nationalised property. "Justice demands not
compensation to the foreign monopolies but restitution by the
Colonialist for the harm they caused to the colonies and their
129
people by prolonged colonial rule"• Professor Yortley on the
water reserves or for any other public purpose shall be
excluded from the area of surface operation...
129* Sapoxhinkov, Sovereignty over Natural Resources - Soviet
Yearbook of International Law 1959 p. 23.
6G ,
other hand, maintained that "a state has as a matter of domestic
Jurisdiction the power to take property in its control for
securing the common good of the state." When it does so, by
providing prompt and adequate compensation, no loss will result
and no wrong will have been done, even to foreignersi by the
lex situs at any rate, no international wrong will have been
130
committed, which will give rise to any claim for compensation*
Prof. G. White pointed out that the traditional formula of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation retains some value
as a convenient expression of the desired aims, but it must net
131
bo regarded as a technical rule for assessment of compensation.
On the same issue Prof. Schwarssenberger takes the view that the
difference between the terms "full* and "adequate" compensation
132
is merely one between synonyms. Prof. Bin Cheng states that
in certain cases, Just compensation falls below full compensation)
moreover quantum of coopensation for expropriation, however in
practice it may be computed, though it must be Just, fair, or
»
1 11
equitable, need not necessarily be full. Aaerasinghe is
of the opinion that no clear exposition of the principle behind
130® Prof. Wortley, Expropriation in International Law, 1959 P. 23.
131. Prof. G. White, op, cit, p. 243 (note 119).
132, Prof. Sohwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International
Law, 1969 p. 10.
133* Prof. Bin Cheng, The Rationale of Compensation for
Expropriation, 44 Grotius Transaction 1958-9 pp. 267-294.
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the rule of adequate compensation iias been given in state
1 34
practice*
The Mexican government relied on this conflict of principle
as is reflected in their note sent to the U.S. Government on
expropriation by Mexico of agrarian properties owned by an
American citizen.
"there does not exist in international law any principle
universally accepted by countries nor by writers of
treatises on this subject, that makes obligatory the
giving of adequate compensation for expropriation of
a general and impersonal character. Nevertheless Mexico
admits in obedience to her own laws, that she is indeed
under obligation to indemnify in adequate manner, but the
doctrine which she maintains on the subject which is based
on the most authoritative opinions of writers of treatises
on international law, is that the time and mcnmer of such
payment must be determined by her own laws."
The United States of America's note to Mexico countered
the Mexican argument as follows s
"The doctrine of equality of treatment, like that of
Just compensation, is of ancient origin} it appears in
many constitutions, bills of right and documents of
international validity. The word has invariably referred
to equality in lawful rights. There is now announced
by your Government the astonishing theory that the treasured
and cherished principle of equality designed to protect
both human and property rights is to be invoked not in
protection of personal rights and liberties, but a chief
ground of depriving and stripping individuals of their
conceded rights. Xt is contended in a word that it is
wholly Justifiable to deprive an individual of his rights
if all other persons are equally deprived and if no victim
is allowed to escape* Xn the instant case, it is contended
that confiscation is so Justified, the proposition scarcely
requires an answer. In addition it must be observed that
the claimants in these expropriation cases did not seek to
be creditors of the Mexican government. They wera, forced
into that position toy the act of Mexico itself."
134. Prof. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries done
to Aliens, <9t>7 p. 148.
135* Mexican Note to U.S. Government, See American Journal
of International Law Vol. 32, 1938 p. 186.
136, U.S. Government reply A.J.X.L. Vol. 32, 1938 p. 193.
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It can be seen that before the Declaration on Sovereignty
over Natural Resources there wore two major legal doctrines
relating to the measurement of compensation. One of the
doctrines was upheld by the Latin American group of developing
countries under the so called 'Calvo doctrine' and another
by the industrialised countries of the Vest* The former group
maintained that the question of condensation is governed wholly
by the municipal law and the only international law obligation
recognised by their government was to give foreign investors
equal treatment with nationals* thus where their citizens wore
not compensated for public taking of their property foreigners
1 37
have no hotter chance* On the other hand* the industrial!sed
states uphold the view, that it is an established rule of
international law, that acts of expropriation of foreign
owned assets place the nationalizing government under obligation
1 38
to pay adequate and prompt compensation.
The position of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development on the issue of compensation is uncertain. In
the third general principle governing international trade
relations, adopted by the Conference it states that:
137* The Calvo doctrine on compensation is contained in the
Constitution of the following states: Bolivia 1945 Art* 18;
Costa Rica 1947 Art* 19 as amended} Equador 1946 Art* 177}
El Salvador 1950 Art. 19} Guatemala 1956 Art. 59}
Honduras 1957 Art. 37} Mexico 1917 Art. 27} Nicaragua 1950
Art. 26, 28} Venezuela 1953 Art. 49*
133. U.N. Doc. A/A.97 SR 30 at 7. So# also U.N. Gen. Ass.
Rec. 17th Session 2nd Comm. A/C.2/8 R. 835 1962*
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"Every state has the sovereign right freely to dispose
of its natural resources in the interest of the economic
development and well-being of its people1 .
139
The Conference never mentioned the duty to pay compensation.
However the views of both sides were fully represented in the
course of debates in the Commission on Sovereignty over Natural
Resources. In this context the Declaration of the Principle
of Sov seignty over Natural Resources is both significant and
relevant as it formulated a compromise between the extremists
of both sides* It neither endorsed the claims of the less
industrialised states* that compensation is purely a matter of
internal discretion, nor the claims for full and prompt compen¬
sation usually made by the Industrialisod nations* It is in
this context that the appropriateness of compensation advocated
by the Resolution should be accepted.
One learned author supported the new trend towards the
appropriate standard, urging the development of Western
principles of law regarding protection of property in conjunction
i ■ ; ,
with the principles and practice of development aid, since
private investment in developing countries is today linked
1 hO
with public aid* This midway approach is also defended
by the same author, on the following grounds J- In the first
139* Final Act, June 1964, U.N. Doc. E/Con.46.L.28, Annex A.
140. Prof. V. Friedman, Social Conflict and Protection of
Foreign Investment (Proceedings of American Society of
International Law) 1963 p. 127*
64*
instance, it la the only way to minimize the cold war between
the underdeveloped countries and developed countries*
Obviously this view has political undertones, but it is
strengthened by the present demand for the reorientation and
remoulding of international law to cope with the impact of
social, economic and political change#• Secondly* ho argues
that the insistence on full compensation advocated by
industrialised nations, which includes the loss of future
earnings and similar opportunities, would render the distinction
between lawful and unlawful nationalisation meaningless* Sines
full damages are ordinarily awarded as a compensation for
wrongful expropriation#, what is the use of such a distinction,
if the same standard would apply to both lawful and unlawful
measures? Me is also of the opinion that the legal consequences
of full compensation, with both direct and indirect damages
included, would constitute such a heavy burden in cases of
long term concessional agreements that national governments
would bo inhibited from exorcising their theoretical freedom
of determination in the initiation of economic development
policies, which may necessitate the termination of such long-
term concessions. The government is in the end left with the
choice of either defying international obligations or desisting
from the exercise of the powers 'that all the capital-exporting
countries claim in their contractual relations with their
nationals". Finally, he maintains that the expected profits
65*
and other lost opportunities are themselves very difficult
to estimate and highly speculative under prevailing uncertainties
of international economies, which far exceed the economic
141
uncertainties within a given country.
Even the evaluation of direct losses is quite complex.
Historic or book costs may be unrealistic, while replacement
costs may not meet the desires of either party. The private
foreign investor would be unhappy in cases where th© development
of modem technology made it less expensive to produce the
original equipment for the receipient country, and the
exchange will leave him (the investor) with less book assets,
which would necessitate a parallel reduction on the side of
the stockholder*s equity. On the other hand, many economic
development agreements provide for the government1s right
to take over all physical assets, at the end of the period
of duration of the agreement. It would seem unjust mo award
the foreign investor the full replacement value of assets which
he would lose anyway after a number of years. Even if th©
government were to takeover the physical assets at th© end of
a concession, much of the equipment might be oo specialised as to
render it useless for any other purpose, and it might be
uneconomic to transfer other equipment to different uses. Hence
the measure of compensation in this respect should depend on the
remaining useful life of assets taken.
141 . Ibid, p. 130.
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On the other hand, it is maintained that the constitutional
provisions of the Calvo countries are not entirely satisfactory,
because they provide for unilateral determination of both the
occasion and the amount of compensation by an interested party,
contrary to the legal principle nemo debet esse Judex in propria
causa« The view of the expropriated owner might be disregarded,
and no room is made either for a neogtiated settlement or
settlement by an impartial body; therefore the Calvo clause
gives much room for doubts, because the obligation of states
to pay compensation for taking foreign owned property cannot
be avoided by the provisions of the municipal laws of any state*
The primacy of international law obligations in all cases has
142
been authoritatively upheld by the World Court. Similarly
the equality or non-discrimination advocated by the contentious
Calvo doctrine, though interesting, is debatable, because it
may be unacceptable as a defence to breach of an international
law duty. This is because the traditional customary international
law and state practice uphold payment of adequate and prompt
compensation as obligatory, and the quantum of compensation
cannot be determined unilaterally by nationalising or
expropriating states. However there is a school of thought,
142. Fees Zones Upper Savoy Case P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B No. 46
p. 167; certain German Interest in l'ftlish Upper Silesia
PIC .I.J. Ser. A No. 7 p, 19, 1926; Chorozow Factory
Indemnity Case, P .C.I.J., Ser. A No. 7 PP* 33-4.
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which maintained that, In the absence or a treaty stipulation
freely undertaken by a state, international law does not make
14*j
payment of compensation obligatory. On the other Jtaiwi, the
traditional and widely accepted view is that the taking of
aliens property must generally be accompanied by payment of
adequate, prompt and effective compensation. Nevertheless,
there are instances, though limited, in which international law
allows taking of aliens property without corresponding adequate
and prompt compensation, such case includes among other things
punishment for crime, the state may revalue or diminish the
worth of property by regulation, either for iiealth reasons
145
or other public purposes - the exercise of eminent domain*
In the light of the fact that there Is no uniform formula arawg
writers on international law, and state practice, regarding the
criteria for determining compensation, coupled with the
difficulties of evaluation of direct losses, and anticipated,
profit in long term contractual duration, It is maintained
that the standard of appropriate compensation supported by t.!io
principle of unjust enrichment, will not only give the arbitrators
143* L. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law 1953
pp. 206-11, Sir John William Fisher, British Yearbook
of International Law, 1328 Vol. IX p. 28, Cavalghori
Revue General de Droit International Public Vol. XXXVIII
p. 257, at 236.
144. Prof. Wort ley op. cit. (note 130) Chap. VII, Faehlri,
L.Y.I.L. 1925 Vol. VI pp. 159-71. L.l. Nwogugu, Legal
Problem of Investment in Developing Countries, 1965, p.22*
145. Ibid, op. cit. p.2., Rubin, Private Foreign Investment,
1956 p. 32.
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more initiative for handling such cases according to circum¬
stances, hut also may be applied in all cases to ensure
equitable treatment for either party in the absence of any
other treaty stipulations.
Although the Resolution on sovereignty over natural
resources did not spell out the forei^r exchange difficulties,
involving the payment of compensation to foreign investors, its
provisions on appropriateness ray apply to tha form of payment.
However Professor Metzgor, in an interesting article on the
subject in the Virginia Law Review (Vol. 50, 1963) maintains
that there is no international law rule requiring that any
money, other than the local currency of a state, whether it is
convertible into foreign exchange or not, be paid for the
taken property, for the following reasons i
Firstly, he maintains, that articles of the International
Monetary Fund provide that member countries may prohibit capital
transfer across their borders. Hence the local currency receipts
from an expropriation may be refused remittance in foreign
exchange, as a capital transfer, unless the expropriating
government is under a treaty obligation to act otherwise.
Secondly, he maintains that the legislative history of the
Charter of the International Trade Organisation, especially
the note to Art* 12, reveals that a member country's obligation
to ensure the payment of just compensation to a foreign national
is essentially an obligation to make payment in the local
currency of that country. Thirdly, he emphasizes that a typical
69
American, treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation generally
recognises the right of the other contracting party to proiiibit
the remittance of the local currency paid as compensation for
the property taken under an expropriation measure, under
conditions of low exchange resources, if such remittance would
diminish the foreign exchange resources needed to secure
146
essential inports into that contracting country.
Hi© rule of compensation proposed by Professor Metzger
would complicate the standard of appropriate compensation. Most
underdeveloped countries impose oxcitange controls to cope with.
their foreign exchange difficulties, and moreover the receipt
of local currency would hardly be of any use to a foreign
investor, whoso expropriated investment was made possible by
Imported capital* For compensation to be effective, the
recipient must, in the words of the United Kingdom Memorial in
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case
"... be able to make use of it. He must for instance
be able, if he wishes to use it to sot up a new enterprise,
to replace the one that has been expropriated, or to
use it for such other purposes as he wishes» Monetary
compensation, which is in blocked currency is not effective
because where the person to be coiqpens&ted is a foreigner,
he is not in a position to use it, or to obtain the benefit
of it* The compensation therefore must be freely trans¬
ferable from the country paying it, and so far as the
country's restrictions are concerned, convertible into
other currencies".
146* Prof* Metzger, Property in International Law, Virginia Law
Review, Vol. 50 19&3 P* 601.
147* Memorial of the U.K., X.C.J. Pleadings, Anglo-Iranian
Case, 1952, p. 106 paragraph 309*
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In support of the above view expressed, Ainerasinghe maintains
that t
"although the general rule may be that payment must
be in convertible currency, it is submitted that there
is room for an exception as formulated above, that
where investment is possible in the nationalising state,
the income from such investment being comparable with
income from investment elsewhere, and that income may
be remitted abroad, payment may be made in the^gurreney
of the nationalising state or in securities.**
It seems Professor Metzger does not take into account the
prime purposes of the fund as set out in Art* 1 by which the
Fund is to be guided in all its decisions, some of which are;
"to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of
international trade, and to contribute thereby to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment
and real income and to the development of the productive
resources„of all members as primary objectives of economic
policy, and to promote exchange stability, to maintain
orderly exchange arrangements and to avoid competitive
exchange depreciation."
Undoubtedly, Professor Metzger would appreciate that his
proposition would disrupt the economy of the majority of loss
developed countries in that, if it were accepted, it would
necessitate developing countries printing more money to sweet
such payments, and thereby Jeopardising the economic equilibrium
which they might maintain under normal circumstances. It is
only necessary that commercial relationship be maintained by
148. Art. 3 (III) of the OBCI) draft convention stipulates that
compensation shall be transferable to the extent necessary
to make it effective for the national entitled thereto.
Prof. Amerasinghe op. cit. p. 162. The harvard draft of
1 961 Art. 10, 12 requires that the payment in the currency
or currency readily convertible unless otherwise specified
in a contract. See the Draft on A.J.I .L, Vol. 55 19&3
p. 533-566-583.
149* International Monetary Fund Agreement Art. 1 (ill) .
150. Ibid, Art. 1(lll). See Fawcett B.Y.I.L. Vol. XL 1964
pp. 32-76.
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taking- into account the difficulties of foreign exchange
problems of less industrialised countries - Asia, Africa and
Latin America.
The development of natural resources under ejqpropriated
concessions is a major contribution to the foreign exchange
earnings of the country, since the greater part of the produce
is exported* Xt would seem fair that the greater part of the
exports of nationalised industry or enterprises be used to pay
the necessary compensation.
In this case the standard of appropriate compensation would
mean that if the compensation is paid in local currencies, the
affected foreign investor should be allowed to make a capital
transfer in a foreign exchange gradually to the extent justified
by the earnings of the nationalised industry within the context
of the balance of payments needs of that country.
Xt is obvious that payment in local currency, if not
allowed to be transferred, can hardly be considered as appropriate
compensation. Xt could be said that the measure of compensation
introduced by the Declaration provides a guide line, which
demands further development. Xt is undeniable that international
law and relations can develop in this field through a series
151of ad hoc compromises out of which, in time, a general body
of principle of International etwnoiaic law may evolve.
151 • Prof. Friedman ~ Changing Structure of International Law
1963 PP. 360-1.
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2. Respect for Acquired Rights
152
The doctrine of acquired rights is recognised by writers,
and is often referred to in judicial decisions. The Declaration
on Sovereignty over Natural Resources does not ignore it, but
is entirely concerned with the application of the principle in
cases of state succession.
In the German Settlers in Poland Case, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, in ruling against the action
of Poland affecting the interest of Germans settled in that
territory, the sovereignty over which had passed to Poland
by cession after the First World War stated that;
"Even those who contest the existence in international
lav of general principles of state succession, do not
go as far as to maintain that private rights including
those acquired from the state aa the owner of the-*-
property are valid as against a successor state."
The court prefaoed this statement by noting that t
"the general question of whether and under what
circumstances a state may modify or cancel private
rights by its sovereign legislative power requires no
consideration here."
With regard to investments made in the colonial period,
most of the developing countries contest universal state
succession. They claimed, therefore, the right to review
152. Kaeckubeeek, The Protection of Vested Rights in International
Law R.Y.I.L. Vol. XVII p. 1, 1^6.
153» P.O.I.J. Series B No. 6, p. 36.
15^. Ibid.
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economic agreements entered into during their colonial dependency.
This agitation was behind the resolution passed in the Human
Rights Third Committee. The last sentence, paragraph 3 of the
article on Self ^termination reads:
"In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence on the grounds of any rights that may be
Claimed by others."
The above contention was not entirely favoured by the delegates
of industrialised countries, hence they sought to establish
the respect for the acquired rights of colonial investment to
1 "Sb
be recognised* As the delegates of developing countries
argued that rights acquired during the colonial era could be
abrogated at the discretion, they based their reasoning on
dormant continuing sovereignty in colonial period, and alleged
157
that such agreements were not freely entered into. In the
light of this fact, they proposed an amendment to be inserted
in preambular paragraph 3 between third and fourth to the
effect:
135. See footnote No. 101.
150. U.N. Doc. A/AC.97/SR.28 p. 3-5.
157* U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Roc. 17th boss. 2nd Committee 298
A/C.2/SJEt.846, 1962. The proposition was made by the
delegates from Algeria. It was supported by Ceylon
ibid 356 (A/C.2/SR.853, 1962), Indonesia ibid 3^1
A/C.2/SR.852, 1962, Syria ibid 3^9 A/C.2/SR .855. Yugoslavia
Ibid 298 A/C.2/SR.846, 1962.
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"that the obligation of international law cannot apply-
to an alleged right acquired before the accession to
full sovereignty of formerly colonized people or countries,
and that consequently such alleged acquired right must
be subject,, to review as between two equally sovereign
states."
159
Writers like Friedman shared the same view.
When it was learnt in the Committee on the Permanent
Sovereignty, that the International Law Coranission was studying
the issue of state succession and might deal with the prqbleais
of acquired rights, the members of the Permanent Sovereignty
Committee modified the difficulty of reaching decision by
adopting this proposalwhich became the preambular paragraphs
5 and 6 of the Declaration on the Principle of Exercise of
Sovereignty over Natural Resources. It reads thus:
"Considering that nothing in paragraph 4 below in any way
prejudices the position of any Member State in any
respect of the question of rights and obligations of
successor states and Governments in respect of property
acquired before the succession to complete independence
of countries formerly under colonial rule."
The view that colonial agreements require special treatment
and that the modification of rights acquired under such agree¬
ments should not be subject to rules of compensation is held
by many states especially by developing countries and the
161
Communist bloc. The inability of the General Assembly to
take a final decision on the issue leaves the validity of the
158. Ibid A/C.2/L.686 Rev. 2, 1962.
159. S. Friedman op. cit. p. 126.
160. U.N. Doc. A/C.2/L.686 Rev. 2, 1962.
161. See footnote No. 157*
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traditional principle debatable. However the reports of the®
Special Commission on the Law Concerning Acquired Rights show
realisation of the need to adopt the traditional principle
to changed circumstances
All that can be said is that the Declaration on the
Principle of Exercise of Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
has set in motion a movement that will enable the contending
parties to reach an acceptable compromise on the issue of
acquired rights.
D. Regime for importation of foreign capital
1. Authorisation by producing country.
In paragraph 3 the Declaration lays down that in cases
where authorisation is granted the capital imported and the
earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms of the
agreement between the producing country and the capital investor.
The profit derived from the utilisation of such capital must
be shared in a way agreed by the parties. Whatever the
arrangements, due care must be taken to ensure that there Is
no impairment, for any reason, of that state*s sovereignty
over its natural resources.
The above paragraph indicates that exercise of sovereignty
over natural resources does not exclude exchange restrictions!
or enactments which control the movement of currency, property,
162. U.N. Doc. Sales 62 V.6 p. SB (1?62).
76
and awviOM for the purpose of protecting the financial
resources of a given country. Such measures prima facie j .
constitute an integral part of & state's monetary policy and
are therefore considered to bo matters of an essentially
domestic nature beyond the scope of international regulation*
In every case, the importation of such capital is at the
discretion of the country concerned.
2. Co-operation in exchange of scientific infer;nation
The declaration categorically states in paragraph 6 that
international cooperation for the economic development of
developing countries, whether in the form of public or private
capital investment, exchange of goods and services, toe nical
services, technical assistance or exchange of scientific inform¬
ation , shall be such as to further their Independent, national
development, and shall be based en respect for their sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources.
The rationale of international economic cooperation in
exploitation of natural resources is based on the fact t tat
the resources are unevenly distributed. In reality the nequal
distribution of natural resources means that international
economic cooperation in this field is inescapable. Bven in
the 'have countries' many minerals and raw materials are not
produced in the quantities required.
The interdependence of nations has grow rapidly with
the expansion of the natural resources Industry* Cooperation
which, Involves both capital and technically rich and poor hut
resources owning countries will promote the international
division of labour, whereby each party contributes in the
area in which it has a comparative advantage* Moreover auoh
cooperation will be intensified as the continuous expansion of
industry calls for ever increasing quantities of mineral raw
iaaterials, especially from the great unexploited reserves*
With advances in technology new sources of minerals are being
discovered and thereby promoting further economic cooperation*
The geographic distribution of natural resources is suoh
that certain countries will always be poorly endowed as compared
to others. It follows that access to the product of natural
resources by the "have not" countries is essential if the
highly developed industrialisation of the modem world is to
continue* It is in this light that the legal position of
capital importing and capital exporting countries on the issuo
of exploration, distribution and disposal of unevenly distributed
and non—renewable natural resources should be appreciated.
3. Observance of investment agreements
Xt is in keeping with the harmonious development of
international economic cooperation and the efficient development
of the natural resources industry that the Declaration emphasises
the Importance of investment agreements.
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Thus paragraph 8 categorically states that foreign invest¬
ment agreements freely entered into by, or between, sovereign
states shall be observed In good faith) states and international
organizations shall strictly and conscientiously respect the
sovereignty of peoples over their natural resarces in accordance
with the Charter and the principles set forth in the resolution.
Very remarkable is th© recognition that private inveotoro
have a certain standing in the international judicial system
as far as the validity of and observance of investment agree¬
ments or contracts or economic development agreements are
concerned. Although reference to private persons is not
specified, it is implied in several parts of the Declaration!
for instance the last paragraph, 4, includes the following
phrase
"however upon agreement by sovereign states and other
parties"•
The other parties could be a state, a corporation, an individual
or group of individuals. However the distinctions are evident
in Chapter 8 of the Declaration.
The Declaration thus takes an important step towards ,
recognizing certain rights for private persons in the inter¬
national community, hence the emphasis on private international
agreements contributing to the course of economic development
of toiderdeveloped countries, which are to be observed in a
similar wa^j as public international instruments»
79
«• .Sft,*■*.!,Of Disputoff
1 * Exhaustion of local ronodloo
Among other things the resolution embodies methods of
settlement of investment disputes* (Methods of settlement
of disputes and the lav applicable are treated fully in
Chapter IV). In this respect it is maintained that in any
case where the question of compensation gives rise to controversy*
the national Jurisdiction of the state taking such measures shall
first be exhausted* However upon agreement by the sovereign
states and other parties concerned, the settlement of disputes
shall be effected through arbitration or international adjudic¬
ation*
The above proposition is a restatement of the principle
of international law concerning the exhaustion of local remedies.
This rule was stated in the Ambatielos Case) viz. - that
the state against which an international action is brought
for injuries suffered by private individuals has the right
to resist such an action, if the person alleged to Siavo »een
injured has not exhausted all remedies available to him under
municipal law.*^~*
One may ask, why the resolution refers to national Juris¬
diction and not national remedies* Jurisdiction and remedies
are not Identical or synonymous* It Is apparent that this Is
I63. Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. United Kingdom) Arbitration
Commission 6th March, 1956, i.L.R. 1956 pp. 306-334.
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the result of bad drafting, and it is not intended to attack
the rule that whore no remedies exist, there is no duty to
exhaust them, because it is possible that in such cases there
is still Jurisdiction to exhaust even if there are no remedies.
The exhaustion of local remedies is a substantive rule
i hji
of international law. In fact no international responsibility
arises until the claim is rejected by the local courts. There
must be a denial of Justice committed by the locul courts,
otherwise international responsibility is non-existent.
The denial of justice may also result either from the
refusal of the administrative redress or from extmordinary
163
methods of redress designed to supplement its difficiencies•
The clearest statement of this rule has been provided by the
European Commission on Human Rights which stated tha t t
*... recourse should be had to all legal remedies
available under the looal law which are in principle
capable of providing an effective and efficiont means
of redressing the wrongs for which on the international
plane, the respondent state is alleged to be responsible•"
164. P.C.I.J. Series A/B No. 76 P« 47• See Castor, Local
remedies in International Law, 1 yb1 p. 33,
103. P.C.I.J. A/B No. 74 pp. 20-28 (the Phosphates in Morocco
Case, in 1938).
lob. The Commission was established under the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms
in Rome, Nov, 4th, 1930. Art, 26 provides that the
Commission may deal with the matter after all do; seasic
remedies ... have been exhausted. 1earbook of European
Convention on Human Rights, 195b, pp. 412-440.
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It is noticeable that the resolution does not provide
an alternative procedure, in cases where local remedies
are exhausted without effect. Of course it is the ineffectiveness
of local remedies that makes it possible to resort to an
international standard of justice. Although the Declaration
left the issue of effective remedies in the same weak state
of indecision as "appropriate compensation" the international
standards of equity and reasonableness are left to the tribunals
concerned to deal with in particular cases.
III. The Legal Slfoiificance of the Declaration
Introduction
The diversity of Resolutions and their unequal juridical
value make it difficult to evaluate their importance as sources
of international law. Added to this difficulty is the long
standing view held in some quarters that since at San I ranoisco
the General Assembly of the United Nations was denied the power
to enact international law, its declarations have only moral
16 7
Valuej ' and as such cannot be sources of legal rights end
duties .
167. Asam©ah 0; Legal Significance of the Declarations of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, 1966, p.?;
Sloan; The Binding Force of Recommendations of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, B.Y.i.L., Vol. 25»
">948, pp. 6-7; Li-Liang Yuen; The General Assembly and
the Progressive Development and Codification of International
Law, A.J.I.L., Vol. 42, 1948, pp. 67-68.
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More ofton than not, the decisions of the Assembly as a
political Organ are thought of only in terms of their polit cal
168
significance, and the separability of law and politics is
maintained. There is also a strong feeling that the actions
of states in the Assembly and in other political organs of the
U.N. are politically motivated and therefore directed towards
advancing national interests, so that legal considerations are
169
submerged. This view has gained such ground that in iany
cases Resolutions are not implemented.
Equally detracting from the legal value of the declarations
are doubts concerning the status of the practice of international
170
organizations as a law-creating process. For example Art. 38
of the statute of the International Court of Justice, which Is
regarded by many as defining the sources of the internal ional
law, does not contain any reference to the practice of inter¬
national organisations. This omission has led people to various
conclusions as to the binding force of a recommendation of the
171
General Assembly of the United Nations.
168. Prof. Schwarzenberger, Vorld Economic Order 1970 P« ^0.
169. Ibid.
1 7Q, The delegate of Australia, supported by that of ;w Zealand,
argued that rules of international law ass formed only
through the practice of states and adoption of conventions
and that the Assembly resolutions cannot constitute a
separate source of international law - U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.
Rec. 17th Sess. 6th Committee 120(A/G.6/SR.75»). Ibid
171-172 (A/C.6/SR.766). They did not appear to deny the
probative value of some resolutions, but they overlooked the
important fact that Assembly resolutions also const!tuts
the practice of states. Their views are typical of many
states, however.
171 • F .B. Sloan, The Binding Force of a Kecorumendatlon of the




The principle of the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources has been relied upon for various reasons by national
courts in adjudication of disputes. The value of reference to
this principle is that it is a part of what is regarded as
state practice and can sometimes be a guide to the interpretation
and application of national laws. It has been relied upon as
evidence of modem law, or modern practices relating to the
right of states to control their natural resources.
Thus the civil Tribunal of Rome in supporting the Iranian
Oil nationalisation stated that the Declaration on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources might be regarded, in the
context of its timing - less than a month after the passage
of the Iranian law - as recognition of the international
1 72
legitimacy of that law.
The High Court of Tokyo also referred to the same law
in an Oil Refining Case, Anglo Oil v. Idemtl.su Kosan Cabushlki
173
jaisha. ~ The most recent case was in the Italian court of
lyracusa1s decision rejecting the claims of the British atroleum
Company to ownership of oil fields nationalised by the Libyan
Arab Republic. The Court raaintained that such claim rust be
considered in conjunction with Art. 1 of Libyan Petroleum Law
No. 25, of 21st April, 1955, by virtue of which all petroleum
172. International Law Report, Vol. 22, 1955, p. 23 at p. 140.
173* Ibid, Vol. 20, 1953, P. 305 at p. 313. So© also Ian
Brownlie, Basic Documents of International Law, 2nd Edition
1972 p. 1^0.
d4 •
lying in ths subsoil of the national stats is doemod to b#
tho property of the Libyan state , and no person can explore
or prospect for mining, or produce petroleum, unless authorised
1 74
by a permit of concession Issued under the lav. In tills
case the court recognised the application of a national lav
in pursuance of the declaration.
An inference can be drawn from the above decisions that
when states and Tribunals are confronted with a point of lav
concerning tho exploitation of natural resources they stay
take cognisance of the declaration on the Principles of the
Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural Resources. This conclusion
is supported by the decision of ths Federal Republic of Germany's
Superior Court of Hanburgh denying third party attachment of
copper sold by the Chilean Copper Corporation. The pronounce¬
ment of the Court was as follows:
wIn tho opinion of this Court the events which led to
the expropriation of Smesta are to be considered not
in their individual acts but as a whole, the e^ emulation
was namely affected for all practical purposes, without
indemnification. It was affected under discri;a±uutory
conditions and the legal channels have bean closed to the
parties concerned. There is a principle of international
law which is conformed to in particular by U.N. Resolution
(1803 XVII) of 14th December 1962, that every expropriation
or nationalisation must provide for a reasonable
indemnification.*
174. International Legal Material (I.L.M.) XIII, no. 1,
January 197k, p. 113.
175* The German ref. of the case is Docket No. <3004/731 see
the English translation in ILK Vol. 12 1973 PP• 275-276.
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It is evident that courts have referred to the principle
of exercise of sovereignty over natural resources in approving
the state takeover of private property in some places* In
other cases it has condemned state takeover of private
property without compensation, referring to the same principle*
In the light of this, it is submitted that because of the
conflicting views and conflicting state practice concerning
the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources, the
principle may represent the only consensus of states as to
what the law is on the subject, and as such, it cannot fail
to have an influence upon decision makers such as the Courts
and Tribunals*
B. State Practice
Declarations of the General Assembly of the United
Nations enunciating legal principles, particularly in new
areas where the law is only beginning to develop, can and do
influence state practice* This is the case with the
Declaration on the Principle of Exercise of Sovereignty
over Natural Resources which has become a part of the serios
of factors influencing national policy. For example, after
the Declaration, Guatemala carried out nationalisation
measures relying, inter alia, upon the unrestricted endorsement




dispose natural wealth and resources. The Libyan Arab
Republic invoked it as an authority for the legality of
transferring the installations of foreign oil marketing
companies to its national development corporation. The
Libyan decree reads thuss
"Because of the fact that the right of people in
controlling their natural resources is an authentic
and undisputable right recognised by international
law and society and adopted by the United Nationst
the revolutionary Government hereby enact law No, 69
of 1970 restricting import and sale of oil products
to N.O.C." 11
Recognition of thispprinciple is also implied in the
statement issued on August 2, 1956, by the Governments of
France, United Kingdom and the United States of America,
regarding the Egyptian "decree of 26 July, 1956, nationalising
the Suez Canal Company. Paragraph 2, of thi3 statement reads»
"the (three Governments) do not question the right of
Egypt to enjoy and exercise all powers of a fully
sovereign and independent nation, including the
generally recognised right,.under appropriate conditions
to nationalise assets, ..."
The Chilean Government also invoked the Declaration on the
Principle of Sovereignty over Natural Resources as authority
176. J.N. Hyde Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources
American Journal of International Law 1956, Vol. 50
p. 854, See Prof. G. ntiite op. cit. p. 36.
177. Libyan Oil, 1954—71 (A monograph published by the
Ministry of Petroleum, Libyan Arab Republic) p. 14,
See also Decree of 7th December, 1971, Art, 1.
17&* Parliamentary Paper Vol. XLI 1955-6 p. 363.
See also the Suez Canal Conference (Selected Documents)
1956 Egypt No. 1, Prof. White op, cit. p. 36 (note 118).
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for the legality of its nationalisation of the Copper Companies
operating in Chile, the major interests in which were held by
United States companies. The Chilean government categorically
stated that;
. . ."the International Community has acknoweldged,
particularly the United Nations in its Declaration
No. 1803 (XVTl), the inalienable right of each State
to dispose freely of its natural resources, pursuant
to its national interest , and the respect for economic
independence of States. This goal is attained through ,
the nationalisation of the major copper mining companies•*
The following countries have also taken over foreign
property invoking the same principle of exercise of sovereignty
1 iiO 181 1 82
over natural resources; Zaire, ^ Zambia, Tanzania,
1«a 184 185
Algeria, Indonesia, Cuba and many other African
179* Decree Concerning Excess Profit of Copper Companies 28th
September 1971 see I.L.M. Vol. 10 Current Document
pp. 1235-1238.
180. Ordinance No. 66-343, popularly known as Bakajika Law.
181 . On the 11th August, 1969, the Zambian Government announced
the Government takeover of copper mines, See "Towards
Complete Independence", Address by President Launda to
UNIP Council held at Matero Hall, 11th August, 1969,
in Lusaka.
♦
162. Tanzania Nationalisation is discussed in detail in the ■
East African Law Journal Vol. 3 1967, in Article by
Bradley, pp. 149-1 76.
183. Algeria nationalised the assets of Sehr Compuny on 24th
February 1971 - Ordinance 71-8. On the same date the
property of another firm (Sothra) was nationalised -
Ordinance 71 -10.
184. Netherlands Law Review 1958 p. 227.
185. Cuba Nationalization Decree, See American Journal of
International Law Vol. 55, 1961, p. 822.
88.
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countries. The fact that the Declaration of Principles
of Exercise of Sovereignty Over Natural Resources was adopted
by a majority of members of the family of nations which reflected
a large degree of consensus - 82 voted for, 2 votes against, with
12 abstentions. This is a testimony to common beliefs and
convictions.
It is not so much its character as a recommendation, which
determines its binding nature, as the quantity, quality and
intensity of community support behind it. The Declaration on
the Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural
1 8*7
Resources has also been recognized by U,N,C.T.A.D., " and the
Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.). All this evidence
indicates that the Declaration on the Principle of the Exercise
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources has influenced state
practice thereby leading to the development of intemntional law.
C. The Views of Writers
The purely advisory character of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, and, a fortiori, the Economic and Social
Council as one of its suosidiary organs, has influenced, one
186. Nationalisation full or partial has been carried out in
the following African states:- For example Nigerian
Military Government Decree 1971, No. 9 Suppl. to Official
Gazette extraordinary No. 15, Vol. 58, 31st March 1971
Part A. See also Art. A of the Agreement between the
Government of Sierra Eeone and Sierra Leone Selection
Txnrst. The agreement is contained in extraordinary Gazette
Vol. C.1 , No. 79, of 6th Nov. 1970, p.4.
187. See footnote 105.
UNCTAD Final Act and Reports 1964 General Principle III p.10.
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school of thought to deny the legal significance of ths
Declaration on the Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over
Natural Resources. This school of thought maintains that the
Declaration on the Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over
Natural Resources is no more than 'para legal ideology of
power economics' and. discredits the capital importing countries
view that it is in a legally binding form. It is also suggested
188
that this principle neither affects the law, nor changes it*
According to this school of thought, the Declaration merely
enumerates the rights of states, which are not qualified toy any
limitation of international responsibility.*®^
There is no doubt that this school of thought relies on
the traditional concept of the role of the General Assembly
of the United Nations as an advisory body whose Declarations
have only moral and political value. The traditional concept
lias been discussed in the introduction to this section and it
was observed that this school of thought takes little cognisance
of state practice and judicial decisions, which can add legal
status to a particular declaration of the General Assembly of
the United Nations. It also ignores the difficulties of
international economic cooperation in an expanding world, aa
188. Lord Shawcross, Sotue Problems of Nationalisation in
International Law, International Bar Association, Monaco,
1954, p.14 at 21.
189* P*J. Okeefe, Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 8, 1974, p* 244
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new nations emerge to statehood; which are provided for in the
jdeclaration on the Principles of the Exercise of Sovereigns -
over Natural Resources; and also the rights and obligations
this principle imposes on the members of the U.N.
Above all this school of thought ignores Art. 55(a) and
(b) of the Charter of the United Nations, under which the
General Assembly undertakes to promote:
i. higher standards of living, full employment and
conditions of economic and social progress and development;
ii. solutions of international economic, social, health
and related problems and international cultural and
educational cooperation.
in this respect the legal significance of the Declaration
on the Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural
Resources will not only be supported in judicial decisions and
state practice, but also in interpretation of the Charter of
the United Nations concerning the discharge of the function
imposed on the General Assembly by Art. 55(a) and (b) of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Another school of thought, recognises the traditional
concept of General Assembly Resolutions but is influenced by
the complexities of politics and economics of the expanding
world and the role of the United Nations General Assembly in
91 .
promoting international economic cooperation. Hence, in
their view, this particular declaration does reflect a wide •
spread recognition of a state's sovereign right to nationalise
1 90
property within its borders. " On the same point, it is
maintained that any particular declaration of the United Nations
General Assembly, which is approved by the big powers lias a
moral and political motivation force which makes it more
effective than a mere legal norm: hence there is no reason
to attach too much weight to the fact that the General Assembly
1 91
of the United Nations cannot go beyond recommendation.
There is also a strong contention by the SetcoJ group that
a particular declaration has legal effect only in the sense
that it constitutes a subsidiary means for determination of
rules of law capable of being used by an international court.
It may not be itself a source of law, its value as a means of
determining rules of law depends upon the degree of objectivity
190. Prof. G. White op. cit. pp. 35-36, See Gess. Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 1CQL 1964 p. 393*
Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, AJIL
Vol. 50, 1956, p. 867. Banjere, The Concept of Permanent
Sovereignty, Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 8,
1968, p. 515, Sapozhmkov, Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1964-5, p. 94.
Mugharaby, Permanent Sovereignty over Oil Resources, 1965
p. 16, Prof. Carlston, Universality of International Law in
Harvard Law Journal Vol. 8, 1962, pp. 73-81,
Prof. Feliciano, Legal Problems of International business
Receuil des Cours 118, 1966, 11 p. 248.
191• Prof. Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General




surrounding the circumstances in which it is adopted. In
particular it depends upon the extent to which it can be
regai'ded as an expression of judicial conscience of humanity
1 92
as a whole.
Vhen the nature of the concept of the Declaration on the
Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural Resources
is examined, an important point that emerges is that the
Assembly has not regarded its limitation to making of
recommendations as excluding it from making more formal state¬
ment or reaffirming legal principles. For instance one may
say that the importance of the Declaration on the Principle
of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural Resources lies not
so much in its political or moral value and long process of
evolution, but in the achievement of consensus on the principles
governing the respective rights of capital exporting countries
and eapital importing countries in areas where these were
particularly disputed:- the binding quality of foreign
investment agreements between states and foreign private
concerns or parties and state takeovers of private property,
compensation for the act of taking, the standard of compensation
and the resolution of disputes arising from the question of
compensation. Despite the conflicting views, the principle
192. Elias, Modern Source of International Law - Essays in
Honour of Philip Jessup (Prof. W.R. Friedman Ed.), 1972
P. 3^.
adopted for the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources
is a useful one in that it puts the relevant considerations
into perspective - an approach which will promote international
economic cooperation.
EVALUATIONS
The Declaration on the Principle of the Exercise of
Sovereignty over Natural Resources proclaims the right of
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources including their inalienable right freely to dispose
of them.
It points the way to furthering the free and beneficial
exercise of the right, and proclaims policies which will guide
its exercise - the state has the right to control natural
resources, but must not exercise this right in such manner
as to constitute an abuse of it. It must exercise it in good
faith, and with sense of responsibility so as to have bone
fide reasons for what it does, and must abstain from discrimin-
atory acts likely to constitute a breach of law.
ii. It acknowledges prudently the right of peoples and
nations to determine the conditions for exploitation, development
and disposition of natural resources including the method of
importation of foreign capital.
iii. The exercise of sovereignty over natural resources
is opposed to violation of the rights of nations to control
their natural resources, because such violation is contrary'
to the spirit of the U.N. Charter and hinders International
economic co-operation and the maintenance of International peace*
94.
Iv. It emphasizes the right of states to control their
natural resources based on the sovereign equality and self-
determination of the state, due care being taken not to let
investment agreements or international economic cooperation
impair the sovereignty of states over their natural resources*
V. Respect for the economic independence of states and
the need to promote the economic development of developing
countries are considered to be the basis of policies which are
conducive to international economic cooperation.
vi. The declaration states grounds for nationalisation
beyond the reasons advocated by the traditional concepts. Thus
the traditional view is that nationalisation must be for public
utility, bpt the declaration adds to this - for national security
and national interests.
vil. Concerning the issue of compensation neither the
orthodox view that it must be effective prompt and adequate
nor the claim of developing countries that state takeover is
entirely a matter of national discretion, with no duties attached,
i® supported by the Declaration* It rather suggests that
compensation should be ajjpropriate thereby leaving the issue
to negotiation.
viii* in stipulating the law that will govern capital
importation and earnings thereon, equal enphasis is given to
agreement between the parties, to national legislation and
to international.law. In this case the Declaration appears to
have abandoned the traditional view that International law
regulates only agreements between sovereign states.
9>.
xx. On the question of acquired rights, the Declaration
indicates that the newly independent nations intent to moderate
the rigour of the principle of acquired rights but they do not
want to abrogate treaties or agreements concluded before
independence, but merely to modify the terms of such agreements
to an extent acceptable to the parties.
x. The Declaration stipulates a duty to pay compensation
and and goes further In saying that in cases of settlement of
investment disputes concerning the payment of compensation,
national remedies shall be exhausted; or where there is an
agreement to do so, recourse shall be had to arbitration or
international adjudication. It emphasizes that investment
agreements freely entered into must be observed in good faith.
xi. Various national courts have referred to the
Declaration on the Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty
over Natural Resources in disputes involving states and private
concerns.
xii. Many states have invoked the Declaration as authority
for the legality of taking foreign private property - in fis
other words, it reflects a widespread state recognition of
their rights to take foreign property within state borders
on payment of compensation.
It is not maintained that the Declaration is binding
per so; rather it is suggested that the Declaration on the
Principle of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural
Resources enumerates the convictions of states over the
issiies of exploitation cf natural resources. On final
evaluation, one finds that the issue of the exercise of
sovereignty over natural resources is not entirely related
to nationalisation and compensation, but also to international
economic cooperation between countries at various states of
their development. However, the probative value of the
ieclaration, as a legal principle supported by a large cross
section of the world community, will be evident when we later
look at the African state practice, which is the subject of
the remainder of this study.
£7.
J.U
REGIME FOR DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Introduction
The previous Chapter dealt with the different views on
the legal significance of the Declaration on the Principle
of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural Resources. In
order to test the validity of this principle, it is necessary
to examine state practice as regards its implementation. In
that case it is intended to examine how African States have
recognised the principle in exercising their sovereignty
over natural resources.
This Chapter will thus deal with various regulations by
which foreign citizens or enterprises are allowed to develop
and exploit the natural, resources in Africa.
I. Forms of Regulation
A. Statutory
The rights and obligations of foreign citizens or foreign
enterprises to exploit natural resources are regulated in
two ways:
First, the conditions of the contract are laid down by statute,
The law thus determines in advance the framework of the
contractual relationship between the state and the licensee.
Also the terms and the conditions of operation in the natural
resources industry axe prescribed. This system is usually
followed by countries whose natural resources industries are
98.
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developed, such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Zambia
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and Zaire. Under this system resources are effectively
controlled. It also shows the Importance of these natural
resources to the economic development of the countries. Above
all when the terms of the contract are prescribed in advance,
the licensee knows his rights and obligations, and there is
thus a known limit to further negotiations between the host
country and the potential licensee.
193* Petroleum operations in Algeria are regulated by a
comprehensive body of legislation consisting of Ordinances,
Decrees, Orders, Model Concessions and Administrative
instructions. Of primary importance are:
Ordinance No• 71-22 of 12th April, 1971• which specifies
the conditions under which foreign companies exercise
their activities in the exploration and exploitation of
liquid hydrocarbons - Decree No. 61-1045, of Sept. 16th,
1961 , aa amended by Decree No. 71-100, April 17th 1971 »
which established a model convention of concession of
liquid gasesous hydrooarbon deposits.
194 * Mining operations in Libya are regulated by the Mineral
Law 1953, Petroleum Law No. 24, as amended by Law 17,
1970, Law No. 30, 1971, Law No. 32, 1971» and the Decree
of 20th Nov. 1965 for petroleum exploitation. There is
now a model concession agreement for the exploitation of
Petroleum Resources in the Republic. See Selected
Documents in International Petroleum Industry 1966 p. 184.
195 * In Nigeria there are also series of regulations, but the
outstanding ones are Mineral Ordinance, 1946, as amended
by the Quarries Decree of 1 969 • No. 26. Petroleum Operations
are regulated by Decree No. 51 , 1 969 - drilling and
production. Equally significant is Profit Tax, 1959, as
amended in 1967*
I96. The Mines and Mineral Act No. 46 of 1969 (in foroe 1st
Jan* 1970) is the major act in force in Zambia. Equally
significant is the Tax Act of 1970.
197* After the independence of the Congo Republic - now Zaire,
the Government repealed the Belgian Law of 1937 with the
following:
La Legislation Miniere National Congolaise Tom 1-101 »
Miniere National Ordinance Loi, No. 67-231 du 11 Mai
1967* Legislation general sur les Mines et Hydrocarbunes
Tom II, Les Reglement Miniere Ordinance No. 67-416
du 23x"d Septembre 1967*
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B. Contractual
The second method whereby foreign enterprises are allowed
to work natural resources is through ordinary contracts* By
this method the terms and conditions agreed by the parties
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on negotiation are embodied in a contract. This is peculiar
to countries which previously had no mining laws. However
recent developments have resulted in ail independent African
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etates promulgating laws of one kind or another concerning
19^* B.g. A Prospecting and Mining Exploitation and Refining
Agreement was concluded between the Government of Sierra
JLeone, and Tennessee Sierra Leone Inc. 21st March 1962.
The Rights and Obligations of the parties are specified
in Pour Schedules.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo signed
two agreements on June 8th , 1 967 with the British Diamond
Distributors Ltd. (The company was represented by Hamilton
Bermuda}* The contract which was entitled Commercial¬
ization of Diamonds, is contained in Mineral Trade Motes
Vol. 64 No. 9, 1967, pp.14-19. Arts. 1-7 of the first
agreement defined the rights and obligations of the parties.
In the second agreement Arte* 1-5 defined the rights and
obligations of the parties.
in may 18th 1972 the Government of Sierra Leone concluded
a Refinery Agreement with the following companies:
The British Petroleum Company Ltd.
The Shell Petroleum Company Ltd.
The Texaco African Limited
Mobul Oil Petroleum Company
A.G.I .P. S.P.A.
Clause 1 Defines the Agreement
2 Objects of the Refinery Coeapanlee
3.Share holding and Finance.
Arts. 6-27 dealt with other matters of interest to the
parties.
199* Mineral Law of the World Series, U.S. Bureau of Mines,
Part IV, deals exclusively with the African continent.
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the exploitation of natural resources, e.g. adopting the
first method. In promulgating such laws many factors have
become important.
XX. Factors influencing mining Legislation
A. Availability of Natural Resources
Not all African States are endowed with the gifts of
nature in the form of mineral resources, such as copper, oil,
and diamonds, in commercial quantities but the few countries
which do have these resources depend upon them for their
economic development. This has led to the promulgation of
mining laws, wherein the interests and needs of the state
concerning conservation of these natural resources are spelt
out.
This enables the state to determine its investment priority)
for example in Mauritania priority is given to any investor
interested in the following enterprises!
"Mining industries which extract, refine or convert solid,
liquid or gaseous mineral substances and their affiliated
companies serving the purpose of maintenance, construction ^qo
or transportation, and companies engaged in oil research..."
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The above situation is the case also in other countries.
200. law No. 61-122. (Details of its provisions are obtainable
from the President's Office, Nouakchott) pu« if Dti' i<h>-
201. In Kenya the investors that receive priority are those
interested in processing food, timber, minerals, textiles,
assembly of agricultural machinery - See the First Development
Plan 1^64-1970, In Madagascar different terms are used!
instead of "priority enterprise" the term "approved enterprise"
is used. These are enterprises concerned with the development
of mines and agriculture. See Ordinance No. 60-624
(essentially a redraft of the Law No. 61-037, 9th October
1961). In Nigeria the term "pioneer industries" is used in
referring to investment in development of natural resources
- see for example the Development Plan of the Eastern
Region, 1962-68, in which the emphasis was on development
of oil resources.
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Most countries with enormous deposits of natural resources are
specific in defining their rights, and the obligations of the
202
licensees. The availability of natural resoir ces influences
other aspects of mining legislation such as measures to control
environmental pollution.
B • Economic needs of the country
Most African States are still formulating their economic
objectives. Even when these have been formulated, it is not
easy to identify them. In some cases for example, they are
203
embodied in the speeches of Heads of State as when the
Algerian Investment Code was presented in July 19<>3 to the
Assembly and Mr. Ben Bella emphasized thatt
The Government shall intervene by means of public
investments in establishing national or mixed economy
companies with the participation of foreign or national
capital to secure conditions necessary to the achievement
of a Socialist economy. particularly in those sectors of
activity which are of vita^Q^mportance to the national
economy, [emphasis added].
202. When the Mining Laws of any countries with developed mining
industries, such as Nigeria,Zambia, Zaire, Algeria and
Libya, are compared with those of the Sudan, Gambia, or
Malawi, one finds a lot'of differences, both in structure,
and details. Compare for example The Mining Law of Zambia
No. 46, 1969 with the Sudanese Mining Exploration Law
No. 25, 1974.
203* President Leo Mba of Gabon in transmitting the text of
the Investment Code to the National Assembly, saidt
its main purpose is to maintain the economic and
social progress of the nation.
On national economic policy, see also Nigerian Prime
Minister's Speech in Parliament News from Nigeria
Ministry of Information, Lagos, April 1st, 1 9<>4, p.10.
204. See the text of the speech by President Ben Bella in
La Depeche d'Algerie, 12th July, 1963, p.4.
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In other cases the economic policies are included in
203
development plans. for example the policy and the development
plans of the Ethiopian Government are embodied in the Second
Five Years Plan (1962-1967) and are described therein as
follows s
"to aocelreate the rate of economic growth, by better
utilization of available resources, and to increase
the productive capacity of the economy, to introduce
modern equipment and technology and to raise the skill
and productivity of labour, and also to raise the saving
and Investment potentials of the country".
In some cases, the economic policies are mentioned in the
Constitution - for example the Constitution of Niger provides
for economic co-ordination among African states without any
reference to national objectives. Thus it provides in
Arts* 69-70 as follows1
"the Republic of Niger is willing to create with other
African States intergovernmental organization of common
action of co-ordination and of free co-operation. Such
organizations may have as their objectives harmonization
of monetary economic and financial policies."
205. The development plan of the Ivory Coast, 1963, emphasized
that the Government thereby enacted a law with respect to
its indistrial policy. Tts provisions empowered the
Government to engage in business through he formation of
State Companies - with or without private participation -
in order to develop unexploited natural resources. See
also Development Plan of the Republic of Chad, 1961 , p. 9,
National Development Plan of Nigeria, 1962-63, Chap. IV,
p.23, and Severn years Development Plan of Chana, 1963-1970,
(approved by the Parliament on 16th March, 1964) pp. 2-3.
206. See Ethiopian Development Plan (1962-67) . The Government
has not limited itself to a period of five years, but has
projected planning into a twenty year period, of which the
second five year plan forms the first aeries.
207* See Constitution of the Republic of Niger 8th Nov* i960
Art. 69-70.
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After studying the details of the various speeches of
Heads of State and the provisions of development plans, the
economic objectives can, in general, be summarized as followsi
i. Independent control of economic affairs
ii. Raising standards of living e.g. of income, health
and education
iii. Establishing a fair society.
The mining laws of various African States reflect the above
policies, which are discussed in Chapter XV of this thesis.
111 • legal Control of Resources Exploitation
A* Exploration
In the pre-independenoe period, there were two forms of
logal control of operations - (a) prospecting for and
(b) mining of natural resources industry. However in post-
independence an interested person wishing to exploit natural
resources in Africa must undertake a systematic approach,
starting with applying for, and obtaining an exploration and
prospecting licence and proceeding to an e3q>loitatlom licence.
203. The two stages of operation in natural resources industry
for which the licence was required under the former British
African Territories were prospecting and mining, See
Mines Manual, Containing Mineral Ordinance and Ancillary
legislation, Cap. 134, 1748.
In Belgian African Territories, two stages were also in
operation - permis special, and pennie general, See Code
et Lois du Congo Beige, 1934, p. 1433*
In French African Territories, the two stages were pernio
de recherche and permis d'exploitation. See publication,
du Bureau d'etudes Geologiques Miniere Colonial®a,
les Resources Miniere de la France d'outre Mer, 1933, P* 130.
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The licensee must pass through three stages - exploration,
prospecting and finally exploitation. The system is designed
to enable the state to control every stage of operation.
During exploration, states allow the licensees to engage
in only one aspect of the activities viz. to conduct a
geophysical survey of the area expected to contain workable
deposits. It can be conducted off the coast, on the continental
shelf, or on the mainland. Care is taken by states not to
grant an exploration licence to a licensee in an area where
such work is already in progress. The avoidance of duplication
makes systematic checks on the licensees possible.
A limitation is generally imposed not only on the size
209
of the area, but also on the number of exploration permits
held by each licensee. This device is used by states to
ensure that large areas are not held for long periods of time,
and exploration work is confined to a small portion of them,
but since it is the aim of eaoh state eventually to have large
•s.
areas explored and many workable deposits discovered controls
are imposed, on the allocation of sites to particular licensees*
The restrictions imposed by states do not in any way retard
the progress of exploration activities, rather they testify
209* In Zaire the Research Licence is granted for an area of
5 Kilometres, while in Zambia the exploration licence
is granted for 10 square miles. See Mineral Act Ko. 46,
1969, Part V. 32(1) and (2).
the state's wish to control the exploitation of natural
resources by the licensees.
In granting an exploration licence, most states give
preference to investors with sufficient capital, technical
know-how, and. experience in the mining industry, because the
efficient development of the natural resources industry
210
cannot progress in the absence of the above factors.
Equally important is that each applicant for an exploration
permit is required to submit his name and nationality? in
the case of corporate body, the registered name must be
forwarded to the host government along with the plans of the
211
area for which the licence is sought. Detailed information
as regards financial status, technical competence, the share¬
holders in corporate bodies, and the estimated costs of the
exploration operation must be forwarded to the government.
This is one of the ways in which states can satisfy themselves
that they have given the development of the resources to the
most efficient licensee. The above condition for granting
licences are not however applicable to state-owned corporations
or companies.
210. e.g. Sudan Mining and Exploration Law 197^, Section 7(ej
Revised Mines Manual of Sierra Leone 196, Part III (30).
211. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part IV (18) a-i, 1969, Mines and
Quarry Act of Sudan, 1972, II (1) a,b,c,d.
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The granting of exploration licences is not automatic. A
permit to explore any area con for example* generally be
denied to a licensee who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for violating mining lavs or detained for
circulating or trading in mineral products without the
authorization of the state* or is inoapable of financing
212
such a venture. Evidently in placing such restrictions
on licensees* states are exercising unfettered sovereignty
over their natural resources.
1 » Measures of control
The sovereign right of states over their natural resources
is extended to both known and unknown deposits within the
Jurisdiction of the state. Accordingly no licensee is allowed
213
to work minerals which are not included in the licence .
If by accident minerals which are not included in the licence
are found in an area where an exploration permit has been
granted* such minerals belong to the state. Such provisions
reveal states' consciousness of their right to control their
natural resources. This does not mean that the applicant
(licensee) has no right to apply for the new mineral to be
included in his licence; such an application is generally
214
allowed, but not automatically.
212. Ibid, Part V(31) Mineral Act of Zambia 1969.
213. e.g. See The Agreement to Lxploit Titanium-bearing minerals
concluded between the Sierra Leone Government and ftutile
Company (Sierra Leone Incorporated), Schedule 1(5) of
22nd March, 1972.
214. Mineral Aot of Zambia, Part XV 24(1)-(5), 19^9.
tor,
The state raay reserve the mineral for itself or grant
a new licence to the applicant for the new mineral. What
is important to this issue is that no licensee has the rights
to such discoveries} failure to observe this may lead to
cancellation of the entire exploration license» or a heavy
215
fine, or even Imprisonment.
It is not in keeping with modem African practice to
allow exploration licences to continue indefinitely. This
is mainly because every state wants to retain freedom to
exploit their natural resources at their discretion. Because
of this policy, it has generally been made an offence for a
licensee to transfer his exploration permit to another licensee
216
without the authorisation of the state, or host country.
A variant in some countries is to make a licence initially
valid for two years with an option to renew, three times,
for a similar period. In this case the renewal is granted
only after the licensee has produced a working programme
approved by state-designated officials or an appropriate
department, such as the Ministry of Mines and Power.21^
215. e.g. Mining and Exploration Law of Sudan No. 25* 197^,
p. 21.
216. In Zaire, for exanple, the Minister of State must give
his approval before any permit is renewed or granted
See Art. 18 II Vol. II Statute 67-231 of 11th May
1967. See Art. 17 of the same statute.
217• e.g. Nigerian Petroleum Decree, 1969, Sch. 1(3).
*
1QS,
Another factor that might influence renewals of the
exploration licence is the report on the previous exploration
licence or activities. When a licensee has been found
negligent in the essential performance of his licence he is
213
denied further exploration permits. This shows that the
state is concerned also with the efficient performance by
licensees of their duties. Obviously the diversity of approach
has one object in view, to control the development of natural
resources in keeping with state policy.
When a licence expires and is not renewed, the holder
cannot continue his work. At this particular stage, the state
usually demands logbooks, plans of works carried out during
the exploration activities, information on the geological
219
structure of the area explored. The purpose of seeking
this data from the licensee is to enable the state to prepare
to take-over such operations if necessary. It is from the
information submitted by the licensee that the state knows
exactly what the licensee has done, the likely mineral deposits,
and the geological structure of the entire area of exploration.
218. Mineral Act of Zambia Part V(33) on the renewal of
exploration licence, the Engineer must be satisfied
with the performance of the previous licensee.
219. Mining Code of Somali Law No. 77, 1970, Art. 22, 23, 24,
Petroleum Decree of Nigeria, 19^9, Sch. 1(2), Sierra Leone
Revised Manual Cap. 196, Part II (18).
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In keeping with the above provisions, each licensee is
often asked to keep half of the Cores* maps and details
concerning the mineral composition of the area under the
licence for handing over to the state, with other items,
22Q
immediately the licence expires • Obviously such a provision
raises an important issue, vhieh if not settled, may lead to
friction between states and licensees* The issue involved,
though as yet not recognised by many states, is the apparent
difficulty of the licensee who wants to maintain his trade
secret, is not willing to hand over all the information
required by states without any form of guarantee that his
trade seorets will be preserved* To alleviate such fears,
almost every report received from any licensee is kept
221
confidential, at least from other competitors, for several
years.
The records usually involved are those relating to
surface and underground workings topographical and geological
assays, bore holes, core logs, and others. It must be emphasized
that an exploration licence does not confer on the licensee
the right to remove any mineral deposits save for the purpose
of having it analysed, determining its value, or conducting
220* Tennessee—Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, Second
Schedule Clause 11*




tests on the bulk of the samples • Xt may be added that
the rigidity with which the state enforces compliance to
the terms of exploration licences reveals the degree of
state involvement in control over natural resources.
2. Rights of licensees
The exercise of sovereignty over natural resources is
not an absolute right. There is a limit to the exercise of
such a right. This is evident from certain rights conferred
on the licensees. More often than not, the licensee is granted
the sole right over the area in his permit, to carry out
223
geological surveys or investigations.
By virtue of this right, the licensee can generally use
any timber (except protected trees) or water, but should not
*
deprive the villagers of their watering places for their
cattle or their lands. The licensee is allowed to set up
buildings, sheds, structures, and other engines, derricks,
facilities for shipping and living accomodation for himself
and his employees, and other installations necessary for the
224
efficient performance of his work.
222. e.g. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part vi, 4o(1).
223. Tennessee-Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement Schedule
XX (2), Sierra Leone, Rulite Agreement to exploit titanium
Schedule 1(3) (see note 21 ), Nigerian Petroleum Decree
No. 31, 19^9> Mineral Act of Zambia, Part V, Section
36(1)(2) and (3), Mining Code of Somali No. 77, of 1971
Art. 1k.
224. e.g. typical is Tennessee—Sierra Leone Agreement XX
(3)(6)(7).
In most cases the area allowed to a licensee is
specified, so that the exploitation of any additional area
by the licensee, without the authorisation of the state
concerned, constitutes a breach of contract and may subsequently
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lead to cancellation of the exploration permit. In order
to avoid conflicts with the host country# the licensee is
better to keep to the terms of exploration licence. Where
an applicant-licensee feels that he is not well treated, he
can generally appeal to the head of state or other competent
226
body. This provision assures the licensee that sovereignty
will not be exercised arbitrarily.
It is not in keeping with African state practice to
confiscate plant or machinery of the licensee. Instead the
licensee is allowed to remove hi, equipment and installations
from an area where the exploration licence has expired, within
227
a specific time fixed by the state concerned. By extending
225. Nigerian Petroleum Decree No, 51, 1967 3ch. 1(1), Art, 32
of Vol. IIj Zaire Mining Regulation No. 67-'* 16 of 23rd
Sept. 1967.
226. In Lesotho, for example, any person who has applied for
the grant of mineral rights in terms of Section 6 of the
Mineral Rights Act, No, !n, 1967, and Is aggrieved by
the decision of the principal Chief Ward, can appeal to
the King under Section 7(2), In Zambia every appeal must
go to a Special Tribunal for that purpose; Mineral Act
k6, 1969, Part XV, Section III.
227# e,g, Tennessee-Sierra Leone Oil Agreement Third Schedule
Clause 25.
National Mining Law of Congo (now Zaire) Vol. 11,
Ordinance No, 67-^16, 23rd Sept. 1967# Art. 55, Mining
Code of Somali Law No. 77, 22nd Nov. 1970, Part 11,
Section 1, Art. 14, p, i486. Tanganyika Principal
Legislation Cap. 123# Supp. 53, 1969# Part III, Clause 65*
112,
such a right to the licensee, the exercise of the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources has incorporated the
protection of an alien*s property and acquired rights. If,
22
however, such property is not removed within a specific time,
it may be sold by negotiation or auction by order of the state.
The not proceeds of such sales, after deduction of any amount
the licensee is required to pay to the state, is withheld
until the licensee applies for it. After a period of time
in which such an amount remains in the custody of the state,
if the licensee does not claim it, it will be forfeited.
The proposition that absolute sovereignty exists in the
sense of unlimited freedom of action for the state is outdated
in African state practice, African states when emphasizing
their full right of sovereignty do not have in mind the
proposition that their sovereignty is outside the rule of
law. They understand sovereignty to mean the right to the
fullest independence permissable in controlling their natural
resources within the international law.
The first step to legal control of the activities of
companies working natural resources in the pre-independence
ppo
period was the issuing of prospecting licences," In the
223, Tennessee-Sierra Leone Oil Agreement, Third Schedule
Clause 2h,
229, See footnote No, 16,
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post-independence period, however, it is the second step
of legal control, talcing place after the exploration licence
has expired. In the period after the expiry of the exploration
licence the holder may apply to the state concerned to convert
230
the licence to a prospecting permit, for any area found to
be promising. At this stage, the process involves a more
profound and detailed, and perhaps more costly, investigation
of a limited area to determine the economic value of a given
natural resource.
In African stato practice the legal control through the
issuing of prospecting licences is quite distinct from legal
control through exploration licences; though applicants must
satisfy similar requirements, such as financial viability,
ability to understand the mining lavs, being over 21 years of
age, and possession of technical competence, which are generally
231
also the pre—conditions for the granting of exploration licences.
230. Somali Mining Code No. 77 of 1970, Part III, Art. 26,
Zambia Mineral Act, 1969, Part IV, 16. In Zambia
prospecting comes before exploration act. The change of
order does not rule out the three stages procedure of the
African system for the granting of a licence to an
intending licensee to work nautral resources i.e.
exploration, prospecting and exploitation, dee also
Sierra Leone Revised Mines Manual, 196, Part II, Clauxe 9f
Tanganyika Cap. 123, Supp. 58, p. 56; Sudan, Mining and
exploration Lav, Law Bulletin No. 25, p.^0.
231, An application for an exploration or prospecting licence
may not be granted to any person who is unable to prove
to the government designated officials that he can read
and understand the mining code. It can be denied a person
under 18 years of age. See Sierra—Leone Revised Mines
Manual, Cap, 196, Clause 11 (1) and (2) a,b,c,d,e,f.
1l4i
1 # Rights of Prospectors under the licence
In prospecting activities the licensees have maximum
obligations and minimum rights. Initially the states generally
allow the licensee to work natural resources in small quantities,
as much as is necessary to test the adequacy and operating
effectiveness of the machinery and equipment which the companies
propose to use,^^2 The licensee® have the right to surrender
their permits for any reasons that might impede the progress
of their work, without incurring any liability, but such
surrender must be notified to the host country three months
in advance,2^3
As with exploration licences, the holders of prospecting
rights are allowed to us® the area for which the permit has
been granted only in accordance with the terras agreedj where
they (licensees) are unable to comply, the permits are
234
cancelled. Prospecting licences are renewable. In some
countries licensees are protected in such a way that anybody
causing an obstruction to the progress of the licensees* x/ork
is punishable by the law."""''' From the above grants and safe¬
guards of the rights of licensees, one may say that States
232. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part IV 4o(t),
233« Tennessee Sierra Leone Agreement Sch, 11, Clause 39,
Mining Right of Lesotho, No, 43, 1967, Clause 11(2),
234. Zambia Mineral Act, Part V (31) a-g.
235. Nigerian Quarries Decree, No. 26, 1969 Part IV (A)(B)(C).
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accept responsibility for controlling any stag© of mining
activities in order to implement sovereignty over their
natural resources.
2. Obligations of prospectors under the licence
The cost of prospecting is usually borne by the licensee
alone, except in the case of an equity joint venture business
operation.The mere fact that the licensee bears the
financial cost of prospecting does not, however, mean that
he has freedom from control by states. On the contrary a
minimum expenditure obligation is imposed on the licensee,
i.e. the licensee must, as a .aatter of obligation, spend a
certain amount of money per square mile or kilometre, within
a given timej for example the Sierra Leone Tennessee Mineral
Oil Agreement stipulates*
"During the period of this licence, or any renewal
hereof, the licensee shall spend not 1©S3 that £25
biennially on its operations ... for each square mile
of the licensed area..." "
Most likely the idea behind the enforcement of minimum
expenditure obligation io to prove that each licensee is
expected to be conscientious with his work, and by so doing
large areas will be prospected and mineral deposits discovered.
236. Art, 6 of the Joint Venture Business Operation between
Libya Arab Republic and A.G.I.P. of 30th Sept. 1972.
237. The annual minimum expenditure in Zambia is as follows*
prospecting licence K.25 per sq. mile. A K,1 is
equivalent of ,68d or more now or 1.4 U.S. dollar, see
Economic Report of Zambia Ho, 26 p. 13,
1t<5»
Although the minimum expenditure obligation sounds very
reasonable from a praotical point of view, it is in the
view of the writer a clumsy way of exercising the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources. It can be an
ineffective device of ensuring that prospecting proceeds at
an acceptable rate, because returns cam be inflated by
inclusion of unreasonable overhead charges. Also it is
impossible to devise a simple scale which will be equally
applicable to all cases. For these reasons it is suggested
that the expenditure obligation stipulated in various acts
and agreements should either be abolished or b^ kept at a
low level in order not to deter investors who have to under¬
take the capital risks, and who might at the end of the
prospecting period not find mineral deposits in a commercial
quantity.
The licensees are not allowed to acquire land other than
the piece alloted for their activities. African states find
most objectionable foreign ownership or interference with
238
land resources, without due authorisation from the state.
Licensees are not allowed to prospect for minerals or any
natural resources in town centres, villages, veils, public
238. Tennessee—Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, Schedule
IV, Clause II - the Lessee shall enter upon and occupy
for operations lands subject to the provision of Section 5#
6, and 7 of the Mining Ordinance, Cap. 197, and in
accordance with such provisions shall receive benefits
including the right to appeal and arbitration.
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buildings, places held to be sacred, thoroughfares or
239
aquaeducts. Host governments object seriously to
stoppage of work during prospecting if caused by either the
use of poor equipment or failure to maintain that in use in
good order. Accordingly licensees are required to keep all
wells and trenches capable of providing mineraltresources
24o
in good condition. Equally significant is that the
licensees are asked to drain wastes and to dispose of them
carefully after prospecting activities have come to an end.
Apart from that they are required to label for future use or
reference by the host state all samples they collect during
241
prospecting. The licensees are expected to hand all the
negatives of photographs taken in the areas prospected to
239. Ibid, Schedule IV, Clause 42(1) a,b,c,d,e,f,g,
In some countries it is simply stated that the lessee
shall meet the requirements of the State. See Mining
and Mineral Exploration of Sudan, No, 25, 1974, p.12,
Section 18.
240. Clause 6 Schedule II of the Tennessee-Sierra Leone
Mineral Oil Agreement stipulates that the licensee
shall, in accordance with the methods and practices,
acceptable in mining industry take all steps practicable
in order to prevent, except for the purpose of secondary
recovery, as authorised by the Minister, the entrance
of water through bore holes to petroleum bearing strata.
241. Economic Report of Zambia No. 26, 1970» p. 12-13.
3rd paragraph - No geochemical samples or drilled cores
shoTild be disposed of without first offering them to the
state. See Sierra Leone Revised Mining Manual (Second
Impression) Cap. 196, Section 19» Tanzania Principal
Legislation Cap. 23, supp. 58, section 55(b). Sudan
Bulletin, No. 25, 197^» P. 33» Schedule III, Tennessee-
Sierra Leone Agreement, Section 31 and 32 (a)(b)(c)(d).
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the state. Evidently the prospecting regulation confers more
rights and less obligations on the states, than the prospectors.
The fact that states demand various materials at
different stages of operation is evidence of their effective
control of natural resources. Equally interesting is the
confidentiality accorded to all materials obtained from the
licensee which presupposes that protection of the trade
secrets of the licensee is also an element of the exercise
of sovereignty over natural resources.
C. Exploitation
Mining or exploitation of specific minerals is the
ultimate objective of the two preceding operations. - exploration
and prospecting. It has been stated in the previous Chapters
that exploration or prospecting licences do not authorise the
licensee to engage In actual exploitation of rcinerais except
for specific reasons. Therefore in order to exploit minerals
1
or eng ige in production in commercial quantities, the holder
of exploration and prospecting licences must first apply for
a mining lease. It is only when the mining lease is granted
that he can engage in production of the mineral resources.
1. Mining Lease
The applicant for a mining lease is usually asked to
give the following informations
(a) a detailed account of the exploration and prospecting
already carried out.
it9*
(b) details of* mineral deposits or a comprehensive
estimate of the ore reserve in the area where the mining
permit is sought.
This infonnation enables states to counter check the previous
records submitted by the licensees. Xt also indicates that
the mining lease will be granted to the holder of a prospecting
licence who has by himself, of through an agstnt, carried on
bona fide prospecting work in the area now applied for for
242
exploitation by mining. In some cases, the licensee is
243
asked to state whether he can find a market for the
mineral. This is because minerals, as a major foreign exchange
earner, must be sold or exported.
Xn granting mining leases some countries specifically
define the area, for example in the Sudan, a mining lease
244
cannot be granted for more than 250 square kilometres.
If states reject an application for mining lease it is
usually on the following grounds:
242. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part VII, 47(b)(c)(e)(f)}
Sudan Mining and Mineral Exploration Bulletin No . 25,
p. 80 8(1)(2)(3)(4)j National Mining of Zaire, Vol. 1,
67-231 of 11th May, 1967, Section IJIj Sierra Leone
Revised Mines Act, Cap. 196, 29(1).
243. Somali Law No. 77, 1970, Art. 46(b).
244. Bulletin No. 25» p• 8 10(1). In Somali a comprehensive
Oil Mining Lease shall not exceed 160 square miles. In
exceptional cases the grant can cover an area of 500
square miles. See Art. 64 of the Mining Code, No. 77,
22nd Nov, 1970.
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1. the applicant or bis agent was, at the date of
receipt of his application, already a holder of a license,
ii. it is considered that the intended programme of
development and mining operations will not ensure proper
conservation and use of mineral resources.
ili. it is found that the applicant cheated during
245
previous activities of exploration and prospecting.
Such a refusal does not in any way indicate disinterested¬
ness on the part of the state in issuing mining leases, it
is only evidence of the fact that the licensee is expected
to display a good standard of workmanship and a spirit of
fairness. Above all it further demonstrates the state's
control of every aspect of exploitation of natural resources *
2. Working rights and ooligations
The holder of mining rights under a licence is allowed to
make any necessary excavation of ores or minerals. As under
exploration and prospecting licences, the holder of a mining
licence is empowered by the virtue of his licence, to construct
buildings and other facilities, such as pipelines, telephones,
246
necessary for carrying out his job. XT for any reason a
state demands for public purposes a piece of land in the area
245. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part VII, 49(1) a,b,e,d,g.
246. Mining Right of Lesotho No. 43, Clause 13 (5) (1) and
(2)j Sierra Leone-Tenneesee Mineral Oil Agreement,
Schedule IV, Clauses (2)(3)(4)(5)(6-7).
for which a mining licence has been granted, the holder of
247
the mining licence must be compensated.
Where mining leases are contiguous and form a single
block, the licensee can amalgamate such permits, provided
such amalgamation shall not extend to a different class of
permit, or at least, not include a different holder of a
248
mining lease. The holder of a mining lease may transfer
his right to third party only with the consent of the state
249
concerned. It is also noticeable that Just as states
grant rights to licensees, the licensees also incur obligations
for the same rights granted to them in the course of production
activities.
In the course of applying for a mining lease, the licensee
must forward plans of the proposed area for mining, otherwise
247. The Mining Code of Somali, Annex A, Art. 7(1)(2) reads!
Wherever any land, being the whole or part of the surface
of any permit, licence or lease, is required for any
public purposes the Secretary shall with the approval
of the Council of Secretaries give notice to the holder
of the mining right, as from the date specified in such
notice, that all prospecting and mining rights in
respect of the surface area of the land required shall
be deemed terminated; and the holder shall remove from such
land, oefore the date specified in the notice any works,
buildings plant or other property. Under the Sierra
Leone-Tennessee Mineral Oil Agreement, the holder of
the prospecting right is compensated by asking him to
choose the same area of land in a different area -
Schedule XV, Clause 9(1). See also Mining Laws of
Zaire, Vol. XI, 67-416, 23rd Sept. 1967, Art. 97-100.
248. Somali Law Art. 13(1)(2)(1970).
249. Lesotho Mining Rights Clause 18(1).
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his mining lease will not be registered. Should the mining
lease or right granted to a licensee interfere with the right
of the surface owner, the licensee will have to compensate
such owner, however such compensation is never determined
251
in advance.
During production, the licensee is expected to employ
any method likely to secure reasonable and uninterrupted rate
of output. Xn mining lease more emphasis is placed on
keeping good records such as the following:
i. strata and subsoil through which the well was drilled;
ii. the casing inserted in any well and an alteration
to such casing. Among other things the licensee has to label
for period of twelve months characterised samples of mineral
• i
worked. Such data can be demanded by states at will, and
252
the licensee must surrender them.
Apart from keeping records the licensees have to send
quarterly returns of their activities for the period they
are engaged in operation. Such returns, among other things,
must include a statement of the depth drilled in each bore
253
hole or well. It is incumbent on the licensee to pay any
250. Ibid, 17(1)(ii).
251. Ibid, 17(i).
252 • Tennessee-Sierra .Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, Schedule IV
Clause 6.
253. Ibid, k7 (a)(b)(c)(d).
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dues and other financial obligations the state may rightly
impose.
It is obvious that for every stage of operations, the
parties have their specific rights and obligations. Therefore
it would be wrong to assume that the exercise of the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources either leaves states
with rights end no obligation or, alternatively, the licensee
with only obligations and without rights.
3. Duration of Mining Lease
States may grant mining rights for any period of time
adequate for developing the mine and amortising the consider¬
able investment involved, or may refuse to grant such a right,
especially if the workable deposits are situated in a restricted
area or zone - for example near the border or other strategic
255
areas* The duration of mining leases differs from country
to country. Jn the pre independence period, the idea that
mining was a consequent right of landed property necessitated
mining rights being granted in perpetuity, as were land rights
254. Sudan Bulletin No. 25» P.9 13(1)j National Mining Law of
Congo 67-231, 1967, Section VII.
255. The following areas are often excluded from mining land
dedicated to the gods, or set apart for public works,
burial grounds, construction areas for public parks,
See the Tanganyika/Tanzania Cap. 123, supp. 3d, Sect.
14j Sierra Leone Revised Mines Manual Cap. 196, Sect.
7 and 8 (a)(b) ii, 2 iii.
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or at least for 99 years. With the growing appreciation
of the sovereignty of all states over their natural resources.
this concept has been abandoned in post independence legislation.
Mining leases or rights are granted for a limited duration of
time, with the state retaining the power to abrogate them in
the case of prolonged non-operation, serious infractions or
257
non payment of taxes or dues.
In African state practice, the mining lease is granted
in some places for a 30 year period in the first instance
for land, but for the continental shelf for 40 years, with a
provision for renewal for another 40 years. The main idea
behind the granting of mining leases for such a short time
is the avoidance of monopoly by any licensee. However in
all cases an allowance is made for the investor's need to
make a profit on his capital investment. In this respect the
control by states of their natural resources is also concerned
with the welfare of investors*
256. Mendico Mining Yearbook of Zambia 1970, p.8. This situation
was not peculiar to African countries. The same situation
prevailed in the Middle Bast, for example the agreement
between the ruler of Qatar and Qatar Petroleum conqpany, the
duration of the mining lease or licence was 75 years from
17th may 1935-2010. In Iraq, the agreement between the
Iraw Government and the following companies:- Mobil Oil,
British Petroleum Company stipulated 75 years duration for
the licence from the date of grant. For other facts on
the Middle Bast, Bee 5th Arab Petroleum Congress 1965»
Paper No. 1-1 9 (A-Z).
257. U.N. Doc. ST/123, 1970. p.50.
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4. Safety Measures
The exercise of sovereignty ever natural resources is
deemed ineffective unless the interests and safety of the
workers in the natural resouroes industry are protected,
the life of every person engaged in natural resouroes enter¬
prises - whether the citizens of the host state, or foreign
citizens who control the companies - should be safeguarded*
This approach has been widely professed in various African
economic development agreements, acts and laws. Clause 40
of the Mineral Oil Agreement between the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Tennessee Oil Company stipulates, for examples
"the lessee ehell comply with any reasonable instructions
from time to time given by the Chief Inspector of Mines
in writing for securing the health and the safety^gf
persons employed in or about the leased area...*
It is pertinent that states should ears not only for the
revenue derived from the industry but also for the life of
the entire public involved. It is interesting to observe
that, the whole argument in the United Nations General Assembly
was directed to the protection of foreign property and the
right of states to nationalize foreign property, with little
or no attention being directed to safety measures for the workers
25b. Schedule IV. Clause 40, Revised Subsidiary Legislation
of Tanzania, Cap. 123. Supp. 58, pp. 38—67j Section 59#
Part VII, of Mineral Act of Zambia; Nigerian Petroleum
Decree No. 51, 1969. Section 8(1 ) (ii) (iii) V; China
L.1554 3; chief inspector may reject any scheme net
geared towards safety measures under all these laws*
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engaged In the natural resources Industry. This neglect
suggests that protection and acquisition of property are
worth more than the lives of the people involved in the
industry.
However, the imposition of safety measures by African
states can be Justified in international law under the
principle of state responsibility. This required that the
state must not only protect its property but also the lives
of those who create and develop the property. Again without
the safeguarding of the lives of people engaged in the industry,
or of the populace where the industry is sited, there may
be no conservation, no construction of refineries, no production
and consequently no foreign capital where a country depends
solely on its natural resources industry for their economic
growth. Therefore sovereignty over the natural resources
industry must be exercised benevolently.
Accordingly in the post independence period, legislative
measures were used to impose safety measures on companies
and, in addition, safety measures have necessitated the
formulation and enforcement of a safety polity, followed by
continuity of interest to ensure that the policy is carried
out at all levels throughout the organization of the n&t&ral
resources industry. Xn order to safeguard the life of the
workers and the inhabitants of the areas where the mining
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operation is taking place, states usually require that lioensees
259observe strlotly the following rules:
(i) filling and fencing dangerous prospecting works)
(ii) protection of shafts not in use. Some lavs even
detail such requirements as that on no account should water
containing poisonous or injurious solutions used in the
treatment of gold or other ores be left without fencing, thus
preventing inadvertent access to it. This requirement is
further strengthened by asking the licensees to instal a
notice board in a suitable place to warn the public of the
impending danger, and to maintain the pits in good conditions.
»
Xt is true that most African states have embarked on safety
measures, but more elaborate programmes still need to be
developed since the prevention of industrial accidents is
essential in the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources.
5• Conservation
Xt is difficult to approeciate the reasons why African
states adhere strictly to the principle of conservation of
nautral resources without understanding the economic effects
of ignoring modern conservation methods in the field of
renewable and non-renewable natural resources. As the
concern of this study is more with non-renewable natural
259* by Tennessee-Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement,
Schedule XV, Section 40-41, 42(a—j) the licensees
undertake to avoid all harmful working methods.
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resources, such as petroleum, an attempt vi11 be made to
explain the reasons why states adhere to conservation policy*
Petrgleum for example is liable to be exhausted and depleted)
when this happens it is difficult, if not impossible, to
regain or renew it* Moreover as such non-renewable natural
resources are distributed in many areas and not concentrated
in one place, continuity of exploration and drilling is
necessary in order to ensure the discovery of new resources
to compensate for those consumed. All these factors necessitate
that all organisations in the various states concerned -
administrative, economic, legal, and technical, observe and
enforce laws and regulations which guarantee that the best
conservation measures are taken in the exploitation of these
resources.
Conservation of natural resources is of great importance
to all states whether they own, produce, sell or buy the
260
product of the natural resources industry. The object
of conservation is to prevent waste. In the pre-independence
260* Ghana Mines and Mineral Conservation Act, 19&9, No. 278f
the same regulation was repeated in 21st dune, 1967,
L.155^ Section 8, Mineral Act of Zambia, Fart VXX,
Section 55(1), 56 and 57(2); Nigerian Petroleum Decree
No* 51, 19^9, Section 8 XX; Tennessee-Sierra Leone
Agreement, Schedule XV, Section 42(b). For a detailed
work on the conservation of natural resources see the
Pro forma approved by OPEC Resolution XVI 90; reproduced
in OPEC Bulletin, August, 1968, p.5.
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period there was little or no evidence of conservation of
non renewable natural resources. This is not to say that
261
there was no attempt at regulation of soil conservation.
In modern African practice, conservation of non renewable
natural resources is embarked upon as an effective way of
controlling such resources. Accordingly each licensee must
abide by the conservation policy and observe rules concerning
the following:
(a) Efficient use of reservoir energy and maximum
ultimate recovery of hydrocarbons.
This principle has been enforced in most countries by
controlling gas, oil and water production, and at the same
time by encouraging the location of surface and subsurface
26b
production facilities.
(b) Gas control and utilisation. Most states impose
an obligation on the licensee to retain as much gas as
practicable within the reservoir and use it industrially*
(c) Efficient and competent operations
Basically the responsibility for competent and efficient
operations belongs to the companies; for obvious reasons it
can be presumed that the companies are interested in competent
261. Lord Harley, African Survey, 1956 (ed.) p. 1015* See
the exhaustive study by S.J. Cookey - "The Concession
Policy in French Congo and the British Reaction 1898-1906",
in Journal of African History VII, 2, 1966, p. 263-278.
262. These measures are often stipulated in conservation
provisions Iseen p- ho . oJ
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operations. It may not be simple to fulfill these requirements,
but they are objectives which states pursue with due respect
for economic considerations and control of their natural
263
resources.
There is every reason to believe that the licensees are
just as interested in the most efficient use of reservoir
energy and maximum conservation of natural resources as is
the state which is the owner of the resources concerned.
Both parties will benefit from a better organized conservation
process, and efficient and competent operations. Perhaps
differences may arise in their basic approach - the government
may view the development of their resources with a much
longer range in mind, than is necessary for the well being
of an industrial enterprise. Nevertheless a government
policy based on conservation is an essential element of
sovereignty, particularly when it is remembered that for
one reason or the other - political or economic - access
to the natural resources of other countries may at sometime
be impossible.
263. The controversy between the Libyan Arab Republic and
the Occidental Oil company furnishes an example of how
some African states are pursuing a conservation policy.
The Government restricted the production of the Intisans
well from 320,000 to 158,000 barrels daily in 1970.
The restriction was necessary as the Government thought
that the company production was not in keeping with
conservation policy. See Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
of 25th May 1970.
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Construction of refineries
On© of the stimuli to the exercise of control over
natural resources is the desire of every state to be able
to supply themselves with such allied products as refined
oil, kerosene, and the like. In the pre-independence period
almost all oil (for example) used in Africa was refined abroad
264
or overseas, with the result that local consunqption was
too dependent on overseas refined products. The reverse is
265
the case in the post-independence period. The availability
of refined oil is achieved by imposing: an obligation on every
licensee to construct a refinery plant within the host country)
for example the government of Sudan requires that t
264 . Pre independence period








265 Post Independence period
Nigeria 2,750 tons 1971 -72
Algeria 2,500 tons H S
Ghana 1 ,000 tons M M
Sudan 1 ,000 tons It It
Tunisia 1 ,000 tons It It
Ivory Coast 1 ,000 tons « N
Zaire 700 tons t! tl
Tanzania 680 tons It M
Senegal 600 tons M It
Gabon 500 tons •# "
Ethiopia 500 tons n M
Sierra Leone 500 tons tt N
Further statistics for the pre independence and post
independence periods can be obtained from the Information
Service of the British Petroleum Institute, See also










"A licensee shall construct and maintain the operate
a refinery on such terms agg^conditions as the Council
of Ministers may specify."
By following the above policies most states avoid over-
dependenoe on foreign refined products. The scaroity of such
products overseas does not affect the some supply adversely.
Significantly by having a refinery within the reach of the
host country the domestic market is assured of supply in a
less competitive manner and at a moderate price. Xt is not
considered sufficient merely to erect a refinery; the
licensee is expected to refine as great a quantity as possible
267
for home consumption and at the same time produce gasoline,
In the case of other products, such as diamonds, there
is nothing like a refinery requirement, but the licensee
is made to weigh the minerals locally, in the host country.
For example Art. 2 of the Convention on the Comnercialization
of Diamonds in the Congo, between the Congo Democratic Republic
and the British Diamond Distributors Ltd, contains the
following provisions
"Diamonds, purchased by Britmond are to be delivered
for its own account to its Kinshasa Office. Before
being sent to London the diamonds will be weighed by
this office and be subjected to a preliminary classification
by quality and provisional pricing..."
266. Tennessee- Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, Schedule
IV, Section 22(2)(a)(b); See Mining and Exploration
Law in Sudan Bulletin No. 25, 197^, Section 12; Nigerian
Petroleum Decree No. 51 » 19^9, Section 3(1).
267. Ibid note 266, p. 12S.
268. Diamond Convention of 8th June, 1967.
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By controlling every aspect of the production of the natural
resources industry the African states are exercising unfettered
sovereignty, within the requirements of international lav*
XV. Limitation on the Right of Licensees
A. Right of Pre-emption
There are circumstances which can limit the right of
a licensee and intensify the control of natural resources by
the State. For example, in the event of a state of war
states can automatically acquire the right to all minerals
mined under any permit, licence or lease, and the products
thereof, and the right to control mining operations for such
time as the state of war exists.2**^
Such provisions are stipulated and enforced in the
natural resources industry so as to ensure that there is no
lack of mineral fuel at times of national disaster such as war*
B. Force Ma.ieure
Most natural resources' economic development agreements
contain provisions governing their termination otherwise than
by effluxion of time. Accordingly most African states apply
the legal rule that failure to perform an agreement due to
force majeure gives a right to an extension of the terra of
the licence corresponding to the period of delay caused by
270
such an event. '
269. Mining Code of Somali 197° Law 77 of 22nd Nov, 1970,
Art. 22} Nigerian Petroleum Decree No. 51» 19^9,
Section 6, Schedule 2(2)(3)(4).
270. Tennessee—Sierra Leone Mineral Oil Agreement, Schedule
IX, Clause 22(1)(22).
1 'Jk
Variations exist between particular licences as regards
the definition and effects of force majeure, or other circum¬
stances, whereby the failure of a licensee to perform his
part will not be regarded as a breach of the agreement, for
example in case of war, act of God, insurrection, riot,
civil commotion, strikes, or other labour disputes, storm,
tidal wave, flood, lightning, explosion, fire, earthquake
and any other happening, foreseen or not, which the licensee
could not reasonably prevent or control. A mining licence
may not be terminated if the reason why the licensee did
not start any activity within a specific period from the
date of issue of a licence was due to circumstances beyond
his control or has a reasonable excuse for such failure.
Usually false information to the host government is enough
to justify cancellation of any permit, but where such inform¬
ation was a mistake, not an intention to cheat, the after
271
effect may not affect the licence. The above indicates
that the exercise of sovereignty is limited not only by
conferring rights to the licensee but also by any forces that
are beyond human control.2"^2
271* Zambia Mineral Act No. 46, 1969, Section 91•
272. During the Nigerian/Biafra Civil War various foreign
companies were affected. There is no evidence that
the Nigerian Government cancelled any licence because
of the war. Most of the foreign companies after the
war continued with their operations. There is also no
evidence that M.P.L.A* Government of Angola confiscated
the licence of any foreign company during the civil war
with UN1TA and other Faotlons.
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C. Imposition of Penalties on Licensees
There are various ways in which the control of natural
resources have been made effective. Perhaps the most striking
is the Imposition for various reasons, of penalties on the
273
holder of a mining licence. The power to impose penalties
comes within the prerogative of states and is used to prevent
any act of the licensee that may obstruct a states' control of
natural resources, such as illegal prospecting, waste of
either crude oil or copper, any fraudulent concealment of
information with the aim to obtain registration in the host
274
country.
Xn the legislation of various countries controlling the
natural resources industry, there are various forms of
penalties. The penalty depends ooth on the type of offence
committed and the legislation of the country concerned. Some
275
offenders may suffer heavy fine, in the form of case payment,
273. Somali Mining Law Art. 104 - Any person Convicted of
violating mining laws has an option of either paying
S.O. 1000 or terms of Imprisonment not exceeding six
months; or both such fines and imprisonment. See
Mining Law of Sudan Bulletin No. 25, 1974, p.40, Clause
11(1) (a)(b)(c)(d). The term of imprisonment is 1 year.
274. Tanganyika (Tanzania) Cap. 123 Supp. 58, Part XI,
Clause 19, Part III, Clause 40.
275* Libya Law 25 of 1955, Art. 22, emphasized the necessity
of effective control and thereby stipulates thatj
(a) A fine of L.D. 5000 (five thousand Libyan Dinars)
may be imposed on any person violating the Petroleum Law.
(b)/
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or have the option of serving terras of imprisonment no matter
for what offence. Licensees also are always in danger of
losing their raining rights or licences as a form of penalty.
The penalty imposed on the licensee is a proof that the
state does not want inefficient utilisation of natural
resources, hence every exercise of state control over the
activities of the licensees is motivated by the need for a
rational and economic use of resources. Penalties imposed
by states on licensees who default can be Justified on the
ground that international law recognizes the right of every
state to control everything within its territory.
Conclusion
The above investigation has revealed that African states
have adopted many different methods of controlling their
natural resources. Though in post-independence African
practice there are many factors that have influenced mining
legislation, each factor is geared towards giving the state
the right of control over natural resources. More specifically
(b) In cases where the licensee or permit holder causes
the loss of crude oil or hydrocarbon matter, he shall be
required to pay the value thereof over and above the
fine imposed on him.
(c) In addition to the said fine a concession or permit
holder who causes damage to the deposits as a result of
his non-adherence to the provisions of the Petroleum
Law and Regulation issued thereunder or his inapplication
of sound oil practices, shall have to indemnify the state
for such damage.
See Nigerian Quarries Decree No. 26, 1969, Part IV,
(a)(b)(e) 27, 28 (l)(2)(3)(a)(b/(c)
Art. 104 of Somali Mining Code 1970 stipulates six
months imprisonment or S.0. 10,000 fine; however, there
is no evidence that anyone has been imprisoned for same.
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this control is exercised through the forms of licences to
work natural resources - exploration, prospecting and
exploitation or mining licences.
The post-independence period has seen the inposition of
a duty on licensees to utilise the resources efficiently,
to maintain, among other things, an efficient conservation
procedure. Refining which was formerly done abroad is now
required to be done within the Jurisdiction of the host state.
It was the practice under the pre-independence regime
to grant a licence to work natural resources to private
companies in perpetuity or to give a monopoly of a specific
natural resource in one territory or another to a company.
If the term was specified in such agreements, it would be
from at least 99 years onwards. The present practice in
Africa, however, is that the duration of a licence to exploit
natural resources should not last for more than 25 years or
30 years in most cases. This is the only way the monopolistic
power of the companies can be curbed. Mining rights and
working obligations have been specified in such detail in
agreements concerning the resources industry that no further
evidence is needed to support the conclusion that those
countries are now effectively controlling their natural
resources, in other words exercising their sovereignty over
them.
13b*
LE&AJb CONTROL OF FOREIGN BMTI3U31ISES
IatMdMdtjai
Tho previous Chapter dealt with, the legal control of the
activities relating to exploitation of* natural resources.
Apart from the working obligations imposed by the countries
on the companies as shown in the previous Chapter there are
other forms of control inherent in the use of legal techniques*
This type of control applies to enterprises that have been
accepted, in other words those enterprises that have fulfilled
the requirements of the host oountry.
It is intended in this Chapter to consider the non-
participating control formula, by which states exert control
indirectly, and participating formula, by which states involve
themselves in the actual operation and organisation of the
enterprises. Among aspects discussed will be the lav applicable
to the operation of the whole transaction and provisions for
settlement of disputes*
-Nqn-parftir.c^pft.tjl.ng Coptryl
By this method, states control different aspects of the
companies or the enterprise operation without holding shares
in them* The control is mainly exercised through various
instruments and other forms of legislation.
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A. Reaigtratioia
In the pro-independence period foreign firms that worked
n»tVirel resources were incorporated under the laws of different
metropolitan governments• With the growth of consciousness
of the need to control foreign exploitation of natural
resources! many African states have followed their example
and insist on incorporation tinder the appropriate African
lav, allowing access to natural resources only to nationals
or enterprises registered under it. The extent to which
thig principle has been implemented is evident in economic
development agreements concluded between African states
276
and foreign enterprises. Xn some African countries, an
individual enterprise is expected to establish residence in
the country for a certain period of time before he can
277
qualify for economic concession.
27b. Schedule 1 (2) of the agreement for prospecting,ruining and
refining of minerals between the Government of the Republic
of Sierra Leone and the Tennessee Company of 22nd March
1 yo2. in this agreement, the Tennessee company, which
was previously incorporated under the Law of Delaware,
United States of America, agreed to file the necessary
documents to register the company under the Sierra Leono
Company Aet.
277• The Law of Zaire, Statute No. 62-231 of 11th May, 1967»
Art. 6(a)(b) - All corporate entities must be incorporated
under Congolese Lav and have their registered and
a&ministrative offices in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, their object must be confined to the prospecting,
exploration, and working of mines, the processing of
minerals and associated operations. See also Mineral
Act of Zambia No. 40, 1969, Part XX, 5 a, (ii).
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Where the enterprise engages only in buying or selling
the products of the natural resources industry, there is
always a demand that such an entrepreneur or dealer should
278
be a banker in the country concerned. This is only
because a state wants every operation to come within its
jurisdiction. The incorporation of foreign firms in the
host countries is not peculiar to African countries; for
instance under the constitution of Honduras in 1957 concessions
may be granted to individuals or companies organised or
279
incorporated under Honduras law. The same method has
2go
been adopted by other countries* Xn some countries, where
foreign enterprises are not permitted, it is used to limit
share holding by or the voting rights of foreigners. In
Sweden, for instance, a foreign corporation cannot register
for exploitation of mineral deposits, nor without special
authorization acquire real property. A Swedish partnership
278. Botswana Precious Stones Act, 19^9, Part III (ii) - n©
person shall buy, deal in or reoeive by way of barter,
pledge or otherwise, either as principal, or agent any
rough or uncut precious stones unless he is a banker
in Botswana.
279. Constitution of Honduras, 1957, Art.6.
280. Iran Regulation for Mines, 1957, Art. 3, stipulates that
any exception to the rule of incorporation in the boat
state must receive the approval of parliament; See also
Foreign Investment Law of, and Regulations of, Far Last
Countries J5CAFL/L.22, p.114, and Turkish Lew No. 6309,
of 3rd March, 1954, Section 12 and 62. See also Foreign
Capital, in Latin America U.N. Publications Sale, 1954, II
G. p.11, 90-91; Italian Law No. 6, 11th January, 1957,
Art. 2, 29.
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in which there is a foreign partner or a company issuing shares
is in general considered on the same footing as a corporation,
and it does not matter what form of Incorporation of foreign
enterprise under the law of the host country is adopted.
The major idea behind this policy approach is to enable
host governments to control natural resources and also to
retain contact with the policy makers of the various enter¬
prises. This also evidences the desire of the host state
to have foreign enterprise, their policy makers and their
records, physically within their Jurisdiction. It can also
be a step in the nationalising process aimed at separating
the foreign enterprise from its country of origin. This of
course may not be the sole reason, for Instance in certain
countries incorporation of foreign enterprise is required to
support total or partial exclusion of foreign capital.
In order to enforce the incorporation procedure, enter¬
prises are required to submit certified documents testifying
j®
their legal formation, the powers granted to their officers
281
and the purpose for which they were formed. They will be
required to give the address of their registered head offices
for the purpose of receiving legal notices. The names and
282
sometimes the addresses, of its directors are also demanded.
281. Mineral Act of Zambia, Part XIV, Section 100-110.
232. Decree of Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somali No. 3,
April, 1^71 , Part IX, Regulation 31 , 32 and 34; dining law
of Zaire, 11th May, 1967, Chapter III, Art* 22.
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The registration procedure has limited the freedom which
private enterprises formerly enjoyed under the metropolitan
regimes in Africa in controlling the production of their
necessary supplies of raw materials. However the registration
procedure is not meant to keep foreign enterprises out of
the natural resouroes industry but nor is it intended to give
them undue freedom that might Jeopardise the Interests of the
host country. It is a flexible approach whereby the exercise
of sovereignty over natural resources will ensure an adequate
development ef the resources concerned, that supplies go to
both have and have not countries* and above all that industrial
relations among members of the international community will
be fostered.
s • Training and Employment ef Indigenous Personnel
There is little or no distinction made by African states
between training and employment ef local staffs by foreign
enterprises. However this aspect of the exercise of sovereign
rights over natural resources is concerned with the transfer of
technology and also has the objective of promoting indigenous
industrial skills. Of course the skills acquired by local
citisene from employment by an enterprise established with
foreign capital is one of the valuable aspects of foreign
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investment. The main tenet of these measures is that ,
investment in human resources is likely to produce a higher
return in terms of economic growth than investment in fixed
amounts of money, and that such investment is also socially
beneficial because it improves individual welfare and earning
capacity. Accordingly most countries seek to obtain the
maximum benefits of industrialisation by either insisting
on employment of a certain percentage of indigenous personnel
or requiring the foreign concerns to effect a training
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programme•
An alternative requirement is sometimes that a minimum
percentage of the payroll of an enterprise must be paid to
local nationals. An example is Egyptian company law which
stipulates that a minimum of 75% of the administrative,
technical., clerical and accounting personnel of branches
of foreign companies operating in Egypt must be its nationals
receiving not less than 65% of total emoluments spent by the
branch. In addition Egyptian nationals must constitute 90%
of the unskilled labour force and be entitled to 80$» of the
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total wages paid by the companies. These provisions in
Egyptian law have the motive of both mobilizing scarce capital
for individuals who want to engage in private domestic enter¬
prise , and increasing industrial skills for citizens who have
2&3. U.N. Doc. (Sales No. E.68 11 D 2) (1968) p.19.
284. Egyptian Company Law No. 28 of 10th January, 1954.
144.
no other chance of acquiring such skills except when employed
by foreign enterprises.
In some other countries it is stipulated in an investment
act that any investor who has received approval from the
government to work natural resources must of necessity make
an arrangement to train nationals in administrative, technical
285
and other capacities. This- provision is pertinent because,
if the transfer of technology, whether by eiqployment of staff
or training of local personnel, is to have a lasting effect in
the economy of the host country, the latter must have the
necessary educational infrastructure and trained personnel*
In this case the transfer of technology is linked to educational
research in and the technological capability of the host
country.
Where the prevision for training or employment of local
personnel is not in the form of statute law, it is often
embodied in an agreement. For example the agreement between
the government of Sierra Leone and the Diamond Selection
Trust, Sierra Leone (inc.) provides that:
"the company shall give preference to the employment
of Sierra Leone citizens.,
285• Ghanian Act Mo. 72 of 19&3» Art. 6; Uganda Sessional Paper
No. 1, 9th June, 1964, Art. 12j Nigerian Federal Military
Decree No. 51, 19^9, Schedule 1, paragraph 37 j law of
Nigeria 69 of 19^9, Regulation 26-9.
286. Schedule D 15(1) 6 of the Agreement to exploit Diamond*
between the Government of sierra Leone and Sierra Leone
Selection Trust (Diamond Company) of 20th October, 1970.
The ratification Act of the same Agreement was published
in a Supplement to Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. C1 , No. 79
of 6th November, 1970. Training and hmpioyment of local
personnel/
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It is most important that the foreign enterprise should be
willing to provide a comprehensive training for national
personnel at all levels where mastering over a speoific
technology is required. The inclusion of such nationals
among top level personnel constitutes a decisive step in
that direction*
A provision for training local personnel is emphasized
in many investment codes and agreements concluded between
African states and foreign concerns probably because the
host countries want to alleviate their dependence on foreign
technology and managerial staffs. The aim of African states
in these measures is effectively to obtain, absorb and diffuse
into their economy know-how and managerial capability in
appropriate forms. Again, countries at a relatively early
stage of development frequently need a combination of management
and technical skills that can be gnpplled only by foreign
investors. This arises if countries do not develop their
own technology and they may then be obliged to pay excessively
high prices to Import indispensable goods.
personnel is often included in the Agreement of Commerce,
friendship and Navigation* The government of United
Kingdom of Great Britain concluded such an agreement
with the government of the Republic of Cameroon - United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 539, p. 59. Art. 4
An agreement of Technical Co—operation between the
Government of Israel and Government of Dahomey included
similar clause, see U.N.T.S* Vol* 448 p. 59*
146.
The companies and their host governments have found a
common language over this issue: for example in Nigeria over
£1?0,000 ^N*330,000) was set up under the Gulf Oil Company
training fund (Administration) Aet,28^ for the purpose of
training Nigerians as technicians and craftsmen in the field
of engineering science, and administration in the petroleum
industry. A similar method vas adopted by the Shell B.P.
company for toe training and recruitment and awards of
scholarships to deserving candidates from aoout 60 schools
288
in the Federation of Nigeria. c Obviously external
technology and management skills are essential elements of
foreign investment.
on the global level the less developed countries have
289
adopted a similar approach. The motive behind the host
governments agitation for training and employment of nationals
by foreign enterprises is twofold: that employment opportunities
for nationals should be provided and safeguarded at higher
levels, and also that nationals should be used In order to
rise to skilled positions. T
287* Gulf Oil Company Training Fund Act No. 32, of 1964.
288. Nigerian Daily Times, 16th September 1971, p. 24.
289. U.N. Doc. A/AC.97 R«v. 2 pp. 37-39.
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All states have lavs and administrative procedures
restricting and controlling to some extent the entry of
290
personnel. Usually these l&vs and regulations are not
limited to personnel active in the field of exploitation of
natural resources, but are special provisions to be found
in some economic development agreements and in lavs regulating
particular natural resources. In more developed states,
where foreign investment within their borders is relatively
less important, control over the entry of foreign labour
is likely to be less specific. and less widespread. The
legality of such requirements may be found in international
law. since it is another way in which states can assert their
sovereignty. In the main such measures do not relate to
employment of foreigners or affect company lav. but they
are effective indirect means for activating the transfer of
technology, skills, and participation of local nationals in
the ownership of natural resources.
The desire that companies train and employ indigenous
personnel reveals that African states are conscious of their
stage of underdevelopment and wish for development, which
can be accelerated by the investment of foreign capital in
their respective territories, however rigidity in the
290• V. Arnaah, Restrictions of Aliens in business in Ghana and
Kenya, See International Lawyer Vol. 3, 1974, pp. 464-77*
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enforcement of training and employment of local personnel
can be detrimental to the economic development of a state,
especially if the required proportions of nationals to be
employed in skilled Jobs is so high that sufficient qualified
291
men are not obtainable locally. In that case, the
advantages to be derived by the host country depend on the
latter1s degree of development, the nature of training and
employment involved, the extent to which the foreign firm
is willing to share its trade secrets and up-to-date
technology, and the local capacity for original research and
development.
In order that such legislation should stand the test of
time, it must be elastic enough to admit exceptions, wherever
the employment of foreign personnel is essential for the
efficient running of the enterprise. This exception finds
expression in some of the agreements already concluded
between African countries and foreign companies,
.Evidently the employment of local labour and the
effective training and advancement of local technical and
managerial staff with high productivity is another benefit
sought through the exercise of sovereignty over natural
291# A typical case Is the Brazilian Law of 1938, which placed
work in oil refining entirely in the hands of nationals
and caused immediate disruption of works under construction
of Standard Oil of New Jersey in Sao Paulo, see Lewis,
The U,S. and Foreign Investment Problems, 1948, p, 158,
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resources* No one doubts that foreign enterprises can made
a major impact on the development of natural resources by
their ability not only quantitatively to expand, but also
qualitatively to enhance, the productive employment of a
country*s human and physical resources through training and
advancement of skilled labour, and of technical managerial
staff.
Nevertheless, legislative rules establishing a maximum
percentage for total wages that may be allocated to them can
at best serve as general guidelines but are not likely to
provide a specific answer to individual situations, and may,
if rigidly applied, give rise to grievances on one side or
the other which are haixi to settle* dven in the long run,
a foreign investor will want to maintain some foreign
presence as long as he retains financial or other assets In
the enterprise and is expected to provide technological
support* In these circumstances, the exercise of sovereign
rights must be elastic and cat ex* for the needs of all .parties,
c* partial Keiinciuialiment of Concession Area
Concessions for exploitation of natural resources in the
pro-independence period in Africa were vaguely drawn, conveying
for too long a time too great an area, without adequate
safeguards of the interests of the host country* As a result
of the undefined nature of many licences, many local rulers
and chiefs were often in conflict with the foreign companies
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with whom the agreements or licences were purported to have
been signed. Since the Declaration on the Principles of
the Exercise of Sovereignty by the United Nations General
Assembly, most African countries have made a determined
effort to revise these concessions, and particularly to
define them more precisely both as to time and as to area
in order to recover some of the rights which ought to have
accrued to the host country had the area and duration of
licences earlier been defined. For example in the Sudan,
the Government stipulates that*
"A lease area shall be 250 square kilometres and
shall be rectangular in shape and be bounded by
straight lines".
Most of the African States have abolished the granting of
mining licence® for 99 years or in perpetuity? for example
the Zambian Government stipulates that*
"Mining licences shall be valid for a period njjt
exceeding 25 (twenty-five) years in any case"."'
In the pre-independence period a licencee did not require
the company to make any partial relinquishment of concession
rights. For example in a diamond agreement between the Grown
Agents for the Colonies on behalf of Sir Arnold Wienholt Hodson,
Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone, and
292. Mining and Exploration Laws in the Sudan Bulletin No. 25
197^ P.8, Clause 10(l).
293. Mineral Act of Zambia Part VII Clause 51(a)*
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the Consolidated African Selection Trust Limited (a diamond
company) on 5th day of October, 193^» it was stipulated thatt
"The company has the sole and exclusive right of
exploring for, exploiting, producing, taking, disposing
of and marketing diamonds throughout the colony..."
In the above provision, there was no specification of the
time or duration of the licence, the area of operation i.e.
the size or area of land beyond which prospecting and mining
could not go.
On the attainment of independence, African countries
objected to this type of system of granting licences, on
the following grounds:
i. the licence for exploitation of natural resources
was granted for too long a time, as well as giving to the
companies the monopoly of an entire area, in which case, the
mineral deposits might even bo exhausted before the termination
of the period of concession;
ii. Most of the grants to companies by Metropolitan
powers were in perpetuity. A typical situation was that which
prevailed in Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) in a concession
between the Paramount Chief Lewanika of Barotse and the
British South African Company in 1909. This concession
enabled the company to acquire mineral rights over a large
29^. First Schedule paragraph B.
295. C.I.P.E.C. Doc. LEG/8 p.3.
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area indefinitely. On the attainment of independence t the
new government contested the legality of such grant* At
this period the issue was between the government of Zambia
and two foreign companies that inherited the right from the
former company (the British South African Company) i.e. the
Anglo-American and Roan Selection Trust groups.
Hie companies agreed to surrender all special grants
under which no prospecting had taken place since 1964, after
discussion with the government of Zambia. They also agreed
to surrender some other areas where prospecting for minerals
had not been carried out and which were not considered by
296
them to include minable minerals*
The present minding laws and agreements in Africa, unlike
the concession of pre-independence period, give economic
concessions for a specific area, and with a specific time
limit. The long duration of the old concession has been
corrected by a partial relinquishment procedure. For example
in Nigeria it is emphasized that*
Ma lesee is obliged to relinquish half of the area of
the leage_ten years after the grant of an oil mining
lease. ***(
Followdlng the purposes of the above, no lessee can assign
his lease to another unless he has the prior consent of the
296* Ibid, p.4.
297. Petroleum Decree, 1969# Sch* 1, Paragraph 2.
153.
298
Commissioner ot Mines and Power. There are variations
in the approach to such partial relinquishment measures
among African countries. In certain countries the law
stipulates that after 5 years a concessionaire must reduce
his concession area to 75^ of its original size, after 8
years to 5Q/*> of its original size, and after 10 years to
33i^ of its original size. However, after 10 years the
299
33i>j° retained must not be less that 3,000 square kilometres.
In some other countries, the principle of partial relinquish*
ment applies to the search permit but not the concession
itself. Under the Saharan Code, for example, the applicant
is not granted a concession but only exclusive search permits,
(usually called Permit II) valid for five years. This permit
can be renewed twice, for maximum periods of five years each.
The partial relinquishment procedure applies to renewal of
search permits, and during renewal the raining area is reduced
by one quarter.
It is worth considering further the practice of partial
relinquishment in Africa before an attempt is made to examine
the same practice elsewhere. One notable feature is that
in most provisions for relinquishment, there is no mention
298. Ibid
299• e.g. Libyan Law as amended in 1965 » Art. 10.
300, Sahara Petroleum Code, 1958, Art, 1-5»
15*.
made as to whom the state should give a permit to continue
the exploitation work in the relinquished areas* Will the
company which has relinquished such an area prefer a competitor
to work the area it has relinquished? The question is not
so much why a state should ask for relinquishment but how
it will use the area, so that the right of the former
licensee is protected. One possible solution seems to lead
to the reason why the above provision is non existent in
most concessions. It is because most states reallocate
the relinquished area to their own national company. The
same situation prevails in the case of state take overs of
foreign assets. In both cases the most likely recipient
of the concession for the relinquished areas is a state
company.
If we digress for a moment to examine the developing
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situation elsewhere, for example in the Middle East, it
will be found that since the Declaration on the Principle
of the exercise o± Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the
partial relinquishment measure has been firmly entrenched
301. The partial relinquishment measure adopted in Africa
applies also in Middle East Models for grantin- licences.
For example, the Iraqi Government entered into negotiations
with the oil companies from 20th August, 1958, to 1!th
October, 1961, relating to relinquishment by the companies
of the underdeveloped portion of their concession. See
Law No. 80 of 11th December, 1961; See also Economic
Development Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and
Shell B.r. Co. Ltd. on 15th January, 1961, Art. 10} and
Art. 13 of a similar Agreement between the same Ruler
and the Arabian Oil Company, 5th July, 1958. See also
Art. hh of the Economic Development Agreement between
the uaudi Arabian Government and Japan Trading Company
on December 10th, 1957.
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in modern oil or mineral legislation - indicating how various
countries are striving to recover some of the concession areas
previously granted. In general, the partial relinquishment
provision was unknown to the legal regime for exploitation
of natural resources in pre-independence period. The mere
introduction of such measures and the understanding reached
in its application among various countries and foreign
companies engaged in exploitation of natural resources is
of far reaching importance! it indicates that by regaining
the old concession area by measures of partial relinquishment,
states are controlling their natural resources, thereby
implementing the principle of sovereignty,
D, Inspection
Different forms of inspections prevail in the natural
resources industry. They are as follows!
(i) supervision i.e, checking the operational activities
of the companies!
(ii) safety, by this form the inspectors are concerned with
examining how various companies implement the states* safety
measures regulations!
(iii) accident, this form of inspection is concerned with
investigation of various accidents, deaths or bodily harm
that might have occured in the area where the exploitation
of natural resources is talcing place. No matter what the
form of incident, States appoint inspectors. They may be
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high ranking officials from different valks of life - for
example the Republic of Sierra Leone stipulates that:
"Any provincial secretary, District Officer, Officers
of Mines, Department, Geological Department or survey
of* land Department may enter upon any land on which
raining or prospecting operations are being conducted
or which is subject of any lease, right or licence and
inspect any prospecting or miningsoperations or any
works in connection therewith."
As has Just been pointed out, inspectors carry out various
duties, some connected with exploitation of the resources,
and others not directly connected, but still falling within
the responsibility of states as territorial sovereigns.
1. Supervision of operational activities
It is the responsibility of inspectors to see that the
licensee is working the particular mineral for which the
licence was granted. They are empowered to make any surveys
necessary for the purpose of reporting on any land} observing
whether the licensee takes the necessary measures to prevent
or reduce soil erosion caused by his operations, fills all
pits, removes any tailing or other dumps or heaps caused
303
by his operations.
302. Sierra Leone Revised Mines Manual, Chapter 196, Clause
83(1)» Mining Legislation of Nigeria, 1969# Part II
15(1)? Mining Law of Congo (Zaire) Statute 67/231 of
11th May, 1067, Vol. 1, Art. 58.
303. Sierra Leone Revised Mines Manual, Cap. 196, Clause
83(b) 84, 85.
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The inspectors are also concerned with guiding the
licensee against wasteful mining practices. They expect
each licensee to comply with the state's conservation policy.
As representative of the state, inspectors enforce compliance
304
with different aspects of mining: regulations and ensure
that state interests are protected, especially in the
attainment of self sufficiency in inspect of any given
mineral. It is only through inspections that states confirm
that a partially relinquished area of a concession is not
being worked by any unauthorised person or licensee.
In checking the operational activities of the licensee,
most inspectors are concerned to ensure the efficient us®
of the plant employed in the exploitation of natural resources.
For example the Tanganyika (now Tanzania) mining laws emphasize
that 8
"all boilers, engines, ladders, windlasses, brakes,
rop©3, winding gear ana other mechanical appliances
shall b® kept in good conditionrepair to the
satisfaction of the inspector."
In any event, the licensee or his agent may be asked to
prepare a boiler, engine or other appliance for inspection.
The idea behind this requirement is to ensure a thorough
utilization of the resources based on the use of efficient
plant and avoidance of metallurgical malpractices.
304. Mining Act of Zambia, Part VII, Clause 55# 0)» 59.
305. Tanganyika (Tanzania) Mining Act, 1969, (Revised




The provision for safety measures has been discussed
in Chapter III c(3). It is the duty of inspectors to ensure
that the provisions laid down by states are observed.
3. Accidents
States are not only concerned with the thorough exploit¬
ation of natural resources with the objective of getting in
sufficient revenue, but they also care about other matters
that affect the individual worker or the area where the
natural resources exploitation is taking place. Accordingly
many states stipulate proceedings in the case of an accident.
For example the Republic of Somali states that*
"wherever an accident occurs in connection with
prospecting or mining operations causing or
resulting in loss of life, or serious injury to any ^
persons, the licensee shall report to the inspector..."
In the event of such an accident, the inspector will conduct
the necessary investigation. The idea behind such an invest¬
igation is to determine whose fault is the cause of the
accident. The investigation is usually concerned with the
following!
i. Whether the lessee or holder of the rights under
the licence or his agent has been guilty of negligence or
has not taken all reasonable and proper precautions to prevent
such incidents.
306. Mining Code Law 77 of 22 November, 1970* Annex A art. 83.
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11. If the person killed or Injured Is employed In
the area where the exploitation of natural resources is
taking place, or in connection with the mining or prospecting
operations, and the licensee fails to satisfy the inspector
holding the inquiry that the accident is attributable to
the serious and wilful misconduct of such a person, the
inspector may award such compensation as be deemed necessary
to the relatives of the deceased or injured persons.
Obviously the purpose of inspection is to ensure that
the licensee acted within the rights and obligations imposed
on him by the licensing state. To the extent that states
have granted rights and obligations to the licensee, they
are also willing to perform their own obligations under the
licence thereby establishing harmony In the whole transaction.
This is the basic reason for inspection as a factor in
implementing sovereignty over natural resources.
IX. Control
Introduction
ireaiabular paragraph 5 of the Declaration on the Principle
of the lixercise of Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
specifically recognizesI
"the right of all countries and in particular of
developing countries to secure and increase their shares
in the administration of enterprises which are fully
or partly operated by foreign capital and to have a
greater share in the advantages and profit-derived from
such enterprises on an equitable basis.""
307. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVTl) Freambular to paragraph 5«
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It 1* because of the ambiguities in the drafting of the
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
that the above provision may alarm foreign investors, and
thus have a deterrent effect on the flow of private capital
to developing countries. It was not aimed at intimidating
foreign private investors, but at giving a strong moral
backing to developing countries* fundamental right to
bargain for the best deal they can obtain for the exploitation
of their natural resources.
Hie Participation measures are commendable from the
African standpoint, because help without self-help is an
empty gesture. This sentiment was expressed by President
N yei^e in the Arusha declaration thus:
"Independence cannot be real, if a nation depends upon
gifts and loans from another for its development. iDven
if there was a nation, or nations, prepared to give
us all money we needed for our development, it would
be improper for us to accept such assistance without
asking ourselves how this would affect our independence
and our very survival. Gifts which start off or
stimulate our own efforts should not be accepted without
asking ourselves a number of questions.*
The inability of a state to control any area of its economy
leads to resentment and frustration. The major objective of
participation is to create a sound and stable state of the
economy by means of direct national investment, and the
308. The Arusha Declaration was published by Tanganyika
African National Union (Tanu) in 196?.
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conversion of resources into a permanent source of income.
This enables a state to draw up development plans that
broaden the base of the country's economy, so that duplication
and reliance on a single source of income are both avoided.
In order to strengthen the participation control over
the exploitation of natural resources some states have taken
, 309
a 51> share of the capital stock of foreign companies.
Describing the state take over, President Kaunda stated thatI
"participation of the host country in the working of
natural resources was necessary because-of the lack of
mining development since independence."J
In this respect a 51^ share in, or partial take over of, foreign
assets is a result of participating control, (in fact the
51^ take over is better described as participating control
than nationalization)• Participating oontrol of natural
resouroes is highly useful to African states, because such
participation facilitates the integration of natural resource*
enterprises in the economic system of the country concerned,
and promotes development of capital pnd skills.
309. Libyan Law No. 30 of 20th March, 19711 Nigerian 'ally
Times 27th Oct, 1971» Art. 3 of the Agreement
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Sierra
Leone Selection Trust published in Supp. Gazette extra¬
ordinary Vol. C.I, No. 79, 1970, p.^.
310. 'Towards Complete Independence* An address by President
Kaunda to United National Independent Party (UNIP)
Congress at Metro Hall, Lusaka, on 11th August, 1969.
See also Ministry of State Participation Economic
Report of Zambia No. 26, 1971 » p.20.
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Justification for participating control can be found
in international law. It is accepted in international law
that states have exclusive competence to regulate all matters
pertaining to acquisition and transfer of property within
their territories as well as to determine the conditions
for the exercise in their territories of econimic activities
311
of both natural and legal persons. It is not lawful for
them to require that no foreign owned enterprise should
operate at all in certain industries for security reasons,
or that certain pursuits be open to their nationals only.
A fortiori states may require that their nationals own
part of such enterprise.
Participating control, among other things, ensures the
domestic supply of any given products. It is the ambition
of most developing countries to escape dependence on foreign
companies and exploit the resources for themselves. Such a
desire can only be fulfilled by participation. The aim of
participation is to control national resources, and the
control of natural resources is the main object of economic
sovereignty. The controlling participation measures limit
the authority and privileges of foreign partners; assigning
to them a purely business role, depending on services needed,
and leaving the ultiraate control, to be exercised for the
purpose of national economic development, in the hands of
the state*
311 UNCTAb $/CQ^*^6/l4l Vol. 1, General Principle III
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In participating control measures, a foreign partner is
only given a minimum authority needed to enable hiin to play
31 2
a positive role in the development of natural resources.
Instead of the wide and exclusive privileges accorded to
foreign companies under the old concessionary regime, measures
of participating control assign functions to the foreign
partner with a view to achieving definite objectives - thus
participating control measure is innovatory - a change from
the traditional concession whereby the foreign companies
managed the whole operation of partnership arrangements.
A. Management
The structure of the natural resources industry, as well
as their increased awareness of the issue of sovereignty,
have affected management control arrangement between African
states and foreign companies. It may be observed that
improvements, in some cases, 'are not identical. This is
because the way the management control arrangement is shaped
is influenced by the relative bargaining strength of the
parties (.which itself is subject to many factors, such as
the technical ability of the country concerned, and the
importance of a given foreign companies * role to the development
312. United Nations Publications, Sales No. /.72.11.A.9,
1972, p.17.
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of the host country), the host country's concern with the
issue of sovereignty and control, and its ability and skill
in negotiating with the foreign companies.
No matter what the difficulties inherent in the negotiation
of management control arrangements between African States and
foreign companies, some facts from the African standpoint are
very obvious. Increased control over the operations of a
foreign firm, either real or imaginary, promises political
and financial benefits. It is also apparent that ownership
gives more right of control. However among other reasons for
management control are the establishment of the position of
host states in the decision making processes of the enterprise.
This also enables states to come into contact with the actual
decision makers of the foreign enterprises.
Management control measures take the form of appointment
of government representatives to the membership of the Board
of Directors, though the management control of this nature
does not in all cases favour foreign firms. An agreement
in Sierra Leone provides an example of minority interests only
remaining in the hand of the foreign firm. For example
under a renegotiated agreement between the Government of
i
Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone Selection Trust Ltd., a new
company (Dominco) was formed with capital held 51 % by the
Government, and 49> by the S.L.T.S. (Diamond Company).
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Art. 4(c) of that Agreement provides that the new company
will have 11 directors. Six of them, including the Chairman,
were to be appointed by the Government; while S.L.T.S.
31 3
appointed the remaining 5« All the operating assets of
S.L.T.S., as it was constituted during the colonial regime,
were to be acquired by a new joint company which would carry
on diamond mining. The foreign firm was to appoint the first
Manager to carry on the day-to-day operations of the company.
The agreeraent had provisions for the protection of the
foreign firm as a minority shareholder, as well as guarantees
for the State (Government). For the security of private firms
an affirmative vote of three quarters of all the directors
was required for the following:
i. the termination of the operation of the joint company
or the sale or transfer of the assets or rights of the joint
company;
ii. the issue of additional shares, the borrowing of
funds, the creation of charges, the making of loans, or the
giving of guarantees;
313. The agreement is contained in Government of Sierra Leone
Bill (Dominco Agreement) ratification Act, 1970, p.27.
See also American Foreign Service Dispatch A-115, and
A-129 reprinted in Mineral Trade hote Vol. 68 No. 2 pp.8-9.
In some other African countries, requirements for the
appointment of Board members are cast in statutory form
for example, The Companies Act passed by Malawi Parliament,
which came into effect on Feb . 1,1972, required foreign
forms operating in the country to appoint local directors
and inform the government. See Mineral Trade Note Vol. 69,
No. 6; Art. 58, Section III, of the Mining Legislation of
Zaire empowered the Minister of Mines to appoint Directors
whose function will be identical to those in a Joint Stock
Company. See Statute 67-231 of 11th May, 1967.
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ill. the appointment and the removal of auditors of
the joint company;
iv. Any purchase or sale of any product or assets or
any other transaction carried out otherwise than on the behest
of the joint company;
v. any restriction on the effective implementation of
agreements with the government;
vi. the expenditure by the joint company of any funds
or the making of any commitments in respect of any new mining
operation or facility or of any expenditure, considered by
at least three directors to be outside the ordinary course of
business; and
vii. the appointment of any committee, board or attorney
whose powers include the doing of certain acts>
It can be seen from the privisions of the agreement that
African states now have much more say, since any action,
financial or otherwise, of the company requires the vote of
a majority of directors. Nevertheless in certain cix'cumstances,
a state may have a sufficient bargaining power to insist on
a voice in management beyond that of its stock-holdings.
Incases, it has not been uncommon in modem concessions
for the state to have a veto right over certain kinds of
decision, regardless of the size of its shareholdings.
A common mechanism for granting the veto has been a requirement
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that a unanimous vote of the Board of Directors be obtained
before certain matters can be Implemented by the management.
The presence of at least one state-appointed director Is
enough to block a decision unfavourable to the state.
Host of the host countries have chosen not to become
involved in the day-to-day operations of the firms. To make
sure that decisions of importance reach the Board, many
states have insisted that the general operating plans of any
314
company be submitted for the approval of the Board. In
such cases there is a mutual agreement between the company
and the state to keep the stale out of the day-to-day operations,
while assuring to the state the right to review important
decisions. Two central problems face states in instructing
their representatives on the Board of Directors of an
extractive operation.
i. defining which issues they are concerned with}
ii. ensuring that their representatives on the Board
of Directors have the necessary technical date to make
intelligent decisions on matters before the Board.
314. In order to make sure that important decisions reached
the Board, some states have insisted that general
operating plans, usually production volumes, major
investments, sales plans, operating plans, and employment
plans, be submitted to the Board. See Smith and Wells,
Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries, - American
Journal of International Law Vol. 69, No. 3, 1975, p.578.
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It would be wrong to conclude, It appears, that the
Increase of state participation in the management of the
enterprises can help to reduce some of the political problems
associated with foreign activities in the natural resources
industry, lire promise, and sometimes, the practice, of
increased control in the hands of states provides at least
politically useful evidence that states are concerned with
national sovereignty. Again participation in management
control, leaves states with administrative and other advantages
whi«h are better used after the foreign firms disappear.
B. Management Contract
there there is an eqiaut „ share, i.e. the state has 50>
and the foreign firm likewise has 30>«, and if also the state
Is financially and technically viable, the management of the
operation of the firm becomes a collective responsibility.
But the management contract is still popular In Africa, even
under a 51^ participating control. Some states still want
the foreign firm to carry on day-to-day management. For
example a Zambian arrangement with foreign companies provides
an example of the use of the management contract under shared
31 5
ownership.
315. Mineral Trade Mote, Vol. 67, No. 7, PP. 12-16. See also
American Foreign Service Despatch in Lusaka A-30 and
A-93» in 1970, CXPEC Doc. INFO/82 p2
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One of the term* of the 1969 Agreement between the
Government of Zambia and the Hoan Selection Trust (R.S.T.),
under which the Zambian Government acquired a 51> equity . ,
interest in an RST subsidiary operating in Zambia» included
a provision for separate management and consultancy contracts.
RST was to provide the following s
i • technical services (including preparing progress
♦
reports, a long term progress report, capital expenditure
estimates, advice on operating problems);
ii. general services (including advice on preparation
of the company's report and financial statements, and on
the development and processing of minerals)}
iii. specialized services (including engineering consult*
ancy, and staff recruitment).
For the services provided under the contract the RST Was
to be remunerated to the amount of 0.73$ of the state operating
company's gross sales proceeds. Among other things RST
would receive 2$ of the operating company's consolidated,
profits after certain deductions. The fee for special
engineering construction was also to be paid to RST at the
rate of 3^» There was also 15> remuneration to RST for total
emoluments payable to foreign personnel within the first year.
In another different sales and market contract, RST was to
receive 0.75% of the gross of sales proceeds of all sales
of copper throughout the world, and 2.5$ on cobalt sales.
170.
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Similar situations prevail in other countries. On
the whole, management contract arrangement is based on the
need of the country. Just as much as the needs of countries
differ, it will be difficult to speak of a standard form of
management contract. In some cases the companies remunerations
have been based on the volumes of sales and expenses incurred,
in some oases another variant emerges such as turning to
share profit with a hope that the managing firm would have
an incentive to increase efficiency. No matter the basis
for compensation, the interests of foreign firms in the
management have been limited, unless where they have equity
ownership or another form of access to significant portion
of profit.
One may view the above on a first evaluation as favouring
the host country but it seems erroneous so to conclude, on
reflection, since there is a likelihood that the host country
will face administrative problems concerning the tam ogement
contract measures. This is because if the contracting party -
vthe foreign firm) decides to abandon the contract, the host
316. Copper Mining in the Congo, illustrates the possibilities
of using management contracts after complete nationalization.
In 1967 the Congo (now Zaire) Government took over the
Belgian owned Union Mineral du Haut Katanga without
compensation. In 1969 however the Zaire and Belgian
Governments reached an agreement on compensation and on an
arrangement whereby the Belgian company would provide
management assistance on a fee basis. See Mineral Trade
Note, Vol. 68, 1971, pp. 36-42; Smith and Veils, op. cit.
Note 314, p. 582.
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country might not have learnt enough about the enterprise to
carry on. However where a foreign firm is considered important
because of its financial, technological or marketing contrib¬
utions, the new structure (management contract) permits the
negotiation of agreements that allocate control and financial
benefit in ways that reflect the bargaining power of the
parties. In this case ownership of natural resources is
negotiated in such a way that the control by foreign firms
is acceptable to the host state. All that can be said is
that the new structure (management contract) has broken the
tight link between ownership, control, and other financial
benefits that accrued, in traditional concessions, exclusively
to foreign firms. Therefore from the point of view of African
states, it has an element of implementation of sovereignty
over natural resources, in that most states have discarded the
traditional concession in favour of the management contract.
C. Joint Venture Business Operation
The rising tide of national independence and self-reliance
in developing countries has created a desire for even more
active participation by local people in aaqploitation of natural
resources, and a share in the capital and profits of foreign
businesses. The joint venture model offers more than mere
\
financial participation in profits to an extant greater than
the classical 50-50 profit sharing arrangement.
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It enables states to share In the management of* the
enterprise and control of operations on an equal footing with
the licensee or concessionaire partner. The joint venture
form of control of natural resources is displacing the
traditional concession voider which the foreign congianies
did everything themselves. The new form of economic partner¬
ship is recognised by many companies. In fact the late
Signor Mattelj founder and the crusader for the now model,
and a one time director of (ENl) - Ente Kazionale Idrocarburi
was quoted as saying:
"the people of Islam are weary of being exploited by
foreigners. Hie big oil companies must offer them more
for their oil than they are getting. I not only
intend to give them a more generous share of the profits,
but to make them my partner in the business of finding
and exploiting petroleum resources.
A joint venture business operation is becoming another
form of economic development agreement in the field of natural
resources. Unlike foreign economic aid, and financial loans to
states, joint venture -usiness operation, as a form of economic
development agreement, is an instrument of co-ordination whereby
a state and foreign investor establish a complementary relation¬
ship in the conduct of an enterprise for a defined period. In
some cases the agreement is made between the state's autonomous
corporation and an individual or corporation belonging to another
317# Quoted by Robert Engler in "The Politics of Oil: A Study
in Democratic Direction", 19^1, p. 198.
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legal system. Such, agreements are usually contracts for
31 8
long term exploitation of natural resources.
In many African countries a foreign owned, enterprise
is precluded by lav or policy from investing in the natural
resources industry except on condition that domestic partici-
31 9
pation is accepted by such investor. This is so because
states can only get involved in the industry by active
participation. In some oases, however, many foreign owned
companies are reluctant to engage in Joint venture business
operation with the host country. SuOk a refusal to co¬
operate has partly prompted the government of the countries
involved to oppose, in their turn, as a matter of principle,
311>. in Mauritania a new company was fronted under the law of
the country to exploit the Akjoujt copper deposits at
Guells Moghein, an Isolated ridge on the coastal plain
of Eastern Mauritania. The shares are as follows:
i. The State (Mauritania) : 25$
ii. French Bureau de RechereMo Geologique et Miner©: 7%
ill. The Chartered Consolidated Ltd: 54$
iv. Bank de Paris ©t pays Bas: 43$
v. Coraifer: 2.2$
A similar provision can be found in Ghana Cement Production
Agreement:
The Government of Ghana: 75$
The Moreen-Norwegian Corporation: 25$
bee U.N. Doc. E/5170, p. 7.
319. U.N. Doc., Sales JS.73 XI B 1 , 1973, P»7» A study by
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation vUKOX*)
320. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
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ownership of natural resources enterprises by foreign-owned
321
companies; in their opinion development objectives may
bo jeopardised by decisions taken by a Board of Directors
composed of foreign citizens, motivated solely by their own
interests and responsible only to entities outside the host
country.
Such beliefs, though in some cases unfounded, should not
be ignored, notwithstanding immediate business considerations
because consideration of them helps to minimize the deeply
322
ingrained African suspicion of foreign economic domination,
Whether such suspicion is justified in a particular case or
not, the fears are real and an important aspect of the
national sensitivity which characterizes many emancipated
people who were formerly held in a state of economic and
political dependency.
The procedures regarding the association of African states
and foreign concerns or enterprises are always carefully spelt
323
out in joint venture business agreements. In most joint
321 . ,w' ^
322. Many developing countries have been eager to break away
from the traditional form of Agreement. The pressure has
been (l) to increase state participation, in ownership
of enterprise, (2) for State active role in management
and extraction of the resources concerned. See Smith
and Wells Jr., op. cit., p. 572.
323* A Joint venture business agreement was concluded between
the Government of Libya and an Italian Corporation (AGIP)
to exploit pets-oleum resources, on 30th Sept., 1972.
Art. 1 deals with the establishment of the venture.
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venture business operations, the participating interest and
ownership rights pertaining to parties are usually equal, in
324
most cases 50-50, but in others the states hold a majority
of shares* The operation is supervised by the parties through
325
their equal representatives. In any case the close attention
given by states to ©very aspect of the operation is in itself
an effective control. Each party bears the cost and liabilities
326
of the venture in proportion to its participating interest.
Where the state corporation is engaged in the joint venture
with another foreign owned enterprise, they both pay rents and
taxes to the state* In this case the state, as well as having
a stake in the business, also collects royalty and other ®ents,
as territorial sovereign. In some cases the marketing is
done on behalf of the government by the partner, the foreign
corporation, except for any part of its share which the
327
government wants to soli directly. '
324. Art. 2 of the joint venture agreement between the above
mentioned parties.
325* Art. 8 of the joint venture agreement between Sonatrach -
Algerian National Corporation and Getty to explore and
prospect hydrocarbon, on 17th Oct *, 1968»
326. Art. 6 of Libya/AGIP Agreement: Art. 2, 6 Sonatrach/
Getty Agreement.
327• Art. 8 of Libya/AGIP Agreement: Art. 7, Sonatrach/
Getty Agreement.
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At the end of the operation, or termination of the joint
venture, the state usually asks the foreign partner to surrender
certain data"*2** relating to specific concessions or operations*
These data may be utilised by the states. But a drawback
is that neither the state nor the companies cecm to appreciate
the inherent difficulty of such provision. For example, how
will the state use the data whilst protecting the trade
secrets of the company concerned. Does the right of partici¬
pation give the state any right to divulge that data? Whatever
may be the case, it does seem proper that any demand for
surrender of data should be accompanied by a provision concerning
how the data will be vised.
In joint venture operation, most equipment, if retained
329
by states, is compensated for. The method of payment of
compensation to foreign partners for this is simple. Usually
each partner owns an undivided interest, equal to its partici¬
pating interest, in all equipment, machinery, and installations,
as well as storage tanks in the field, pipelines in terminals
and all rights and commitments relating to operations. To
determine the amount of compensation, an inventory is taken
by the representatives of both parties. The same people are
328. Art. 9(4) Libya/AGIP Agreement; Art. 34, Sonatrach/
Getty Agreement.
329* Art. 9(1) Libya/AGIP Agreement.
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responsible for fixing the amount of compensation based on
the usefulness of the machinery required by the state. Apart
from the compensation issue, there are generally provisions
330
for remittance of companies' profits, and reinvestment
331
of companies' profits in the host country.
Before further investigation is carried out, one may ask
what is the rationale of joint venture method of control, in
relation to the attainment of economic sovereignty? It is
fundamental to joint venture business operation that no
party has an advantage over the other. The procedure of
equal, or equity participation, of partners is beneficial
from the foreign investors point of view, especially when
he is unwilling to bear the risk alone, and also for the
host government whose physcological and a possibly unfounded
fear of exploitation is thus overcome. The joint venture
operation in the exploitation of natural resources has proved
an effective way of maintaining economic sovereignty because
it affords the possibility of integrating the natural resources
enterprise into the national economy. For example in the
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone's talks with SLTS
(Sierra Leone Selection Trust Limited - Diamonds) in Freetown,
the Prime Minister, Siaka Steven, contended:
330. Art. 13, Sonatrach/Getty Joint Venture Agreement.
331. Ibid.
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"that since minerals were wasting assets, his Government
was duty bound to ensure their effioient utilisation
into vital economic structures for the development of
the national economy; with that in view his government
decided to participate actively in the country's mining
industry
At its best, a joint venture business operation can be an
important experiment in sharing not only legal and financial,
but also human responsibilities.
Another aspect of the benefits derived by African countries
from such ventures is access to markets. Natural resources
in the African continent include copper, oil, petroleum, gas,
diamonds, and other minerals of the subsoil* Some of tne
above mentioned products are produced in such large quantities
tiiat they often exceed local needs, and therefore other
markets have to be found for them. In this case, the host
government has to make use of the foreign partner, whose
experience in such markets is generally enormous. In some
cases the foreign partner not only agrees to help to sell
the products of its partner, the government, but may even
buy the products itself, thus giving rise to what may seem
to be a buyer's market situation. This is important because
the state will receive revenue when the product is disposed
of, thereby strengthening its economic independence.
332. Sierra Leone Trade Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1970, p. 10.
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By using measures of joint venture control, or participation,
a state can secure full control of foreign companies' operations,
including the preparation of development programmes and
approval of expenditure and investment projects. The enforce¬
ment of joint venture business operations leads to a state
being fully represented at shareholders meetings, and on all
specialised committees. Lack of technical lenowhow appears
increasingly to be an obstacle to effective exploitation of
natural resources. The supply of technical knowhov, like the
supply of capital or ready market outlets, constitute a major
role of the foreign partner in joint venture operations. It
is only when the above factors are in existence that exploit¬
ation of natural resources becomes feasible and a source of
revenue for otherwise unexploited or wasted minerals have no
economic value. The unavoidable need for technical knowhov
in African states favours the formation of joint venture
business operations with foreign companies in the natural
resources industry in order to strengthen their economic
independence. As technological improvement continues to
expand the productivity of the industry and agriculto re,
the ability of African countries to participate in this
advance becomes the key not only to their competitiveness
in international trade, but indeed to their ability to reach
the point of sustaining development.
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Apart from Joint venture business operation between
the African states, or state corporations, and foreign companies,
there has been a novo to organize a joint venture business
operation in the oil sector between the African producing
and consuming countries through the U.N. Economic Commission
for Africa (ECA). This agreement emphasized the necessity of
collaboration between the producing end consuming African
countries in the short terra and long terra policies for oil
exploration, production, processing, supply, distri >ution,
marketing and consumption. it was further stressed, in the
preamble, that such collaboration should, inter alia, have
regard for the interests of both oil producing and oil consuming
countries, for other forms of energy and for the need to
reduce the influence of third parties on the processing,
'333
supply, marketing and the price of oil and its products.
The joint venture business operation en regional basis is
geared towards coordinating policies and activities of members
concerning the exploration, production, processing, transport,
distribution, consumption of oil, its by—products, and sub¬
stitutes, with the aim of accelerating harmonious and balanced
economic developments of member countries •
333* United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Doc. E/CN.
£ f'.lM-j .52, paragraph 3. For an elaborate study of the
draft agreement for the establishment of African Oil
Organisation see E.C.A. Doc. E/CH/ik/hit p.52, pp. 2-15.
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Although, the emphasis Is laid on Joint oil production,
there Is already an element of Integration In the Held of
334
trad© among African states. The relevance of the agreement
334. The treaty for Bast African Co-operation creating the
present Bast African Community was signed in June, 1967#
and came into force in December of the same year. Its
main objective is to strengthen and regulate the industrial,
commercial and other relations of the partner states in
order that there may be accelerated developments and
sustained expansion of economic activities within Bast
Africa* The profit accruing from this Organisation is to
be distributed equally among the members.
See also the Central African Custom and Economic Union
(UDLAC) t like the East African Community , the UDEAC originated
from past economic links and both groupings approximated
to federations at the time of their evolution. Tne XJBSAC
was oreated to replace an earlier Organisation, the TJDE,
which was oreated in 1959 between Chad, the Central African
Republic, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon. In 19^4 the UBEAC
came into existwee including the Cameroon, but in 1968
the Chad Republic withdrew from membership. The main
objective of UDBAG was to establish, gradually, a Central
African Common Market through the elimination of all
restrictions on trade between member states.
For the same purpose of trading Maghreb Permanent Consult¬
ative Committee (CPCM) was established. The protocol
establishing CPCM laid down a number of specific areas
for cooperation among member countries, which comprised
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, in industrial developments,
as well as transport, trade and tourism* It may be
remembered that an Afro Malagesy Mauritius Common
Organisation (OGAM) was oreated in 1966 and had a fourteen
member countries wl:lch were drawn mainly from the areas
of former French West and Central Africa. Their aims
are to cooperate in areas such as industry, agriculture,
and communications. The members aret Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gauon,
Upper Volta, Togo, Niger, Ruanda, Senegal, Chad,
Madagascar, and Mauritius, which Joined in 1970.
West/
182.
to form an all African joint venture business operation in the
field of oil, and. other economic cooperations is that it is a
breakthrough, overcoming many hindrances vkich disrupted
cooperation among African states in the exploitation of natural
resources during the pre-independenc© regime. Under the pre-
independence regime , the African continent was partitioned by
various powers. This hindered the effective formation of
A Vest African Economic Community was established in 1970
to replace the Vest African Customs Union. The protocol
agreement states the objective of the grouping as tie
improvement of distribution facilities, the development
of transport and communications, the harmonization of
industrial development with member countries and expansion
of inter-African trade.
For a more detailed study of the above economic groupings
see U.N. Economic Survey of Africa, 1971, pp. 190-209,
Chapter 15.
On 11th December, 19^9» South Africa concluded an agreement
with three neighbouring countries - Swaziland, Lesotho and
Botswana, for a new Customs Union. The preamble states that
the old agreement of 1 910 required modification w.,. to
ensure in particular that these arrangements encourage the
development of the less advanced members of the Customs
Union and the diversification of their economies' . The
old agreement provided for free exchange of pre*' tots
and manufactures within the oustoma area as well as for
the uniform application of South African customs md excise
tariffs. All revenue from customs and excise duties
were pooled by South Africa., and a fixed proportion,
totalling 1.32 per cent, was returned to smaller members.
This sharing was based on the ratio of actual collections
in member countries in the thre© fiscal years prior to 1910.
The new agreement, which will enter into force on 1 March,
1970 (though the revenue sharing provisions are retroactive
to 1 April, 19b9) retains many of the basic features of ths
old agreement, i.e. generally free exchange of goods, within
the customs area, and pooling of revenues from uniform duties
for redistribution among the members. However there are a
number of important differences. The new agreement provides
for each country's share of the common revenue to be
determined annually by a formula rather than by a fixed
proportion. See ECA Doc. E/CN.14/ST.FTN., 27» p.44.
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of syndicates, or cartels among African states, for the
purpose of exploiting their natural resources. However the
Joint venture business operations of African countries will
fulfil their purpose only to the extent to which the partici¬
pating partners are in fact development orientated and have
the capital and competence to share more than nominally in
the management and control of the entezprise. There may be
other difficulties, such as sharing of profits. Nevertheless
all interests are likely to be served through a genuine inter¬
national division of functions, as is the case in truly inter¬
national companies, whose ownership, management, production
and research facilities are judiciously spread among all the
countries in which they operate.
Consequently the control of natural resources by means of
bringing the different units together for joint venture business
operations can be effective, if it is remeaibered that the
accelerated development of economically small, primary p educing,
export orientated countries requires the promotion of industr¬
ialization but expansion in this direction creates a bottleneck
in small national markets* The importance of economic cooperation,
is obvious in Afz'ica, where national markets are in many cases
small in size. The exploitation of natural resources has been
very slow. There are exceptions, but facts show that out¬
standing performances are really dlffioult to maintain, and
the relative prospecting of the richest oountrd.es is very
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fragile, because Its basis Is very narrow. Above all by joint
exploitation of natural resources, each country is assured of
a supply, and the problem of scarcity is minimized. At the
international level, such multilateral agreements, involving
acceptance of restrictions on sovereign powers over certain
natural resources with the view to achieving a common good
or economic benefits, are common among states; with the
result that it has provided an effective way of implementing
sovereignty over natural resources.
Ill. Forms of Settlement of Disputes
A» Arbitration
The arbitral process is of peculiar significance in
resolution of disputes in the field of natural resources.
This is necessary, since with the passing of years new and
unanticipated conditions may arise creating unexpected hardship
upon one of the parties * The Declaration on Sovereignty over
Natural Resources anticipated such disputes, and accordingly
stipulated, in the last sentence of paragraph 4, that:
"Upon agreement by sovereign states and other Parties,
settlement of disputes shall be.made through arbitration
or international adjudication."-^^
335. G.A. Resolution 1803 (XVII) paragraph 4; See Gess,
Permanent Sovereignty over 2<«atural Resources,
Vol. 13, 1964, p. 430. See also Art. XXIX of the
Charter of tho Organisation of African Unity (oAL)
which contains a provision for settlement of disputes.
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Artibration is not only a dispute settlement mechanism in the
natural resources Industry. It has other aspects which the
American Branch of the International Law Association Committee
on International Commercial Arbitration had in mind, when it
observed the awareness of African states thatj
"their participation in international transactions of
vital importance to their economic development required
the use of-arbitration for settlement of commercial
disputes."
African states have decided to engage directly in exploit**
ation of natural resources, expand their economies, and
international trade. More often than not the execution of
the above projects require capital and expertise on long
term basis, which has to be provided by foreign citizens
and corporations. Long term arrangements are in turn tinged
with uncertainty and risks which a foreign entrepreneur is
anxious to protect himself against. But the events which may
occur in future may be so imponderable as to virtually make
it ixqpossible for the parties to make contingent provisions
in their contracts. An agreement to arbitrate at any stage
of transaction will help to break an otherwise impossible
impasse©. It allays the entrepreneur • s fears about future
uncertainties for it creates a confidence that his interest
336. Report on International Law Commercial Arbitration Progress
1963-64, p. 137 at p. 140.
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will be protected by, or at least represented on, a properly
constituted arbitral tribunal. The importance attached to
arbitration provisions in Africa is attributable to the
above considerations. For example» in introducing the
arbitration bill, which later became the Arbitiation Act,
before the Parliament in 1 961 , the Ghanian Minister of Justice
explained the purpose of the Bill in the following wordsj
"... I wish only to point out that the main purpose of
the Bill is to remedy a situation which is having an
increasingly bad effect on the international commercial
activity of this country. Hon. members may probably
agree that there have been difficulties arising in the
course of negotiations of commercial agreements with
other countries. Objections have usually been taken
by these countries to the provision that the agraemant
should bo governed by the law of Ghana relating to
arbitration of differences arising in such international
commercial transactions and that this law is totally
inadequate.
... The purpose of this Bill ... is to remove this
anomally by providing a comprehensive modern system
of commercial arbitration, adopting the most recent
convention on the subject, ,.namely the United Rations
Convention of June, 1958"."'
In nearly every African country there exists an arbitration
statute. Some countries go so far as to provide specific
338
arbitration procedures relating to investment. There are
also provisions for arbitration in cases of disputes arising
337, Ghana, Hansard (Official Proceedings of Parliament},
1961 , p. 99.
338. Ghana Investment Act, Act 1?2, 1963,
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out of joint venture business operations between African
339
states and foreign owned companies. Again an arbitration
provision is a common feature in treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between African countries and
developed countries
Most of these arbitration statutes are drawn in line with
the principles of arbitration applied in the former colonial
territories. Their basic features and principles follow the
same pattern therefore as the English Arbitration Act of
In some instances the judicial interpretation of these
statutes is frequently based upon precedents established by
Metropolitan Judges in interpreting their own statute. For
example, in the Ugnadan Case of A.V. Roussons Ltd. v. C.J.
Valaline & Co. and C.H. Valentine Uganda Limited (quoted by
Trwrsh and Tsegah) the Court (Meed J.) in interpreting a
provision of the Ugandan Arbitration Act referred to English
decisions and explained this course as follows:
"I have referred to reports of English decisions. This
Court is not bound by those decisions. I respectfully
agree with the conraents of Spry J.A. in Rashind Miledina
& Co. v. Hoima Sinner Ltd. that respect should be given
to such decisions. In my view the English judgement to
339. Art. 10 of Joint Venture Business Operation between the
Government of Libya Arab Republic and AGrlP.
340. Art. 111(3)» Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations
between Togo and United States of America, 1966,
Part I.
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which X have referred contained guiding principles that
are pertinent in considering whether or not this Court
should exercise the discretion vested in it by the
Arbitration Act (Cap. 55) and the Civil Procedure Rule
(Cap* 65)".
One peculiarity in the arbitration statutes of some
African countries is that no attempt is made in any of them
to retain the common law distinction between an agreement to
submit a present dispute to an arbitration tribunal and an
342
agreement to submit a future dispute.
The terminology used in much legislation to define the
contractual provision, which makes the obligation to arbitrate
binding, obscures the traditional common law relating to
arbitration clause, which distinguishes between agreements
to submit future disputes, and actual submissions. For
example the Uganda Statute defines an arbitration agreement ast
"...a written agreement providing for the reference to
arbitration or any future dispute relating to a matter
specific in the agreement, whether an arbitrator is
named therein or not."
The Arbitration Act of Ghana is also not precise in its
definition. It substitutes for the object of arbitration the
term "difference" in the place of "dispute".
341. 1968 (2) A.L.R., Coma. 178, 183| See also ICLQ, Vol. 24
Part 3. 1975, P. 399-
342. For detailed discussion on Arbitration and Settlement
of Commercial Disputes, A Selective Survey of African
Practice, see Tiewal and Tsegah XCLQ, Vol. 24, pp. 393—418.
343. S. 1, Arb. Act, Cap. 55.
344. S• 1 the Arbitration Act (Act. 38), 1961 •
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As one examines arbitration provisions in Africa, one
observes a variety of approaches. For example in the Ivory
Coast, Libya, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and the Chi ted Arab
345
Republic there are no special provisions for arbitration.-'
In the case of dispute, the party may either resort to the
ordinary court, or depend upon any remedy provided in the
tanas of the contract.
In some African countries, even where there is no
Arbitration Act, however, there is provision for the appointment
of an arbitrator. A good number of investment codes, especially
in former French colonies, contain the above procedure. The
general practice is that one arbitrator is appointed by each
rty to a dispute. The third, according to the majority of
codes is appointed by the consent of the two parties. Where
the consent is lacking, the code indicates the procedure for
chosing the third ar bitrator.
It is only in the choice of the third member of the team,
that the laws of various countries differ. According to the
Investment Code of Chad, the third arbitrator is appointed by
the International Court of Justice. In Dahomey, this right is
given to a highly qualified authority designated by t Agreement
or selected from the Judiciary of the country of the investor.
345. U.N. Doc. E/CN.INR/28 Rev. 2, p. 14.
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In the Upper Volte, the arbitrator must be a highly qualified
346
person, which must be named in the contract.
Each of the procedures has its own advantage, and provides
that parties have means for redress in the case of an invest¬
ment dispute. Equally significant is the provision for naming
tn© arbitrator in the contract. This measure from tae onset
avoids the conflicts that could arise in appointing an
arbitrator. It reaffirms the confidence of the parties in
the transaction, because they have chosen a person of integrity,
whose opinion in certain issues will be impartial.
The relevance of Arbitration provisions in fulfilment
of economic independence in the controlling of natural resources
is very important. The existence of an arbitration clause
signifies that the commercial agreement between the state
and the enterprise is to be respected, and that impartial
results will ensue in the case of controversies. Further¬
more, the effect of an arbitration clause is that it leads
to development of settled practice. There may emerge gradually
certain customs and principles which lends certainty to
transactions•
346. See the Draft Convention on Settlement of Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, Meeting of hegal
Experts, Addis Abbaba, 16th-20th Dec., 1963.
347. Art. Ill (4) of the Charter of the Organisation of African
Unity (OAU; stipulates, as one of the principles of the
Organisation, peaceful settlement of disputes, by
negotiations, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration.
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The procedure for arbitration signifies a recognition by
the State that it will not sit in Judgement in disputes
involving its own acts, but will rather join with the other
party (private entities) in the establishment of an independent
judicial body, an arbitration tribunal to which such dispute
will be referred for a final and binding decisions. In such
cases, states waive implicitly any requirement of the exhaustion
of local remedies, and accept em obligation to execute the
arbitral decisions*
Where a state refuses to proceed to arbitration as
required by the Arbitration Agreement, it is guilty of denial
of justice* In the case of foreign investors such a refusal
by the host state will entitle them to seek the intervention
348of their governments on the ground of denial of Justice.
However the above assertion does not apply if the host state1s
refusal stems from general legislation which is not discrimin¬
atory or confiscatory or otherwise inconsistent with minimum
standards, which according to the lex arbitri would invalidate
349
the arbitration. Arbitration provisions, as contained
348, International law grants sovereign states the rights to
uphold the interest of their nationals before the govern¬
ment of other states. See American Journal of International
Law Vol. 54, 1960, p. 484 - Netherlands reply to Government
of Indonesia: see Prof, G. White op, cit. p. 38.
349. Prof. F. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility
AJIL Vol. 54 i960.
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in most African transactions and statutes, no matter what
their shortcomings, give the parties a model for settling
disputes in a manner flexible enough not only to meet all the
needs of the natural resources industry, but also of inter¬
national trade transactions*
There is considerable support for the African approach
that for the settlement of trade disputes, arbitration is
preferable to judicial procedure, even where .domestic differ¬
ences are involved, for reasons which seem universally
recognized - arbitration is less rigid, less costly, and
350
less dilatory than the normal judicial procedure*Settlement
of disputes through the arbitration forms part of the essential
protection which African states give to foreign investors.
Such provisions ensure that aliens are capable of enforcing
their contractual and property rights, and enjoy the
protection of the court. Hie mere fact that foreign investors
enjoy national treatment proves that the control of natural
resources by the African states is within the law and not
discriminatory*
The adoption of arbitration procedures by African States
for settlement of disputes is commendable not only because it
enables the party to appear before the tribunal and to present
350* Rouhani International Agreement and Contracts in the
Field of Petroleum, U.N* Doc. ST/TAO/Ser.C.6o/ p. 291.
See also Henry Catten, the Law of Oil Concession, 1967»
P.59.
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their claims without restraint, but also because settlement
is then conducted in a dispassionate atmosphere. This is
achieved by the selection of a venue (place)?'*1 which has
no territorial connection with either of the parties, and
designation of a personality, with whom neither party has
any association, to appoint the arbitrator, or, in particular,
a presiding arbitrator, should the parties fail to agree on
his appointment. Such a personality could be the chief
executive or Judicial functionary of an international body
or of a third state. There is an apparent difficulty should
either of the parties fail to recognize such an lit ernational
body. A similar case seems to have arisen in the Peace Treaty
352
between Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria.
The merit of arbitration for settlement of disputes
arising from investment contracts between African states on
the one hand and private foreign investors on the other has
been recognised. The adoption of arbitration procedure by
351. Art. 10 of the Joint venture agreement between the
government of Libya Arab Republic and AGIP, 30th Sept.1972,
stipulates that any dispute or difference arising between
the parties in connection with the agreement shall be
settled by arbitration. The venue for arbitration will
be in Paris at the International Chamber of Commerce.
See also the following agreements: U.N.T.S., Vol. 523 » p.
241, Art. 4, between the Government of Tunisia, and
Government of the Netherlands.
Ibid, Vol. 602, p. 235 Art. 6, of an agreement between
the Government of Senegal and Government of the Netherlands.
352. Peace Treaty (i.C.J.) 1950, pp. 8—9 between Bulgaria,
Hungary and Rumania, one of the parties did not recognise
an international body as arbitrator.
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the natural resources industry- is vital, not only because
the resources are important to any national economy, but also
because better understanding between the parties is necessary
to the discovery of new resources. However the negotiation
of such arbitration arrangements may be hampered by the
parties disagreeing on an appropriately neutral location for
settlement. The fact that agreements between states and
*
private foreign investors are no longer an exceptional occurence
and now extend to many fields of econoinic activity has made
international institutionalisetion most expedient. Above
all the only way African states can attract foreign capital
for the exploitation of natural resources is to assure the
investors of fair treatments this is the sole aim of
arbitration measures in the field of natural resources,
B, Conciliation
African states have proved that their exercise of
353
sovereignty over natural resources is within the law.
This is evidenced not only by control of the activities of
foreign enterprise but also by the offering to them of
facilities for conciliation as another method for settlement
of investment disputes) arising from the contractual arrange-
ment, Though this method is not widespread, it is
> r, V W 2 ;• *
353. Protocol, O.A.U. Charter, 196**, Art. XIX.
Art, 17 of the Joint venture agreement between Sonatrach-
Algerian National Development Corporation and Getty Gil
Company 19th Oct, 1968) In Zambia the Chief Engineer
is appointed the conciliator, Mineral Act No. 46, 1969
Part XIII Section 94(1).
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nonetheless Important In consolidating economic independence.
In certain circumstances, particularly in the exploitation
of natural resources, where state and private entities want
to conduct business in a harmonious way, continued cooperation
by conciliation may have greater merit than arbitration.
Hie parties will often need no more than a catalyst, in
whom both have the fullest confidence, to assist them in
settling their differences. In many cases the mere fact¬
finding involved in conciliation can by itself be instrumental
in bringing about an amicable settlement,-^-* As with
arbitration, it is a condition of conciliation that it should
be voluntarily accepted. But unlike arbitrary awards the
3*»6
conciliation recommendations are not binding. In some
instances, however, conciliation has been envisaged as a
formal procedure prescribed as a preliminary means for
settlement of disputes under state contracts.^^^ Such a
formal procedure entails in some, though not in all, cases
355. Mr, Black, one time President of the World Bank, mediated
in a financial agreement between the Government of the
United Kingdom and Egypt - see IBRD, 14th Annual Report,
1958, p.7. See also Broaches in Proceedings of American
Society of International Law, 1961, p.72,
356. Oppenheim, International Law, 2nd ed. p. 13,
357. The Iranian Oil Agreement, Art. ^3, and Iranian Offshore
Agreement, Art. 38, 19<>5# prescribed conciliation procedures
prior to recourse to arbitration.
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certain legal consequences, such as the binding character
of the decision, if reached unanimously by the conciliation
panel, and the suspensive effect of the conciliation procedure
upon the measures which are the subject of complaint and
conciliation.
There is another distinction of some relevance. In the
case of arbitration the parties will expect the dispute to be
settled by an expert - whether legal expert or an expert in
the matter at stake - and will rely on a third party to
appoint the expert, if they cannot themselves agree on the
choice of a person. In consequence, in most cases, the
parties will wish to have recourse to conciliation only
where they are confident that they will be able jointly to
agree on the person who can really assist them to reach an
amicable settlement. (in such cases they do not so much
need an expert in the case). This consideration explains
the fact that the Declaration on Sovereignty over Natural
Resources rarely mentions the conciliation procedure. It was
presumably the uncertainty regarding the type of dispute which
may arise out of agreement, as well as the uncertainty
regarding the conciliator to be selected by the third party
in certain contingencies, which disuaded the members of the
family of nations from including it in the Declaration on
Sovereignty over Natural Resources, and which also influenced
them to prefer arbitration as a remedy.
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Neither of these reasons necessarily applies to the use
of conciliation ad hoc for a particular dispute* In some
cases it offers an outstanding advantage. It is only desirable
that more use of ad hoc conciliation be made, particularly
where it can serve as a catalyst for keeping parties together.
It is also suitable in the natural resources industry, where
almost every aspect of the government and companies relation¬
ship is kept secret from outsiders. From the African point
of view conciliation is commendable. By participating in
such proceedings, the countries are involved in the complex¬
ities of natural resources industry. It offers them a training
ground for participation in deciding affairs that concern
the most important part of their economy. It gives such states
the satisfaction of knowing that they are managing their
economy. It is only hoped that the conciliation facility for
settlement of investment dispute offered by the IBRD i.e.
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
will act as a stimulus, and lead to more use of conciliation
where appropriate in the natural resources industry.
XI .C.S.l.D.) International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes <
It is mistakenly assumed in certain quarters, that the
developing countries1 concept of sovereignty over natural
358. ICSID Convention, 4th March, 1963, Art. 28.
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resources is an absolute one." This assumption will be
found wanting in the African approach isf. carefully examined.
This is evidenced for instance by their ratification of the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes. The
importance of ratification of the Convention on Settlement
of Investment Disputes will be appreciated only when the
jurisdiction of the Centre is examined.
ICSID is an international organisation created by the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States to resolve controversies
between governments and foreign investors through conciliation
or arbitration procedures. The jurisdiction of the Centre
is based on the consent, given by both parties to an invest¬
ment dispute. One of these parties must be the Government of
a contracting State, or a constituent subdivision or agency
designated by such a Government. The other must be a national
of another contracting State, who may be a natural or judicial
person. Once given consent cannot be unilaterally with¬
drawn by either party, even if one of the contracting States
ooncerned should withdraw from the Centre.
359. Journal of World Trade, Vol. 8, 1974, p. 244,
(Permanent Sovereignty and the U.N., by Okeefe).
360. The ICSID Convention came into force 14th Oct, 1966,
Art. 1(1)(2).
361. Ibid, Chapter II, Art. 25(1).
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Once both parties have given their consent, either
before or after a dispute has arisen, either party may file
a request for conciliation or arbitration as appropriate, or
both parties may do so Jointly. The method of filing such a
request is regulated by the Institution Kules promulgated by
the Administrative Council. Each request must be addressed
352
to the Secretary-General, who subjects it ton a preliminary
screening for substantive conformity with the requirements of
the Convention; unless the dispute is obviously outside the
Jurisdiction of the Centre, e.g. because a party has never
consented to submit it to the Centre, the Secretary-General
is required to register the request, whereupon the proceedings
are considered as instituted,
Each Tribunal is the ultimate Judge of its own competence.J
It may also decide whether the proceedings are within the
Jurisdiction of the Centre, and is not bound by the preliminary
decision made by the Secretary-General in registering the
request. Arbitral Tribunals are required to render an award
364
on the basis of rules of law agreed by the parties, or as
specified in the Convention. The failure of a party to appear,
or to present its case, cannot prevent the Tribunal from render¬
ing an award, though it is required to follow special procedure©
362. Ibid, Chapter IV, Art. 36(1).
363. Ibid, Section 3, Art. 41(1).
364. Ibid, Art. 42(1).
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in case of such a default. The decisions of the Tribunal are
365
taken by a majority of its members and the award must be
assigned by them. It is then certified by the Secretary-
General.
366
Once rendered, an award is binding on both parties,
who are required to abide by, and to comply with, its terms.
Moreover each contracting state is required to recognize as
binding all awards rendered in pursuit of the Convention,
whether or not its government or any of its nationals were
parties to the proceedings.
The African preference for arbitration is reflected in
the fact that almost half the states which ratified the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes are from
367
Africa. In fact the greatest use made of the Centre's
facilities has been by African states. The first proceeding
instituted in 1972, concerned a dispute between Holiday Inns
S.A. (a Swiss Company) and Occidental Petroleum Inc. (a U.S.
Corporation) on the one side, and the Government of Morocco
on the other.
The second request for arbitration, which was registered
in 197^» concerned a dispute between Societe Adriano
365. Ibid, Art, ^8(1).
366. Ibid, Art. 53(1).
367. ICSID, 9th Annual Report, Annex 1, pp. 8-9
368. Ibid, Sixth Annual Report, 1973/7^# P«^»
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Gardella SPA (An Italian Company) on the one aide, and the
369
Government of the Ivory Coaet on the other, and the
arbitral tribunal was then instituted.
African states have a marked desire to use arbitration
in settling commercial disputes in which they are involved.
In statutory enactments or decrees relating especially to
investments provision is often made for the arbitration of
disputes which may arise from withdrawal of the concession,
nationalisation, or other measures. Thus the Ghanian
Government after repudiating a number of contracts signed
by previous governments with private concerns, worth US &9k*k
million, on the ground that the contracts had been vitiated
by corruption and illegality still maintained that:
"...the Government of Ghana would be prepared to go to
arbitration in respect of all disputes from our action,
and for this purpose we would be willing to submit to
the Jurisdiction of the Interaational^Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes..."
By submitting a case to the Centre, the prospective parties
accepted the Jurisdiction of the Centre. One can thus
conclude that African states have taken the necessary steps
to promote and maintain the investment of foreign capital,
thereby disproving any allegations that they adhere to a
concept of absolute sovereignty over resources.
369. Ibid, 8th Annual Report 1973/7^» p.4.
370. Ghana Review, Vol. I, 1972 p.21.
202
In any event, there is nothing in the Convention to
prevent parties to a dispute agreeing on their own rules of
procedure for the conduct of an arbitration, in preference
371
to the arbitration rules then in effect. Accordingly the
parties may select arbitrators established under the Convention
provided they possess the necessary qualities. An aspect of
considerable significance is the provision that no state which
becomes a party to the Convention shall give diplomatic
protection or bring an international claim in respect of a
dispute which one of its nationals and another contractor
state have consented to submit to arbitration under the
372
Convention. By giving such consent to such procedures
African states prove their creditworthiness to foreign
investors who may be interested in development of their
natural resources, without loosing control of these resources.
IV. Law Applicable to Natural Resources Investment Dispute
One of the important problems in international law in
general, and world commercial transaction in particular, is
that of the relation between a state and aliens resident in
its territory, engaged either in exploitation of natural
371. ICSID, Art.4.
372. Ibid, Art. 27(1)
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resources or other public utilities. In relations between
states and .private individuals conflicts of interest seem
likely. Before the responsibilities of states and licensees
can be ascertained, it is pertinent first to establish the
law applicable to the economic development of natural resources.
The yardstick for determining liability is always dependent
on whether there is a breach of a provision of a relevant law,
unless it is assumed that these types of contract are always
identified with only one legal regime, the issue as to which
law is applicable in the transaction between states and
foreign enterprise in natural resources industry is a prelim¬
inary point.
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In Africa the raining laws or acts lay down the general
373» e.g. Gabon - Law 15/62 of June 2nd, 1962, is the principal
mining code.
Zambia. The controlling raining legislation is the Mineral
Act of 1954, as amended by Chapter 121 of the Revised Law
1965. Petroleum operations are regulated by the Mineral
Aot of 1955, as amended (in Mineral Gil Regulation) of i960
(also amended). Chapter 122 of the Laws, 1965, Law. No. 2,
19b5, extended Zarabian Jurisdiction to the continental
shelf which was not specifically defined by legislation.
.Gaana. The Mineral Act No. 2, 126 of 1962, supplemented
by the Regulations issued thereunder, governs all raining
and petroleum operations in Ghana. See also Mineral Rights
Regulation, Ordinance, Cap. 153, Mineral Regulation, 1962,
(L.1 231); Mineral Regulation, 1963 (L.1 253)I Mineral
Amendment Regulation, 1963 (L.1 284); Mineral Offshore
Regulation, 1963 (L.1 257); Mineral Oil and Gas Regulation,
1963 (L.1 258); Oil Mining Regulation, 1957 (L.W.221/57);
Mineral Oil Taxation Ordinance, L. No. 17/1951*
Guinea. Petroleum Law Decree 34-110. (undated).
Ivory Coast/
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principle* under which the agreement may be made. They
describe the varieties of authorised relationships, but once
an agreement is made and ratified by legislation, the mining
laws in that particular case fade away, because the agreement
Itself is deemed a sufficient instrument to regulate the
transactions.
In the case of Joint venture business operation such an
agreement becomes the fundamental or consultative instrument
of the Joint enterprise between the Government and the
concessionaire• It embodies a statement of the rights, duties,
powers and privileges of the parties with respect to the Joint
enterprise, and defines their respective spheres of action.
Ivory Coast. The basic legislation governing the development
of Mineral Resources is the Mining Code of July 3rd 1964,
Law 64-249* The Ivory Coast has not onaoted a separate
petroleum code, however, The Minind Code authorizes the
development of hydrocarbons under special decrees.
Supplementary legislation relevant to the application of
law 64-249 to petroleum operation includes Decree 65-96
of 26th March, 1965, and Arret 806, of 26th April, 1965*
The Ivory Coast claimed a territorial sea of 6 nautical
miles in 1967 under Decree 67-334.
Kenya. The Mineral control in Kenya is Mining Act,
Chapter 306, Laws of Kenya, 1962, as amended by legal
notices 142/1965 and 56/1965, and by the Act No. 21 of
1966, and by Mining Regulations made under the Act.
See also Unwrought Precious Metal Act of 1962, Chap. 301,
and Gold Development Act of 1962. The controlling
petroleum legislation is Mineral Oil Act, Chap. 307 of the
Law of 1962. See also Oil Production Act, Chap. 308.
Lesotho. Mining Right 1967» and Mining Rights Amendment
Act, 1968. Precious Stone Act No. 24, 1970, regulated the
precious stone trade and provided for diamond protection
and security. See also Lesotho National Development
Corporation Act, 19571 State Mining Act, 1968, G.S. 73;
1968 G.V. 11 ,
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It la an instrument of coordination* Typically it sets forth
the complementary functions of the parties in the conduct
174
of the Joint enterprise - The bases upon which the gain
175
shall be sharedj The manner in which differences shall
be settled or resolved, the law governing the agreement and
376
the terms of the Joint enterprise.
A proposition that interests some writers is that the
concession agreement should remain an autonomous legal order}
but this view is not supported by the writer because such an
agreement cannot regulate exhaustively, not only the economic
and social but also the political Issues which are often
intermingled in the natural resources industry. This could
account for one of the reasons why the majority of African
states have ratified the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. Again no contract can exist in vacuisn
177
without being based on a legal system.*"'
374. Art. 4(1) (a) Joint Venture Agreement, Algerian National
Development Corporation and SOPEL, a French firm, 15th
December, 1971; see also Art. 1 , Libya Arab Republic
Agreement with AGIP (Italian Finn) •
375. Ibid, Art. 1(3).
376. Art. 16 of the Refinery Agreement between the Federal
Military Government of Nigeria and Shell B.P., 25th
July 1961; Art. 49 of Ghana Valco Aluminium Agreement;
Art. k of the Diamond Agreement between the Government of
Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone Selection Trust, 16th Nov.
1970; See also Mining Act of Lesotho Act No. 43, 1967,
Section VTII.
377 * Lord Mohair, General Principles of Law Recognized by
Civilized States, BYIL, Vol. XXXIII, 1957* p.7| see
also Professor F. Mann, Proper Law of Contract by
International Persons, BYIL, Vol. XXXV, 1959, pp. 49-50.
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However African countries or states do not rule out the
importance to the parties of an agreement, for the single fact
is that it constitutes the first instrument of reference in
cases of conflicts and conciliation. Nevertheless an economic
development agreement as such is not chosen as an independent
legal order to regulate the exploitation of natural resources
because of the wider scope of the natural resources industry,
and the complexities of the relations involved. The above
consideration explains why African states have chosen laws
that are of the broadest generality and content in the control
of their natural resources.
A. National lay
The parties to transactions always choose their laws, and
national laws are always a most favourable choice. For example,
the Mineral Oil Agreement between the Government of Sierra
Leone and Tennessee Sierra Leone Inc. stipulates thati
"their agreement shall be governed by, and Interpreted
in accordance with, the laws of Sierra Leone, and such
principles and rules of international law as may be
relevant, and arbitrators and conciliators shall hase
the award upon those laws, principles and rules.
By making such stipulations, African states are keeping their
control of natural resources within a standard acceptable to
producers. For example the contention that the local laws
378. Schedule 1(19) Mineral Oil Agreement between the Government
of Sierra Leone and Tennessee Sierra Leone Inc.
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should govern the contract can be traced back in English
practice to a dictum of* Lord Romilly, M.R. in 1869 in the
case of Smith v. Wefruelin. The issue involved was whether
or not, where the government of a state contracts a lean in
another country, the contract was subject to the law of the
379
state in which the loan was contracted. ' Another emphatic
statement to this effect was made by the Permanent Court of
International Justice on 12th July, 1929, in the Serbian Loan
Case. In determining the proper law of the loan agreement the
Court observed that:
379. I869, L.R. S Eq. 198. The free choice of law in contraot
between the sovereign States and Individual has been
confirmed by the House of Lords in Hex v. International
Trustees for protection of Bond holders, 1937» A.C. 300.
The case was about a gold loan issued by the United Kingdom
Government in Hew York and subscribed by the American citizen.
When the question as regards the effect of the American
Abrogation of the gold clause arose, it was assumed that,
Britain, being a sovereign party to the loan agreement,
English law should govern the contract. The House of Lords
rejected such a view and maintained that the governing law
was that of the United States of America:
Lord Atkins remarked, at p. 3511
"It appears therefore that in every case, whether a
Government be party or not, the general principle which
determines the proper law of contract is the same. It
depends upon the intentions of the parties either expressed
in the contract or to be inferred from the terms of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances and in the latter
case, the inference may be drawn that the parties intended
the foreign law to apply."
1x1 ffyrton Steamship v. Agent Judlcere du Troe's. Journal
droit International, Vol. 83, 1958, at p. 1003-1009. The
Court said that} in effect, contracts concluded between
states and foreign nationals may in respect of the applicable
law be assimilated to contracts between private persons,
where they possess the feature of private government. It
was held t at English law governed the contract between
the French Government and a private shipping company.
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"Any contract which is not a contract between states
in their oapacity as subjects of international is
based on the municipal law of the country...."
The concept that national law must govern the contractual
relationship between parties in the natural resources industry
has been stressed, to the point of confusion, by Soviet
Doctrine. According to a Soviet jurists, the Soviet doctrine
rejects t
"the attempts of the imperialists to ioipose on a state
obligatory settlement of disputes over compensation
for nationalisation through arbitration or the Inter¬
national Court of Justice. Such a course runs counter
to international law. Terms of nationalisation, including
questions of compensation, are regulated by the national
legislation of the state which effects the nationalisation.
Claims arising in this connection are handled by its
judiciary or its administrative agencies. The examination
of such claims on the international plane and, in general,
the settlement of disputes between states through
arbitration of the International Court of Justice is
possible with the consent of all states parties to
dispute ."Jai
It is evident that the Soviet concept corresponds to
some extent to the traditional international law attitude,
which maintains that international law is a law which regulates
the conduct of states inter se and since an alien party to
the contract is not a state, then such a contract cannot bo
governed by the principles of international law. This view,
though supported by the Soviet doctrine, is somewhat outdated,
and seems not to be absolute in its application to the
380. P.C.I.J. 1929, Ser. A No. 20/21 pp. 41-42.
361. S&pozhnikov, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
Soviet Yearbook of International Law, 1964-63, p.95.
i
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principles of international economic transactions and relatione.
The simple fact that the majority of African statee have
ratified the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes seems to weaken the orthodox Soviet view.
On the other hand, there is an instance where agreements
are subject to their own provisions independent of the law of
the contracting states. This applies to the World Bank Loan
Regulation; No. 3 of this section stipulates;
wthe rights and obligations of the Bank and borrower
under the loan agreement and Bonds shall be valid
and enforceable in accordance with the terms. It
may be regarded as a reflection of pacta sunt servanda
and as a statement of the autonomous character of the
agreement...
A typical example of a contract which is denationalized
can be found in an agreement concluded between the Sheikdom of
Qatar the the Qatar Petroleum Company in 196k. Here there is
a slight difference from the above, in that the agreement,
instead of being subject to its lex contractus, is subjected
to the principles cf law recognised by civilized states
The above investigation has revealed that there must be
factors such as the refusal of means to secure redress in
382 • Broaches, International Legal Aspect of the Operation of
the World Bank, Hague Recueil des Cours, 1959* Vol. 98,
XIX, PP. 3^5-3^6•
383. Section D of the Petroleum Agreement between Shiekdom
of Qatar and Qatar Petroleum Company, 1964.
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municipal courts, or other forme of denial of Justice, before
such cases can be brought within the purview of international
law. In particular cases, however, the concession agreement
may be within the ambit of international law ab initio, either
by agreement of the parties, whether express or implied, or
from certain obvious facts. What is really necessary in the
field of exploitation of natural reoources, where legal and
economic needs are expanding, is a more realistic appraisal
of the situation as it is. In fact Professor Jessup has
this to sayi
NIf those who are trained, particularly in our law schools,
and graduate schools of political science, are nourished
on the pap of old dogmas and fictions it is not to be
expected that they will later approach the situation of
transnational problems with open minded intelligence
instead of open mouthed surprise."
Despite the fact that natural resources economic development
agreements are not treaties, the law applicable to disputes may
still vary. Hence the method adopted by African states - the
application of national law first, then submission to the
Centre on Settlement of Disputes, and, in certain circumstances
t application of principles of international law.
B. International Law
Many writers have dealt with the proper law of economic
concession, but one outstanding error in their work appears to
384. Prof. Jessup, Transnational Law, 1956, pp. 108-109.
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bo a misconception that there Is a given, or rather, one
type of, proper law applicable to the concession. In Africa,
and even in the Middle £ast, there are diversities of cases,
ranging from concessions in the form of licences or leases
for one type of natural resources, e.g. minerals, to contracts
between Head of states and a foreign company for others, an
arrangement which is almost on an equal basis.
Thus the process by which international law becomes
applicable to natural resources economic development contract
can be seen in African approach* For example a concession
agreement may be internationalised where the state and the
alien have agreed to submit their agreement to a form of
international arbitration, for example under Art. 50 of the
long-term Convention of Fstablishment and Implementation between
Mauritania and the Societe dea Mines de Mauritania (a Belgian
Company) tho parties agreed to submit any subsequent disputes
to arbitration at the Centre fer the Settlement of Investment
Disputes
Another example oar. be found in the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and nationals
of other states, under which nationals of the contracting
states may, under Art. 25, have locus standi before an arbitral
035* Arbitration and Settlement of Commercial Disputes, A
Selective Survey of African Practice by Tiewul and Tses&h
ICBQ, Vol. 24, 1975, p. 406.
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tribunal or oonoiliation commission established under the
Convention's Art. 36 and 28 respectively. Under the Convention,
an arbitral tribunal is required to apply the law of the state
party to the dispute and such rules of international law
as may be applicable. The ratification of the Convention
on Settlement of Disputes by nearly all African states has
clarified the situation, in that international law is adopted
and later on, applied, depending on the circumstances, ex
contractu, that is a body of law freely adopted by the parties
at their free will, rather than ex lege, as body of law from
which a legal relationship stems irrespective of the will
of the parties.
In the field of exploitation of natural resources involving
countries that have Just acquired political independence and
foreign companies, the law is relatively new, and still expanding.
As might have been expected there are not enough actual court
cases arising out of these contracts between governments and
individual private enterprises to form any clear precedents.
Obviously statute law establishing appropriate principles is
limited and, in the majority of Jurisdictions pertinent to our
consideration, is often non existent. It is only bearing this
386. Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes Art. 42(1).
213.
in mind that one may examine the degree of* consensus reached
by developed and developing countries on whether the Declaration
of* Principles of the Exercise of Sovereignty over Natural
Resources now stands as the law on the subject. Moreover the
fact that African states both allow the licensee access to
local courts, and agree to submit any case to the Centre is
evidence that their exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources is within the law.
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CHAPTER V
ERAMEyORK OF FJK^HC^L COKTRfiL
Introduction
From previous Chapters, it is evident that several
factors and considerations have played a part in the develop¬
ment of the widespread belief that a state*s economic prosperity
is largely dependent on its control of it© natural resources.
Host African countries think in terms of controlling natural
resources for economic development, rather than for prosecution
of war) hence every effort is directed towards encouraging
investors in the natural resources industries.
The new states have come to realise that foreign capital
will flow fastest to countries which make it most welcome.
This is a fact of life, which the new states have to face,
that foreign capital will flow to countries which have a good
climate for investment. This is so because mining companies
are only Justified in spending shareholders money on expensive
'grass root' exploration programmes in those developing
countries which offer the necessary stability and security
of tenure. In this respect African states should appreciate
that they are in competition with such countries as North
America, South Africa and Australia, which not only afford an
ideal ollioate for investment but also offer much scope for
successful exploration. Undoubtedly it was the realisation
of the importance of this that prompted the recent promulgation
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of investment legislation in Africa in the field of natural
resources. This Chapter will therefore examine various
financial controls and economic inducements available in
natural resources enterprise.
1. Inves twent !r-,r '3L* d.h fro y - ~ - 1 "
A. Development
The essence of the promulgation of investment legislation
promotion as a method of control over natural resources may¬
be appreciated only when a brief analysis of the historical
background to problems of capital investment during the pre-
independence regime, especially in the natural resources
industry, is undertaken. To a great extent capital investment
for military and administrative purposes preceded every form
of economic development, and also exercised a potent influence
on subsequent economic activity. Nfit all European powers
possessing territory In Africa were able and willing to incur
these expenditures. Consequently, tftey resolved to utilize
every method available to persuade the private enterpreneurs
to undertake the task themselves, a burden which the latter
were unprepared to assume without the concession of special
advantages. This was therefore the basic course followed
resulting in a policy of large mineral and land concessions
in many African countries."*^
387* Prof. Frankel, "Capital Investment in Africa; Its Course
and Effect" , a book published tinder the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1938.
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It was also the reason for a groat revival* during this
period, of the system of chartered companies in Great Britain,
whose example was followed elsewhere. These companies differed
from the prototypes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
in many fundamental aspects. They were created for various
reasons. The ideas which led to granting of charters to
early companies and which inspired their promoters were
entirely consistent with the general principles of government
and economic policy, of the times. They were in every respect
private concerns, and their founders looked to the advantages
of privileges and monopoly for their reward.
There was no doubt that the companies achieved some
noteworthy results. They built roads and railways, opened
up trade, enforced order, and at all events laid the foundation
of administration. But their very success in this direction
finally exemplified the transitory nature of the task which
they were fitted to fulfil. The fundamental economic reason
for the abandonment of the chartered company system in British
Afrioan Territories was that the companies could only continue
as long as they were able to raise capital from the public.
None of them was able to continue indefinitely to assume the
increasing burden of long term investment in administering
and developing vast untapped natural resources within the
territories under their control.
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Even the Niger Company, which was financially successful
owing to the expansion of the trading operations out of which
it grew, and in which, in effect, it established a monopoly,
was unable to bear the burden of administering the vast
hinterlands which it opened up. Moreover it was significant
that German chartered companies, which were modelled on the
British charter system, all failed in the purpose for which
they were created, owing to the fact that their financial
resources were inadequate."^3 The chartered company system
could not in any given case solve the problem of supplying
long term capital investment for territories in which
opportunities for immediately profitable production were
absent•
The investment procedure adopted in many foreign-owned
African territories illustrated the o>ove approach. Xn most
oases the licensees were not able to raise sufficient capital
for long term development, and often were disinterested in
such activities. The lack of well established investment
regulation led to stagnation of economic development in parts
389
of French and Portuguese African territories.
368. Bismark commenced German colonisation in Africa on the
model of the British chartered companies in order to
avoid political and economic responsibilities but his
plans proved a failure. See Mary Evelyn TownsLend, "The
Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire", 1930.
389* For a good description of the early activities of
"chartered companies" in Africa, see Encyclopeadi
Britianica, Vol. XXVI, Tenth Edition, pp. 691-702.
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It so happened that before the world wars, capital was
thought to be the key to open up the African continent. At
that time very little was known of what capital oould not do.
It was only after the chartered companies had given up the
administration to their home governments that a little more
of the realities and inevitable gradualness of the task
involved in developing the vast continent and its resources
was realized. Whereas economic growth was once thought to be
primarily dependent upon capital, it was then seen that the
influence of capital was restricted by far reaching institutional
190
factors. Particularly in Africa its rate of application
became increasingly dependent on the extent to which greater
skill and knowledge could be imparted to the population and
its latent powers stimulated to new activities by more flexible
economio institutions.
Unfortunately there was then no form of regulation or
legislation for foreign investment in the natural resources
industry. Notwithstanding this fact different European
Governments, especially the British, did everything .to attract
private investors into the natural resources industry in their
overseas territories. For instance in British dependencies,
a considerable part of the early investment was directly
financed by government loans and grants-in-aid. Whenever this
390. Prof. Frankel, op. cit. (Note 387) p.24.
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was don® it was invariably because without government inter¬
vention the capital would not have been made available.
Apart from these loans and the powerful influence of the
391
Colonial Stock Act, there was no direct control of
Investment,nevertheless the direction it took was influenced
in many ways* The subsequent diversities did not take place
through definite regulation but by the process of consciously
or unconsciously influencing public opinion and the expectation
of investors.
The exploitation of natural resources had not been as
actively pursued in German and French African territories as
in British African dependencies because the German anf French
investors had been less ready to invest in enterprises of
so speculative a character as mining. They preferred to
invest in fixed interest bearing ohs es, and moreover they
looked more to Europe as a place of investment, than overseas
393
territories. Xt was therefore natural that the very few
private investors concentrated on investment in what seemed
the easiest openings for profit. Since not all parts of
the continent were explored, it follows that workable deposits
were discovered only in the areas to whioh investment was
confined.
391. For a study of events which led to and influenced the
Colonial Stock Act, see "The British Empire", a Report
on its struoture and problems by a study group of members
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
19371 PP. 290-291 .
392. Prof. Frank©1, op. eit. (Note 387) pp. 16-29.
393. Lord Halley, An African Survey, 1930, p. 1513.
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B. Objectives
On attainment of independence African countries assumed
sovereignty over vast natural resources, which they could
not develop without foreign capital, hence the promulgation
of investment legislation, which in its approach and implement¬
ation market the difference between pre-independence and post
independence control over natural resources. Investment
legislation promotion creates the framework that facilitates
the realization of the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources, just as much as economic planning gives concrete
expression ft© the aspiration that led to independence. The
importance of investment legislation in th© African natural v
resources industry lies in the fact that scarce capital, both
domestic and foreign, must be channelled to provide an infra¬
structure . In this respect the function of investment
legislation promotion is to announce and define the policy
of the government with respect to areas of investment,
particularly natural resources, and location of investment
i.e. where foreign enterprise may be allowed to operate.
The major purpose of investment legislation promotion
is governmental enumeration of the duties of the potential
394
investor, and the privileges accorded to him in return.
394 • See Official Journal of the Algerian Republic No * 53» of
2nd August, 1963, p. 744, for Law 63-277. 25th July, 19631
and Art. 38, Republic of Chad Decree 156/TR, Art. 3j
Somali Law No. 10, of 18th Fob, i960, published in Official
Bulletin of Somali, Supp. No. 2 to 5. Art. 13, 14 of the
same year (i960).
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Secondly, it is to facilitate tlx® method of application fox*
foreign investors, and at the same time to enable the government
to select those foreign enterprises which have adequate
financial plans and modem equipment, and which, by reason of
their location or sector of activities, will contribute to
the economic development of the country concerned within the
framework of national plans and programmes. States indicate
not only the main area of operation in the public, private
and mixed sectors, but often enumerate specific natural
resources industries which are accorded priority in the
•595
process of industrialization. Such industries are mainly *
i. Mining industries which extract and refine or convert
solid, liquid or gaseous mineral substances and their affiliated
companies serving the purpose of maintenance, construction or
transportation, and companies engaged in oil research}
ii. Enterprises engaged in the preparation of processing
of local plant and animal products;
ill. Industries engaged in the production and servicing
of primary consumer goods;
iv, Fishing industries and ship owners engaged in commoroial
fishing when they themselves market the products locally.
395. haw of Mauritania National Assembly of 26th June, 1961, No.
61*122; Republic of Madagascar Ordinance No. 62*024
(essentially a redrafting of Law No. 61-037 of 9th October
1961). In the Republic of Cameroun, priority schedules
describe the type of enterprises suited to exploitation
of natural resources, see Law 62/DF 297 of 7th August,
1 972.
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The above industries require capital investment, which
at times is supplied by foreign citizens.
A remarkable peculiarity is that most of the ex-French
colonies with an integrated investment code have specified
approved industries according to their basic economic needs.
The natural resources industries in this category are those
producing agricultural products, manufacturing and assembling
articles of general consumption, mining, and those engaged in
396
production of power, real estate and stock revision.
Another group of states prefer to enumerate their priorities
in government publications rather then by including them in
397
the investment legislation. Whatever the case, a scale
of priorities exists which indicates the future pattern of
industrial development in a given country and the range of
choices available to potential investors.
The control of exploitation of natural resources through
investment legislation has been embarked on by the African
states for the following reasons;
i. the desire to achieve a more equitable geographical
distribution of economic development, in areas where special
problems - lack of heavy capital, and heavy techno logical*
requirements - have hampered, or militated against, the
396. U.N. Doc e/CN.14 INK, 28 Rev. 2., p.6.
397. Prime Minister's speech in Parliament, News from Nigeria
April 1st, 1964, p.10. See also first; progress report of
the Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Sessional
Papers No.. 3, DD 48-51, of 1964.
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development of natural resources.
11* In Instances where climatic conditions or the long
distance from markets have resulted in the disproportionally
slow economic development of a particular resource compared
to others or the rest of the country legislative measures
have been taken to attract industries by means of special
tax abatements, accelerated depreciation allowances, and
preferential freight rates•
iii. Investment legislation promotion attracts foreign
and domestic investors by creating a recognizable structure
of and a legal framework for government policy both for
potential investors and for administrators.
iv. The exercise of the principle of sovereignty over
natural resources in this form has become a universal procedure
for promoting industrialisation in African countries.
v. Investment legislation provides an orderly framework
within which African states are organizing themselves to reach
their economic goals because such legislation embodies the
changes in the form of the duties and privileges of investors
which the governments need to make to carry out their develop¬
ment plans.
One may say that the investment legislation promotion
adopted by African states is welcomed by foreign investors.
This is so beoause a private foreign investor in natural
resources enterprise may regard stability - political, economic
22k
and to some extent, legislative - as the principal factor
determining confidence. This has achieved international
recognition as the following extracts show:
"From the point of view of foreign investors what
is decisive is not so much the granting of complete
freedom but rather a clear and if possible definitive
statement by developing countries laying down the
conditions under which foreign capital ia,->accopted
(into the natural resources industry)".
In can be seen that the implementation of the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources from the African stand"
point, has generated a practice, which may now be said to have
attained the status of lawf evidence of the formal validity
of which is derived from the practice of states.
XI. Preliminary Regulatory Agencies
Screening of foreign investment in the natural resources
industry as a means of controlling the foreign exploitation
of such resources is a post-inclependenoe introduction in Africa*
Thus in the majority of independent African states access to
resources by foreigners, whether by individuals or corporations,
is controlled. The prospective investor in the natural resources
industry needs the prior approval of & competent government
body to which he must submit his plans* hot until a decision
is taken by that body on the basis of the country's econoniic
development policy for the particular resource concerned will
he be allowed to import his capital.
398. UNCTAD Doc. TD/13/85/Rev.1, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.
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In some countries the application for eligibility must
be submitted to the Minister of Finance and Comerce. Usually
the application will include the nature and volume of
investment, and other supporting documents which must contain
a financial and constitutional statement on the nature aid
function of the enterprise, an economic study of the proposed
activities, and the manner in which the proposed enterprise
will fit into development plans, and lastly an account of
the investment proposed* Such is the case inter alia in the
n *. 399 T .. 400 „ . 401 , „. . 402Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sudan and Nigeria.
1. Investment Commission
In other African states there is different machinery for
the implementation of the principle of sovereignty over natural
resources through screening, generally by "an investment
commission"• This practice is common among countries such
399* The investment code in the Ivory Coast was enacted in
1959 by Law No. 59-134. Other texts include Decree Ho,
60-9» 6th January, i960, and 377 FABF, 18th January, 1JoO.
400. See An Act of Establishment of National Production
Council, approved by the Parliament of Liberia on 23rd
February, at its 43rd sitting, first session.
401. U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/INR, 28 Rev. 2, p. 63.
402. Nigerian Trade Journal, Vol. 12, No. 3, July-September,
1964, p.91.
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as Algeria, Cameroun, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar,
and the United Arab Republic.Constitutionally these
conxnissions are quasi-governmental agencies whose relAtions
with governments, via ministries, are very intimate. Most
of the Investment Commissions are established in conjunction
with investment legislation and promotion in the natural
resources industry. They are statutory bodies designed for
special purposes, processing the applications of potential
investors interested in the exploitation of natural resources,
and at the same time promoting investment projects by offering
technical and commercial facilities.
*
2. Economic Control Commission
Variety exists as regards the name of the screening
authoritiesi in some countries they are called "Commissions
for economic control" and are selected from members of national
409
political parties, ' in others they are called "economic and
403. U.M. Doc. E/CN.14/INR/26, Rev. 2, p.13.
404. Cameroun Investment Law 60-64, Art. 4-5, of 25th June, i960.
405- Ethiopian Investment Code, 16th Sept., 1963, Art. 4(1).
406. Ghana Investment Act of 19th April, 1963 Art. 1(2).
407. Madagascar Ordinance No. 60-037, Title II, Art. XIII and
XIV of 9th Oct . , 1961 .
403. U.A.R. Law No. 475, of 1934. The Economic Authority, as
the Screening Board is called, is attached to the President's
Office from where the activities of various enterprises
engaged in exploitation of natural resources are controlled.
409. In Guinea the particular authority to which an investment
programme is submitted is not stated in the investment cede,
but the main function of the Commission de Controle Bconomique




social councils". Hegardleas of the difference in names
of the screening authorities in different places their
functions are identical, and they are all vested with
powers to deal with economic and social matters as they
affect the natural resources industry and to advise states
on these matters.
Screening of investment in the natural resources industry
is an administrative act by which the African states control
the international flow of goods, services, and capital. It
is usually imposed by states for one or more of the following
reasons:
, >
i* to correct balance of payments disequilibrium by
allowing only such amount of Imports of goods and services,
and outflow of capital, as can be financed by earnings from
export goods, services and flow of capital;
il. to protect nationals from trading with certain states
for political reasons;
iii. to protect national production by prohibiting the
free entry of foreign products into domestic markets;
iv. to channel investment to the development of particular*
natural resources, where insufficient sapital has hiterto been
a barrier to progress.
410. Brochure No. 3» published by the Embassy of Tunisia,
(undated) pp. 4-6.
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In this respect the establishment of financial institutions
or commercial banks becomes pertinent to the exercise of the
principle of sovereignty over natural resources.
3. Development Banks
In most African countries national development banks
411
have been established. As an instrument for controlling
the exploitation of natural resources their main objectives
are to assist in the establishment of privately owned industrial
enterprises and their expansion. The banks co-operate with
the appropriate government institutions in conducting systematic
research into sectors of industrial production suitable for
operation by private enterprises. The banks ensure that all
the selected enterprises for the working of natural resources
are appraised on their financial and aianagerial merits and
also ensure that their importance is assessed from the point
of view of a balanced economic development and their contribution
to the national economy. Among other thing's, the national
development banks certify that the investment is actually
directed to the areas which the state has approved. The banks
take the responsibility for negotiating the association of
411. The Algerian Development Dank was established on 21st
April by Decree ho. 63-182, of 16th May, 19B3J be© also
the Official Journal 21st May, 1963, p. 502. The
Cameroun Dank was established on 21st April, 1 961 by
Decree No. 60-24?. In Congo Brazaville an Investment
Dank was established mainly to uelp process and assess
foreign investment in the country by haw No. 52-61, of
30th December, 1961. In Ethiopia the Bank took the
forta of a share Company in August, 1963 — See Art. 304-509
Title IV, of the Commercial Code of the Empire; the
Bank of Somali was established by Law No. 8, 1956, Art. 10.
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government or private capital with foreign enterprises. Apart
from this the banks also provide financial assistance in
preparing all projects in the natural resources industry,
organizing production, labour, sales, and giving general
guidance in the management of the enterprise.
It is quite obvious that screening as a method of
implementation of sovereignty over mtural resources has a
defined objective. Perhaps the most important and, in any
case, the most widely found, objective is concern for the
condition of the country's balance of payments. Another
objective may be attributed to avoidance of the excessive
concentration of foreign investment in a few natural resources
deposits or fields. Since investment in Africa is mainly
directed to exhaustible or non-renewable natural resources,
such as petroleum and copper and these industries earn the
greater bulk of foreign exchange for such countries, it is
pertinent to adopt screening methods in order to ensure that
investment complies with the country's general economic
policies and long term development plans, and to avoid any
balance of payment difficulties arising from unessential
investment and to protect the state against any inflationary
tendencies which might result from unrestricted investment.
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Notwithstanding Mie control of natural resources through
screening procedure, the importation of foreign capital into
Africa is left nominally free and the approval of African
states is not a mandatory requirement. On the other hand,
if such approval is required, certain legal guarantees or
privileges, or both, regarding such matters as taxation and
exchange restrictions, are granted at the same time, so that
the approval of African states becomes necessary in substance,
if not in form. Screening of investment in the natural
resources industry is often motivated by geographical
considerations, especially when states do not want the foreign
enterprises to operate in certain areas, such as near their
frontiers, fir in strategic zones; such practices r ™e inter¬
national but cannot be evaluated in the abstract since they
depend on each country's peculiarities.
The practice of screening is often said to be a deterrent
to the flow of foreign investment into natural resources
Zj.1 2
industry. It must be remarked that there is abundant and
controversial literature on the question of creating an adequate
climate for foreign investments. Yet neither in capital exporting
nor in capital importing countries are the needs of an investor
412. Bradow, Legal Deterrent to Private Investment, Grotius
Society Transaction, 1957» Vol. 43, 1959t P*J>1 •
231 .
clear and precise. After weighing the value of the screening
of foreign investment in the natural resources industry as
a means of controlling the foreign exploitation of such
resources the extent to which it affects the volume of
investment of foreign capital in Africa is open to doubts.
It is maintained in this study that the principal short¬
coming of the screening system is its inherent lack of legal
permanence. This is attributed to the fact that such legis-
lative measures are more liable to changes than the constit¬
utional provisions, special contractual engagements, or indeed
commitments undertaken at the international level by means
of treaties* The writer would not wish to suggest that
changes made In the screening system have often affected
basic provisions regarding the legal security of foreign
investment and adjudication of disputes. Nevertheless the
very fact that these unilaterally enacted measures may also
be amended unilaterally is a cause of apprehension to the
foreign investor interested in exploitation of natural resources*
It is not disputed that in some cases the criteria in
effect express not only nationalistic tendencies but also
a desire to protect existing uneconomic or insufficiently
financed domestic natural resources industries. Furthermore
screening of foreign investment in the natural resources
industry may result in the establishment of a government
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bureacracy, which may be antagonistic to foreign investors.
Another likely source of dissatisfaction from the point of
view of investors may be that screening authorities are
generally rigid and sometimes may be arbitrary in their
application of relevant regulations. Their inquiries into
projected enterprises and prospects may be detailed to the
point of absurdity, and their standards for valuation of
such capital and assets as machinery and patents may be
arbitrary and perhaps detrimental to the investors' interests.
Some of these contentions may be true, but they indicate
the need for improving rather than eliminating screening
practices. From a legal point of view the acceptance of the
practice in international law cannot be contested, because
screening may be considered as coming under general rules
allowing states to impose any restrictions they see fit on
the entry and residence of aliens. It is also supported, by
41 3
state practice and by textbook rrdters, e.g. one learned
author stated that:
"In practice every sovereign state is free to organise
its own social and economic system to its own liking.
This follows necessarily from the normally unrestricted,
freedom of independent states in matters of internal
jurisdiction".
413. U.N. Doc. A/AC.97/5/Rev. 2, pp. 56-62.
414. Prof. Schwarzenberger, Protection of British Property
Abroad, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 5» 1952, p. 308.
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When once It is recognized that the control of foreign
exploitation of natural resources through & screening procedure
is the practice of states it has also to be conceded that
there is nothing illegal in it if applied judiciously.
In Africa, for example, once foreign capital is admitted
into the natural resources industry, it is no way restricted
and problems relating to its entry are non-existent. It can
be said that there is consideraole substance in the argument
that a screening practice in natural resources industry is
probably desirable from the stand point of an investor, since
it carries with it the assurance that the investor has mot the
requirements of the host country and thereby qualified for any
necessary protection and privileges.
Screening of investment in the natural resources industry
establishes the role of the state as a regulator. In this
aspect the state uses various leverages of control, notably
the power to regulate Investment in the natural resources
industry and the volume and kind of ioq^orts and exports,
through such msans as exchange controls, import and licensing
controls* This last-named device, though used by any country
that suffers from more than a temporary balance of payments
deficit and consequent foreign exchange shortage, is particularly
important for African states. At present, on the global level,
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the screening method of control of natural resources Is commonly
used by the Industrially developed countries of both Vest and
.wast so that it has come to witness a situation in which tie
role of the state as the owner and regulator of natural
resources has become sufficiently large to cast doubts on the
validity of "capitalist" and "free" as appropriate adjectives
for enterprises, but not sufficiently large to justify the
415
appelation "socialist".
Generally, there is no laxity over the control of natural
resources by African countries, the rights to which they were
stripped in the pre-independence period. The need for effective
control of natural resources may be attributed to its importanoe
in maintaining economic sovereignty. Analagously, the dominant
concept of sovereignty over natural resources, as exercised
by independent African states, may be said to have been Implied
in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, on the Auatro-German Custom Union. Thus in interpreting
Art. 88 of the Treaty of Peace of Saint Germain of September,
1919» the majority of judges asserted that the article must
be understood to meant
415. E. Hanson (hd. Manson) The Corporation in Modem Society,
1960, p.15.
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"the continued existence of Austria as a separate state,
with the sole right of decision, in all matters,
political, financial, economic, or otherwise ...
Austria's independence is violated as soon as there
is violation of this right of decision, the different
aspects of independence bein^ in practice one and
indivisible .*•
In this context, it is safe to say that the enforcement of
the screening method adopted by the African states, to strengthen
their control over natural resources, is relevant to the
exercise of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources.
HI• Control of Remittance of Capital and Profits
The issue of the control of remittance of capital and
profits to the country of original capital investment did not
arise in the pre-independence period, not only because there
was no investment regulation in the natural resources industry,
out also because most at the investors were citizens of the
f
Powers under whose law most African territories were administered.
iowever significant changes took place in the post independence
period, whereby the ownership of the natural resources reverted
to African states, while the capital and technical know i <ow
remained foreign. Since the exploitation of natural resources
demands a lot of capital investment, the major supplier of
wuich is still the private investor, any exercise of sovereignty
over natural resources will not lose sight of these fects.
416. See the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, of 5th Sept, 1931, on the Custom
Regime between Germany and Austria, P.C.I.J. Series A/B
No, 41, pp. 45-46,
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Repatriation of Capital
African states not only Incorporate conditions for the
entry of foreign capital into the natural resources industry,
but also lay down rules for capital repatriation; for example,
the official policy of the government of the Sudan categorically
states that}
"the government accepts the principle that foreign
industrialists should have the right to remit profits
to the country of origin of the capital and furthermore
it should give assurances in respect of payment of
compensation in the event of acquisition of any property
by nationalisation and will also grant facilities for
repatriation of such compensation."
hike other methods of controlling the exploitation of
natural reaources, the approach of many African states, though
geared towards maintaining effective control, differs in the
percentage of the amount to be transferred* For example some
countries have accepted in principle that foreign enterprise*
are allowed to transfer their capital after admortization at
417* See African Special Report, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1959t p.20.
The system, em it operates in Nigeria, is quit© clear in
that profits and dividends arising from sterling or non-
sterling capital investment in approved projects my be
freely transferred to the country of origin and such
capital may be repatriated at will; prior permission for
non-resident capital investment and approved status must,
however, be obtained from the Federal Ministry in Lagos
See Statement by Alheji Kkzori, Minister of Nconouiic
Development, July 15th, 1964, p.6.
A guarantee of freedom to transfer profit abroad is also
given to foreign Industriallsts by the Republic of Congo-
Brazaville - See haw No. 39/61, 20th June, 1961; See also
Kenya Government Investment Bill, 1964, Art. 7(aj(b)(c)j
Ghana Investment Act No. 172, of 1963, Art. 3. The
Government of Gabon guarantees absolute liberty of transfer
of capital and profits - see Investment Code of 8th Nov,.
1961; Uganda Industrial Charter 9th June, 1964, Art. 3f
Investment Code of Niger, No. 61-21, of July, 1961, Art. IX.
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the rate of ten or fifteen per cent counted from the last
exempt fiscal period. In addition all foreign investors or
tenders are authorised to transfer annually seme of the
interest, and at least twenty per cent of their shares of
the annual net operating profits. A portion of wages (thirty
4'
per cent) paid to foreign personnel is also often transferable*
Another group of countries stipulates that any enterprises
working their natural resources will benefit from the facilities
of transferring funds under the existing investment legislation
in force at the time the transfer is sought} in addition sums
resulting from liquidation or sale of enterprises or of shares
and special capital stock are guaranteed on parities established
41 9
by the International Monetary Fund. In some cases allaxis
are only allowed, subject to verification by the competent
authority, to remit 'dividends, proceeds and liquidated
assets of capital invested in the original currency to the
420
country of residence'.
418# Guinea Investment Law 5QAn/62, Title IV, Art. 20~24.
These provisions apply notwithstanding the foreign
exchange regulations in effect in the Republic.
419* See La Depeche d'Algeria, 12th July, 19^3. p.3* Tlii®
applied to the vhole portion of the profits and sums
pertaining to imported foreign capital.
420. Investment Code of Senegal, 21st March, 19^2, Art. 6.
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Apart from such stipulations in various lavs, there are
a series of economic development agreements concluded between
African countries and developed cotantries containing capital
repatriation provisions. For example Art. 2 of the Convention
between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Government of Tunisia reads:
"Transfer of profits, interests, dividends and royalties
due to nationals or corporations of the other party
will be effected."421
The repatriation provision features in almost all investment
laws, not only as a means of exchange control, but also for
promotion of a good investment climate in the continent.
There are still apparent difficulties not yet realised
or provided for by the parties, in the provisions for transfer
of capital to the country of original capital investment.
Among them are:
i. with which country of origin is a Multi-International
Company identified?
ii. Does the devaluation of a particular currency in a
particular country affect the precentage of transfer?
The answers to the above questions can only be provided
by the parties - i.e. States and Investors; private persons
or companies.
421. U.N.T.S. 523, 1963, P* 239, Art. 2. A similar treaty
was concluded between the Kingdom of the Nethexi and® and
the Republic of Senegal on 12th June, 1965. Ibid, Vol.
602, 1967. P. 233. Art. 2(2).
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It must be noted that this principle, which safeguards
the repatriation of profits to the country of original capital
investment, has become law in African states; not merely
because it represents a universally recognised standard of
justice, but also because it is absolutely essential for
the welfare of every nation, for without such guarantees
to foreign investors, no commercial or international financial
intercourse could safely be carried on. Accordingly the real
basis for the adoption and enforcement of the guarantee of
remittance of profits to the country of original capital
investment, as an element in implemeiitation of the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources in international relations,
is its appeal to enlightened public opinion, not only because
of its inherent Justice but also on account of reciprocal
benefits. It derives its real value and permanence from the
universal need of nations for foreign trade to ensure their
prosperity and their mutual benefit resulting from the
investment of foreign capital for the development of natural
resources.
B . Remittance of profits
A penult to transfer profits given by African countries
to foreign investors goes hand in hand with the principle of
international law prohibiting the confiscation of foreign-
owned property. However the growing intercourse between
African states and other members of the family of nations
2kO,
has necessitated the improvement of the fiscal treatment of
aliens, and the establishment of their fiscal rights upon
a more stable and uniformed basis than mere special privileges*
Especially when it is accepted that a foreign investor in
the natural resources industry may wish to exercise his
repatriation rights in a number of instances, such as on the
liquidation or reduction of investments, the surrender thereof
to another party, or where a reduction in capital occurs or
in the event of a take over. In the main African states have
used positive methods to bring .about the above conditions
by concluding bilateral and multilateral treaties. Obviously
the repatriation of profits on capital to an extent not
detrimental to the balance of payments of the host country
is commendable, since such procedure enhances not only the
investment climate, but also affords the host country th©
chance of controlling the exploitation of natural resources*
C. Tax on Profit
The financial relation between states and the natural
resources industry is distinguished by special features in
that the state, where it has assumed ownership of mineral
rights, can, in addition to ordinary taxation, claim a share
of the profits representing the public interest on wiiich the
industry is drawing. There are however factors which set a
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limit to the amount at which the state can assess this
interest. Natural resources, especially minerals, are so
important an element in general development, that it is
impolitic to do anything which would Jeopardise the flow
of new capital into the natural resources industry.
The speculative element in mining and the heavy outlay
required for certain ventures, such as deep-reef gold ruining
or large copper and oil concerns, combined with the fact that
the asset often has a terminable life, Justifies a return
to the investor 011 a higher scale than that of ordinary
commercial profit. Further the interests of the community
demand that the deposit should be thoroughly worked and the
maximum amount of low grade ore extracted but too heavy demands
by states may lead to wastage of marginal ores. All these
factors fall within the field of fiscal policy and must be
considered in relation to the returns which the investment
market has normally earned on the capital which it has
provided.
In the pre-independence period there was diversity of
approach to the imposition of taxes on the profits of licensees
422
or companies exploiting natural resources. Profits are
also taxed in the post-independence period, but each country
422. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, 1938, p. 1530.
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has adopted the policy most suited to its particular natural
resources. For example in Zambia, a new system of mining
taxation was introduced with effect from 1 at April, 1970•
The new tax provisions are incorporated in the Mineral Act
of 1970. Hie most important change is that all mineral
royalties, and in the case of copper, the export tax as well,
ixave been abolished and are replaced by a Mineral Tax charged
entirely on profits at the following rates:
Copper: 51 per cent
Lead and Zinc: 20 per cent
Amethyst and beryl: 15 par cent
Gold, bismuth, selemium: 15 par cent
4P3
Cobalt Silver, and goraium: 15 par cent.
In order to establish the profit each company is allowed
to deduct all expenditure incurred during exploration arid
prospecting in the same year*. The companies are allowed to
carry forward accumulated losses and unredeemed balances which
effectively means that for tax purposes the distinction etween
the operating costs and the capital expenditure has been
established. Ih the case of old mines the dry balance of
unredeemed capital expenditure which has been outstanding
423. Economic Report of Republic of Zambia Ko. 26, 1970,
pp. 22-23. The situation is slightly different in Zaire,
another African copper producing country. A perforruanoe
tax, as it is called in Zaire, is within the discretion
of the Minister to determine. See National Mining Law
of Congo (Zaire) Vol. 1, Section VII, 1967, Art. 78.
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for a long time is written off. The main purpose of this
new system of capital allowances is to improve the discounted
cash flow rate returns on new investment and thus promote
development in the mining sector.
In some other countries it is stipulated that the
licensees shall pay such income tax and other taxes and imports
as are payable under the law of the country. Apart from that
they are also subjected to any form of taxation or other
exactions the nature of which the state may in the future
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decide. In all circumstances, public interest demands
that taxation should he at the highest possible level, subject
only to paying due regard to certain factors inherent in
the nature of the industry itself. The exploitation of
natural resources involves enormous amounts of money, and
tax on profits must have due regard to the return which the
private investor will expect from an investment in what is
essentially a wasting asset.
424. Libyan Law of 1 955, as amended in 196"\ , Art. 14. In
Nigeria, the provision for calculating the oil companies
profit and loss account is laid down in Section 9-15 of
the Petroleum Profit Tax Act. Profits are calculated
as an aggregate of:
(i) the proceeds of the chargeable mineral resource#
sold by the companies;
(ii) the value of all chargeable oil disposed by the
companies;
(iii) all income of the companies in that period identical
to, and arising from, any one or more of its petroleum
operations. See Petroleum Act 1959, No. 15; See also
Decree of 19^7. amending the same Act; the Petroleum Act
was amended in 1970.
In Algeria, the direct tax on profit is determined as
follows: If the amount of royalty exceeds the amount of
taxable profits a sum equal to one half of the difference
between such two amounts may be deducted by the payee|
See/
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Antiquated fiscal policy however may impose excessive
burdens on the enterprise and thereby deter the rapid develop-
marit of natural resources industry. It is of great importance
that African countries have realized this and have so far
insulated enterprises engaged in the exploitation of na ural
resources from this burden, by granting them some exceptions.
This method of exercise of sovereignty over natural resources,
in the view of the writer, is justifiable because where such
privileges are granted to enterprises, engaged in working
natural resources for some period of time, they are tantamount
to a semi-permanent subsidy which African countries cannot
afford to give to foreign investors for the development of
their natural resources.
This does no a undennine the right of a sovereign to tax
aliens working natural resources in his territory; for this
right has been advocated in international law in three basic
425
concepts;-
See Petroleum Coda, 195S, Art. 65. The Petroleum Code
of Morocco provided that, if the total sum paid by the
licensee, as tax, royalty and duties is less than
Oi&jo of the profit the licensee will pay surtax equal
to the difference between the sum and one half of
the profits- Petroleum Code, 195S» Art. 31 .
425. Albrecht - Taxation of Aliens Under International Law,
British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXXX,
1952, p. 145.
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1. the 'contractual* according to which taxation should
be regarded as a paywent for the exploitation of the non¬
renewable assets of the state.
ii. the so called 'ethical' which affirms that taxation
of an alien engaged in working natural resources is Justified
on the grounds of the privileges and protection accorded
to him by the states in which the resources lie.
iii. 'sovereignty' according to which taxation is
justified solely as a means of expression of the will of
tue state , limited only by international law.
The taxation of aliens, whether on their profits accruing
from the exploitation of natural resources, or ordinarily,
by states in their capacity as territorial sovereigns, is
recognised in international law, and is supported by a decided
case by international tribunal. For exauq?lo in the George
¥. Cook claim to tax exemption, which was decided by the
United States Mexican Claims Commission, the report of the
Commission contained the following significant passage
"the right of every state to levy taxes constitute an
inherent part of its sovereignty. ^tj^is a function
necessary to its very existence..."
One may deduce from the statement of the Commission that
no law, whether municipal or international, may restrict the
free exercise of the sovereign power of the state in this regard.
426. See the Opinion of the United States of America/Mexico
Claims Commission, in George V. Cook Tax Exemption Case,
reported in Annual Digest, 1929-30, Case No. 15b.
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Apart from the fact that the right of a sovereign to
tax an alien cannot be contested in international lav African
states have gone further in using their tax systems to Improve
their investment climate for private investors. Most of the
economic inducements are in the nature of fiscal concessions
which enhances the early stage of production in the natural
resources industry. In this way the foreign investors are
assured that the exercise of sovereignty over natural
resources is not only in keeping with the principle oi"
international law, but can be carried further to promote
mutual understanding between the host Government and foreign
concern and thereby strengthens the effective control of the
exploitation of natural resources.
IV. Other Financial Obligations
It is within the prerogative of every state to impose a
financial levy on ax y concessionaries or companies working
natural resources. The validity of this right, though limited
by international law, cannot be contested since it is an
attribute of statehood. The right of a state to impose a
financial obligation on persons working natural resources is
not rendered inapplicable by the fact that the aliens do not
recognize the foreign taxing state as their own sovereign, for
while they cannot, fbr this reason, be compelled to pay taxes
to a state on the ground of political allegiance, they may
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nevertheless become subject to taxation or Imposition or
other levies by virtue of the territorial sovereignty of
the foreign power, whenever they, their properties, or their
427
economic activities are located within the state jurisdiction.
Thus no sooner do companies enter Africa in order to
work natural resources than they incur financial obligations.
These can be in the form of fees, rents, custom duties, or
they may be taxes on profits. The amount may differ depending
on the availability of natural resources, and the competitive
character of concessionaires.
A.
The preliminary step to asserting sovereign rights over
natural resources is the imposition of fees on a low scale,
to test the viability of prospective licensees. These fees
428
are levied for exploration licences. Similar fees are
payable for pipeline licences. In some cases the fees payable
vary according to whether the application is for a permit to
survey a pipeline route, or whether it is a licence to construct
art#- operate a pipeline. There are also fees for prospecting
licences, for raining leases, and sometimes for operation of rig®.
427• Albrecht, op. cit. (note 425) pp. 149*
428. Nigerian Petroleum Decree, 19*>9, Sch. 1, paragraph 2,
See also Mining and Exploration in Sudan, Bulletin No. 25,
1974, Section 13 - Fees of L.S. 500 shall be paid on grant
of licence. In Zambia the fee payable for prospecting
in K.15 per square mile. See GIPEC Doc. LGG.8/Appendix
p.9.
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However it should be remarked that the fees levied on
licences of all classes are of a token nature only. The main
purpose at this stage being to regulate these activities and
to exclude undesirables from them, rather than to create any
source of substantial revenue for the Government.
B. Rents
Payment of rents by the licensees to the host state for
the period of the exploration licence is one of the ways African
states are controlling the exploitation of natural resources.
The amount of rant changes with specific operations, as for
429 j
instance in petroleum drilling and production. for example
in Zaire mining contribution and licence fees are as followsl
First renewal 80 Zaire
Second renewal 160
Third renewal 320
429. In Zaire Mining Contribution and Licence fees for renewal
of Individual prospecting licences are contained in
Government Decree of 8th January, 19^9. No. 85/69;
Rents payable for mining licences are contained in
Decree 430/68, 31 December, 1968.
In Nigeria, a rent of #250 (N.500) is paid to the mistry
of Mines arid Power for each Calendar year that an oil
exploration permit is in force. In the case of mining
leases the rent if N.1; see also Tennessee-Sierra .©one
Government Oil Agreement, of 1962, Section 15i1 }i,2)
(22nd March) .
2k9
Such payments are usually collected on behalf of the state
in advance by a Department of the Ministry of Finance (the
Accountant General)• Apart from rent, the licensees are
required to pay rates, the amount differing according to
the country and to the area occupied during the exploitation
process.
There are situations in which the licensee may have his
money refunded; such situations arise when the government
itself acquires a part of the area for which the exploration
licence has been granted, or there is a voluntary surrender
of .a licence by the licensee, in which case he may still be
asked to pay yearly rent or royalties depending on the
circumstances and the time of surrender of the permit.
C. Premiums
These are cash bonuses which as a rule are paid before
the grant of an oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease*
The premiums are paid in addition to rents. The amount of
premium charged depends on workable minerals an area contains*
Areas with enormous workable deposits carry high premiums,
but for other resources in territorial water and land, the
430
amount varies.
430. For a detailed study of various premiums paid by oil
companies, see, Story of Oil in Nigeria, Shell 13 ,P.
Development, i960, p.5*
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The premium charges come under the executive power of
the state and are imposed on the licensee in return for the
privileges enjoyed within the territory of the host state.
In some countries the policy adopted for the payment of all
premiums for the exploitation of natural resources is
similar to that of oil prospecting or copper as the case may
be, but a difference is that a premium is not charged when
converting a prospecting licence into a mining lease.
Royalty
Royalty in some cases is rolated to a portion of the
land produce, which must be paid or offered to the proprietor
in return for utilizing the resources of his land.
In the natural resources industry, royalty takes the
form of an ad valorem tax which the licensees or concessionaires
must pay and is based on the value of the natural resources
product concerned, e.g. copper, oil, gas, phosphate or other
mineral substances. States justify the imposition of such
payment as within their sovereign powers on the ground t at
the state is placing its non-renewable national assets at
the disposal of the licensees; such fees represent a
compensation for removing those non-renewable assets.
In the pre-independence period in Africa the term royalty
as then known, e.g. in Great Britain, owed its origin to the
fact that gold and silver procured from land by mining or
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similar means were, by ancient usage, held to be part of
the prerogative of the sovereign. The Governments of other
countries, such as Belgium and France took advantage of their
legal position as the temporary ovners of mineral rights
in Africa, and also made the payment of royalties a condition
of granting of concessions to exploit natural resources in
their various African territories. This development was not
unnatural in view of the fact that in many of these countries
the principle of direct taxation in the shape of income tax
43I
or its equivalent did not for some time exist.
In areas where royalty was demanded, the approach of
the different powers diverged. Hie British Government lias a
systematic way of assessing the royalties payable by each
432
coiispanyj But in the Belgian African territories, the
companies themselves were empowered to collect royalties.
In the post-independence period the system of payment of
royalty to states continues, but significant changes have
occurred, not only in the concept but also in the method of
assessment. In exercising their sovereign rights over oil
resources African states, in solidarity with other oil producing
431. .Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Revised, 1956, p. 647.
432. See Mining Royalty and Rents in British Empire, published
by the Imperial Institute (Mineral Resources Dept.)
1936, p.14.
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countries, brought the issue of royalty before the meeting of
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
comprising oil producing and oil importing countries.
At the OPEC•s meeting the equal profit sharing concept
was discussed on the understanding that the total royalty and
income tax paid by the concessionaire would be 50> of the
net profits and would represent the producing countries
overall share. Consequently royalty payments were deducted
from the income as an expense in computing the income tax
payable to producing countries.
African countries and other oil producing countries
challenged this approach. They argued that the royalty was
a payment ordinarily made to the owner of the ground, in
consideration of depletion of natural resources. They also
contended that royalty should be paid to states independent
of tax. After a heated argument and prolonged exchange of
views, an agreement was reached between the oil companies,
which were mainly represented by their various home govern¬
ments, and the oil producing countries, on what was described
in oil industry Jargon as "expensing royalty". Under this
system the royalty was treated as an expense in computing
income tax instead of as a credit against tax, the system
which prevailed in the companies1 practice before.
^33 • OPEC Resolution on Renegotiation of Agreements with
Oil Companies, Res. XXV 160, of 16th September, 1970.
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Most of African countries have implemented the new
OPEC agreement. For example in Nigeria the position has
434
been regulated by a new decree, which stipulates that
royalty is to be calculated on a full posted price system
rather than on the field storage price. Many Middle East
countries have, like Nigeria, also adopted the OPEC system.
In most of the countries which are members of the
Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries
(CIPEC)4^^ royalty is replaced by a mineral tax based
entirely on profitability (a Pay as You Earn Basis (PAYE)),
at monthly intervals, and a company tax, based on the balance
of profits. Other African countries, which are neither
members of OPEC nor CIPEC, have copied one or other of the
systems
434. In Nigeria, this decree introduced, for the first time,
the concept of posted prices for determining royalty
as opposed to the realized price to which the companies
had been accustomed - see Supp. to Federation of Nigeria
No. 62, Vol. 56, 27th Nov., 1969, Part B.} Petroleum
Drilling and Productions Regulation 6o(4). See also
West Africa, 7th of May, 1971. p. 525.
435. See Zambian Economic Report No. 26, 1970, p.2j
Mining Laws of Congo (Zaire) Vol. II, Section VII, I967.
436. Sierra Leone Republic is not a member of OPEC or CIPEG,
but it also adopted the 12^% like Nigeria. See
Tennessee-Sierra Leone Mineral 04.1 Agreement, Sch. IV,
Section 16(1), 2(a), 3(a)(b) of 22nd March 1962|
the Sudan also adopted similar procedures, See Mining
and Mineral Exploration Bulletin No, 25, 1974. Royalty
on petroleum produce must be calculated at the rate of
12. 5^ on the well head value of all crude oil and natural
gas provided that the Government may elect to take
petroleum or petroleum products in kind, in satisfaction
or part satisfaction of the royalty due in any year,
P.10(b).
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The new system of payment of royalty reveals two salient
points concerning implementation of sovereignty over natural
resources* They are that:
i. The companies now pay royalty, in whatever form, to
African states, which they never did previously} rather
they paid out to the various powers that then controlled
African territories,
ii. The pre-independence system for calculating royalty
has not only been modified, but a new concept has been
suggested by the OPEC countries - expensing of royalty,
V, Economic Inducements
Many African states accord a various and vast range of
economic privileges to enterprises engaged in the exploitation
of natural resources. Such a procedure is not merely a
response to the states* demands for thorough development
of natural resources but is part of a structured programme
of systematic investment promotion. For example, tinder the
Algerian Investment Code three types of economic benefits
are given to approved enterprises in the natural resources
industry. They are:
i. State protection against foreign competition within
the framework of Government policy on imports.
ii. Assistance of state financial bodies for the purpose
of obtaining loans for new equipment.
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iii. Orders for supplies for Government offices and
public works.
Apart from the above provisions economic inducements are
usually in the form of tax exemptions, to a certain degree,
for income and profits taxes and import and export duties.
In some cases there is also a provision for generous depreciation
allowances including reduction on turnover tax, standard tax,
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and business tax. Equally significant in this sphere are
such benefits as exoneration from the payment of import and
export duties on manufactured goods.
As a rule the above economic benefits are granted to
enterprises which already have, or have acquired, a certificate
of exemption, or have been approved by a recognised governnrent
agency in the natural resources industry.
A. Temporary Exemption from Tax on Income and Profits
One salient feature of the African approach to implement¬
ation of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources
is the practice of granting to a licensee a temporary exemption
437# It must be remarked that the general concept of taxation
is different in civil and common law countries. The type
of taxation this study is concerned with differs from the
Anglo-Saxon systems and concepts. Reference in this
study is made to such tax devices ast
(i) Entry tax (Droit fiscal d»entree) levied for revenue
purposes on nearly all goods from foreign countries;
(ii) Standard tas (Tax forfeitaine) which is a type of
transactions tax based on custom duties and fiscal
entry tax.
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from taxes on income and profits. In order to attract foreign
investors in to the natural resources industry most African
states exempt foreign investors from payment of tax on income
and profit for a period of five years. For example, an
Investment Decree of Ethiopia stipulated that:
"exemption from income tax is granted for a period
and above in agriculture, mining ana transport...-
Variations exist in the time period in that some countries
This, period is regarded as long enough for installing machines
and other plants for the beginning of operations.
In most cases it is the amount invested in the natural
resources Industry that determines the privileges granted.
For example, in the three year development plan of Mauritania,
it is stated that:
"Companies of exceptional importance investing a minimum
of lOOO million (F.A.) francs (U.S.£ 4 million) in less
than five years and accorded the long-run financial
stability regime, benefit from stabilization of some of
all taxes and other imposed costs for periods of up
to twenty—five years".
438. The Investment Decree was promulgated on 16th Sept. 1963
The five years exemption privilege begins from date on
which the enterprise starts operation.
439. Ghana Investment Act No. 172 of 19th April 1963, relates
to tax holidays not exceeding 10 years — from the date of
production. The same provision was embodied in the Valco
Ghana Agreement to manufacture Aluminium of i960 Art.
15, 17, 20.
440. Mauritania, Three Year Development (196O-3) Plan, Law
No. 61-122. This plan was replaced by a draft Four
Years Plan, 1963-66. See (Plan Quadrennial de Development
Economlque et Social).
of five years to new
439
grant 10 years exemption, from the date of production.
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The precise effect of tax incentives din attracting
investments which otherwise would not have been forthcoming
and, conversely, the revenue loss suffered where concessions
or licences are granted though not needed is as yet
inadequately studied. Such empirical enquiries as have
been made to elucidate the actual inducement effect and
overall operation of various schemes confirm the expectation
that while prohibitive and discriminatory taxes may effectively
impede otherwise worthwhile investments temporary exemptions
from noxmal tax burdens are unlikely by themselves to constitute
a determining factor in many investment decisions.
However the importance of exerting sovereign rights over
natural resources through tax incentives, or rather temporary
tax exemptions, is that it helps arouse interest in investment
opportunities which might not otherwise attract attention in
the natural resources Industry of particular countries. Such
schemes have now spread to all African states. Since most of
these laws are addressed not only to foreign investors but
also to domestic investors, one can soe. that there is no
basis for thinking that tax exemption is discriminatory.
*|41. Karl E. Lachmann "Industrial promotion laws in Central
America" United Nations Technical Assistance Report
prepared for the Committee on Economic Co—operation
of Central American Isthmus (TAO/LAT/29/I960) Chapter 1f
Paul L. Cheng-Young "A Study of Tax Incentives in Jamacia"
National Tax Journal Vol. XX, No. 3, September 1967,
PP. 292, 304} George E. Lent "Tax Incentive for Investment
in Developing Countries" IBRD and IMP Finance and
Development September, 1967* P.5.
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It is quite true that the content and scope of tax
incentives vary, as do the criteria (relating to economic
sector size and use of domestic and human resources), which
determine the selection of qualifying investment projects, and
the particular natural resources industry towards which it
will be directed. It is likely that these variations in
tax incentive as a proof of exercise of sovereign right over
natural resources, will call for some measures of harmonization,
at least among neighbouring countries and within economic
integration areas, where tax incentive difficulties are more
likely to have a distorting influccnce than in cases where
countries are wholly unconnected and distant.
Though African states are giving tax exemptions to
attract foreign investment in the natural resources industry
there are also provisions for reinvestment, in the same
industry, of profits - a "plough-back" system. For example
the Decree relating to Investment issued by the Government
of Tunisia contains the following provisions»
"Income must be reinvested for certain purposes....
especially in extension of industrial, commercial,
or agricultural buildings and installations inc^uging
heavy equipment and agricultural equipment...."
In some countries failure by companies to reinvest up
to 105^ of the profits in the natural resources industry may
442, U.N. Doc. E/CN.14/28 Rev. 2, p.67, Section VI - for




increase the liability to pay to 50$, By insisting on a
plough-back system, or reinvestment of profits in the natural
rescurces industry, states mobilize scarce capital for develop¬
ment of new industries and the expansion of the existing
industries for the exploitation of natural resources. Similarly
states encourage reinvestment of at least part of the earnings,
both to reduce the foreign exchange outflow and to increase
the contribution of the venture to the national economy.
Here again there is no need for excessive rigidity since
there are limits to the useful expansion of a given enterprise,
as well as to the diversification that can be expected from
all but the very large companies. Yet there would seem to
be good reason for the requirement included in some investment
laws that the investor must present a basic plan of reinvest¬
ment and expansion at least for the first few years of the
operations. Nevertheless, what is necessary is to formulate
realistic tax targets and to keep the tax system in line with
the objectives of the plan, as well as with the structural
changes which emerge from its implementation.
443. In Togo, there is a special rule concerning enterprises
which have realised more than 1 million CFA over a four
year period and are subject to tax under the law. If
they fail to reinvest a minimum of 10$ of these profits,
an increased tax liability of 50$ is levied on them.
See U.N, Doc. Sales, No, 65# II. K.3# p.66, (1965).
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Limited tax Incentives designed to favour specific
desirable practices (such as allowances for reinvestment
profits or for multiple shift plant operations) may then
retain a plaoe in a more development orientated tax system,
where advances in tax admimistration will allow these refined
tax burden differentials to become fully effective. No
matter what form investment takes, the objective is to
mobilize capital for effective exploitation and control
of natural resources; by adopting such a policy states are
exercising their sovereign right over natural resources.
B. Custom Exonerations
Initially African states imposed either a low, or no,
customs duty on equipment imported for use in the natural
resources industry. For example in Art. 3(1-10) of the
Algerian Code of Taxes, a number of buildings required in
the mines benefit from a +ax reduction of 6$ (the general rate
being 12.8>). In some cases exemption from duty was allowed
only where an enterprise had in some way contributed to the
445
successful development of the natural resources industry.
444. Art. 3(1-10) of the Algerian Code of Taxes; a number of
building materials enumerated therein benefit from tax
reduction of 6^o (the general rate being 12.8$); the
list in this article is completed in a note 462/463,
F/LG.399 of 23rd August, 1960, and circular No. 1
152/F/LG/A/399 of 29th June, 1961.
445. In Morocco the whole policy is enumerated in "Plan
Quinquennial 1964" — Division of Economic Co-ordination
and Planning Ministry of National Economy and Finance,
Nov* 1961. The most noteworthy of the advantages accorded
by these laws is exemption from custom duties on materials
and equipment necessary to the creation or extension of
a factory or Industry.
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Some conditions for granting customs exoneration are quite
specific e.g. that any imported products which can be found
locally do not qualify for exemption, Squally if a product
is found to be competing with the domestic market, it will
446
attract heavy customs duty. The purpose of this is to
protect infant domestic industries. These is a legitimate
case for tariff protection for struggling infant industries,
but its indefinite continuation may lead to the perpetuation
of inefficient high cost monopoly production at the expense
of other domestic concerns, as well as of foreign investors.
Where such incentive tariffs are part of a tax concession
package it is therefore best to grant them only for limited,
though extendable, periods and subject periodically to full
re-examination of the needs and performances of the protected
natural resources industry.
On the other hand where the duty imposed approaches the
level of that in developed countries, a far reaching provision
available for doub ,e taxation is also likely to enhance any
excess burden that investor may encounter.
446, Under the Libyan Customs Tariff, duties on the import
of industrial machinery and raw materials are generally
reduced while duties on products competing with local
industry or agriculture are generally increased.
See U.N, Doc. E/CN.14/NR28, Rev. 2, p.46.
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C. Double Taxation (Relief)
Under this arrangement (double taxation relief) certain
classes of income derived from one country by a resident in
another country are (subject to certain conditions) exempt
from tax in the former country; these classes are shipping,
air transport, and profits* Dividends are exempt from any
tax which is additional to the tax charged on the profits
represented by the dividends* Where income continues to be
taxed in both countries full credit is given by the country
of the tax payer*s residence for the tax payable in the
country of origin of income* In most cases provisions are
included for the exchange of information between the taxation
authorities of the two countries*
The practice of double taxation relief was well
kkv
established. In the post-independence period most African
states continued with the old practices with certain conditions
448
adapted to the new states. The method of calculation of
447* Double Taxation Agreements of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain Vol* 1, 1969. PP. 67, 249, 275. 459. 597.
See also British Tax Encyclopaedia, by John Tabbot and
Wheatcroft; 1968, p.279.
448* S. 1964, No, 1401, the Double Taxation Relief (tax on
income) Malawi Order, 2nd Sept* 1964, This agreement
was signed between the Government of Great Britain and
the Government of the former Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, on 25th Nov* 1955. After the dissolution
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the agreement
was regarded as continuing in foroe between the Govt,
of the U»K* and Malawi, See British Double Taxation
Agreements, Vol, 1, p, 460, I969* See Petroleum Profit
Tax Ordinance of Nigeria, 1959, in supp* to Official
Gazette no. 26, Vol. 26, 30th April, 1959, p.64, Part. XI.
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relief to be allowed for double taxation is always specified
in the agreement or tax law. For example in Nigeria the
amount of the credit admissible to any company under the
terms of any such arrangement must be set off against the tax
chargeable upon that company in respect of income and, where
that tax has been paid, the amount of the credit may be repaid
to that company or carried forward against the tax chargeable
upon that company in any subsequent accounting period.
The significance of double taxation is that it relieves
the companies of certain hardships that might otherwise
accrue from heavy fcax in a country in which they operate.
It gives an incentive to the companies, thereby promoting
investment of capital which itself is necessary for the
development of natural resources. Double taxation relief
operates between countries that have good trade relations,
so in itself it can be another means of encouraging inter¬
national economic co-operation.
VI. Conclusion
When the method of control of financial matters as they
are involved in exploitation of natural resources are examined
it will be evident that African states have adopted procedures
which not only facilitate the development of antural resources
but also give states ample opportunity for controlling every
aspect. They range from the investment regulation, and
promotion - creating a favourable Investment climate for
26h.
foreign private investors ~ to scrutinizing every investment
to ensure that an adequate distribution of it in a required
area.
Apart from accepting such investment terms the investor
is allowed to transfer a certain percentage of the profit
accruing from it to an extent which will not jeopardise the
country*s balance of payments and monetary policy. Such a
transfer does not exclude levying a tax on the profits of
the companies nor a demand that the companies should
reinvest a certain percentage of their profit in the host
state for the purpose of expansion of new industries.
Notwithstanding the economic benefits offered to various
enterprises to enhance their early operation, states impose
different financial obligations on companies working natural
resources. Such grants of rights and imposition of obligations,
and above all the creation of the most advantageous financial
situation for the states concerned are proof of the exercise
of sovereignty over natural resources.
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CHAPTER VI
NATIONAL. AND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES CONTROL AGENCIES
Introduction
In the previous Chapter, the legal framework of financial
control of enterprises in natural resources industry was
examined. Apart from this there is another form of control
over natural resources prevalent in Africa. This method
involves the principle of control, or exercise of Jurisdiction,
over these resources through various agencies:- national
development corporations or state companies, the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the intergovernmental Council
of Copper Exporting Countries and other organisations.
In the pre-colonial period, such a system was non-existent.
There were many foreign companies in the colonial period. Most
of them were private concerns, in which the governments had
449
shares. The post-independence period saw a different
approach by African states - the establishment of autonomous
state companies without any shareholding, and the formation
449. The British Government was the principal shareholder in
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. See Robert JLiefman -
International Cartels, Combines and Trusts, 1927»
pp. 72-74; The French Government through the Bureau










See United States of America Bureau of Mines Special
Supplement No. 51 . 1958, p.3.
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of producers' cartels for the unification of policies regarding
the exploitation of natural resources. This is so because most
of these countries place great hope in the use of their natural
resources. They would like it to do more than provide revenue
and satisfy domestic demand. This is reflected in a statement
Biade by Moussa Kobailli , leader of the Algerian delegation to
the Seventh Arab Petroleum Congress. He said:
"Ve consider that the time has come to leave the beaten
track and study objectively not only fiscal aspects of
the petroleum industry but also above all, the part which
petroleum can play in the development of our countries.
This means re-examining the anachronistic system of
concession and taking charge of the exploitation of our
resources. That is the only way in which we can freely
dispose of our petroleunhriches, and use them to attain
our national ambitions".
This Chapter will examine the setting up of the national
and international agencies and the methods they employ to
exert economic control over the exploitation of natural
resources. Finally we shall assess how useful those bodies
have been in reaffirming economic sovereignty. Since there
are many state companies in Africa, it is intended only to
use one or two of them as illustrations of a general pattern;
however reference will be made to others.




One may start this investigation by asking what is really
the significance of state companies for the purpose of exerting
jurisdiction over natural resources? Does it in any way differ
from control over those companies in which the state holds
part of the shares, like Shell-BP and Campagnie Francaise des
Petroles, which are more indirectly state controlled? The
state companies, however, as they emerged in the African
attempt to reaffirm economic independence, differ from the
companies mentioned above.
The state oil or copper company is a remarkable phenomenon
because it is really paradoxical. Usually it does not have a
genuine monopoly therefore it is in a competitive position. A
state company lacks the initial investment of private capital
to enable it to obtain a position in a market dominated by
large companies with ample funds, therefore public funds have
451
to be assigned to it. In that case a state company may
be said to be an industrial and commercial concern, which has
to make its way in a competitive situation, with the interest
of the state at heart. For example the Algerian Government
451• For the purpose of carrying out its mission, e.g.
Sonatrach-Algerlan State Company was given an initial
capital of 40 million Algerian Dinars. The amount was
divided into 100,000 AD each; all the shares were purchased
by the Government. See Monograph published by the Public
Relations Department of Sonatrach, 1968, p.20. The
Nigerian National Corporation also was initially given
a loan or grant by the Government, Decree No. 18, 1971,
4(b); i.e. Mendico, The Zambian National Corporation was
given K.25 million, See CIPEC Doc. Xnf/82; see also
Mendico Mining Yearbook, 1970, p.4.
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stipulates the aim of its national state company (Sonatrach)
to be the following!
i. Safeguarding national interest in all industrial
phases leading up to. and following after, actual hydrocarbon
production}
ii. Increasing the national potential of mineral wealth
by the constant promotion of exploration and development
activities of known deposits;
iii. Bringing together oil and gas plant and wther
associated or large power consuming industries such as the
petrochemical, gasochemical, and steel industries;
iv. Helping to establish a truly national petroleum and
petrochemical industry by promoting the formation of a national
technical elite and by integrating Algerian workers into the
technological advances being made in the modern world;
v. Systematically multiplying the points of impact of
the petroleum industry on the rest of the economy by creating
and taking charge of companies capable of providing all the
services required by the multiple and complex activities of
the hydrocarbon and hydrocarbon-derivative industries;
vi. Developing exports under the trade conditions most
favourable to Algeria, to its balance of payments, and to
provide maximum revenue for its treasury;
26?,
vii, Providing a constant power supply for the domestic
market under optimum cost and safety conditions;
viii. Cooperating with friendly nations so as to bring
about the unity of action needed for reinforcing the bargaining
power of petroleum producing underdeveloped countries for
452
harmonizing their interests,
Xt may be observed from the above provisions that the
state or national coiqpaniea are established as a special means
of implementing state policies, especially in the control of
natural resources.
No matter how punctiliously foreign companies are controlled
the creation of a state company to work natural resources along
with the international oil companies shows the need for more
than mere control of foreign companies to secure sovereignty
over natural resources, A more decisive move is made where
the state itself becomes an entrepreneur, sets up the necessary
apparatus and uses this to work its way into the system devised
by the foreign companies. By this means, states endeavour to
combat the backwardness which exists in Africa because of its
lack of knowledge of either oil or copper technology. The
importance of establishing national companies either in
the field of oil or copper was given priority in an OPEC and
a CIPEC resolution. The OPEC resolution began by urging
452. Sonatrach Monograph, op, cit, (note 451) p.12.
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that member countries should endeavour, so far as possible,
to explore for and develop their own hydrocarbon resources
453
directly. This aspiration has been transformed into
practice, hence some African states have embarked on direct
exploitation of natural resources through a national develop¬
ment corporation as a means of substantive control.
1. Organs of State Companies
The state companies are administered through the following
organs: - Board of Directors, a General Manager and his staff.
i. Board of Directors. In most cases the state companies
are controlled through a Ministry) but they also have a Board
454
of Directors; which conducts the affairs of the companies.
They are usually selected from top civil servants such as
permanent secretaries, chief executive officers of the
companies, and men with specialist knowledge of the particular
resources concerned.
ii. General Manager. Most of the state companies have
a General Manager, who is charged with the administration of
the companies. Working along with the General Manager is the
455
Secretary whose duty it is to keep the records and correspond¬
ence of the companies.
453. OPEC Resolution XVI 90 - C1 -1 , 1 968.
454. Nigerian Military Decree No. S, Schedule 1 -(1); Libia Oil
1954-1971 * Libya Oil is an undated booklet published
by the Ministry of Petroleum.
455. e.g. Nigerian Decree No. 18, 1972, 4(2).
271 .
The staffs of the state companies are not civil servants,
they are employed by the Beard, who determine their salaries
and emoluments ,^6
2. Legal Status of State Companies
The creation of state companies does not alter the fact
that the state has a more general role in legislation and
control of natural resources. However the state companies
are structured towards strengthening the national economy
by means of development, administration and exploitation
of natural resources in their various spheres - the distribution
of local and imported products in the market. The corporations
457
can sue and be sued in their corporate names. Apart from
engaging in exploitation of natural resources in their own
right, they can acquire, or take over, all assets, business
property, contract rights, obligations, and liabilities of any
other companies, firms, or persons, in furtherance of their
business
456. Ibid, Schedule 1(9).
457* Xbid, 3-1(a); Sonatraeh op. eit. (note 451) P«21j
Libyan Oil (1954-1971) p.17.
458. e.g. By Decree No. 71-64, 71-65, and 71-66, of 24th February,
1971» all assets, stocks share rights and obligations of
foreign companies nationalised by the Algerian Government
were transferred to tho National Company (Sonatraeh) •
The nationalised assets of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga
wore transferred to tho Zaire State Company - Gecomines.
See U.S. Mineral Trade Note, Vol. 7, No. 9, p.34.
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The state corporations have the right to enter into
459
partnership with any company firm or individual. Likewise
they have the right to dispose of any property lease and to
manage moveable property. They are financially independent
in that they have their own budget tailored to the model of
other commercial enterprises. Vith their own finance they
can defray their expenses. Above all they are administratively
free, keeping away from subordination to government laws, and
regulations both their staffs and their organisation. This has
enabled such companies to use their initiative in exploitation
of natural resources.
It may be added that in some oases the state companies
are given a monopoly of transport and construction of pipeline
industries. They are also empowered to control the finances
of affiliates by approving their budgets, profit, and loss
account and distribution of, and amendment of, their bye-laws.
For the furtherance of their business they can formulate their
own programme of training, staffing and safety measures for
their own technical staffs.
459. A Joint Venture Business Operation was included between
Government of Libya and the Italian Corporation (AGXP) on
30th Sept. 1972, to exploit petroleum resources. Art. 1
deals with the establishment of the venture f A similar
agreement was concluded between Algerian National Corporation
(Sonatraoh) and Getty Oil Company to explora and prospect
hydrocarbon in Algeria on 19th Oct., 1968.
460. Sonatrach Monograph, op. cit. (note 451) pp• 19-20.
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It can be seen that the state companies become suppliers
461
of capital, controllers of activities, employers of personnel,
buyers and sellers, seekers of supplies and customers,
signatories of industrial and commercial contracts* These
roles of state companies are in line with state policies for
controlling natural resources.
3* Functions of State Companies
Another question worth investigating is whether the state
companies actually involve themselves in the exploitation of
natural resources. Obviously one of the reasons for setting
up state companies has often been the non-existence of private
enterprise in the oil or copper industries, or their failure
to assume the risks that are involved. The function of state
companies in such cases is to fill the gap. This is the
case in African countries, where, in addition to the role
of supplying the required facilities, the state companies have
now been given the task of replacing foreign participation
in various activities.
There is ample evidence of this practice in the exploitation
of natural resources. For example Sonatrach, the Algerian
stats company, directly controls 100^ of the area ceded to it
462after the state took over foreign property. It controlled
461. The above Algerian Enterprise had only 3,000 employees at
the end of 19^7» but the figure rose rapidly to 9,000 in
1970, and at the beginning of 1971 It was 10,000. The
number of employees of Sonatrach is far larger than that
of the Elf and Eurofep Companies operating in Algeria —
See the Statement of the Chairman of Sonatrach, Mr. Chizali,
reported in BIP 1677, Sept. 1970, p.3; Medlin, op. cit.
note 450, p. 106.
462* Art. 2 of the General Settlement Agreement between
Sonatrach and Eurofep 23rd Nov. 1971.
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14 permits which covered 50,000 square kilometres in the free
area, most of which had been abandoned by foreL gn companies
for technical reasons. It is already acting as a petroleum
operator in two blocks, D*1 and D.3, of the operative areas,
and for this it had 70 million Dinars between 1966-67) the
budget covered drilling of eight exploratory wells and twelve
geophysical works.
As a result of these operations of Sonatraoh petroleum
production in Algeria increased from 26 million tons in 19&5
to 38,4 million in 1967. This means that there has been an
annual Increase of approximately 25$ between 1965-67 which is
the highest increase in the world compared with 10.5$ in the
Soviet Union, 9*5$ in the Middle Bast, 4$ in the Carribean,
3.5$ in North America and the world average of 7»5$.^^ The
importance of this national company in promoting the economic
independence of Algeria has been expressed by an oil expert
thus 1
"Sonatrach nust be considered to have begun to have
significance at the international level* It is negotiating
contracts for the sale of oil to its neighbours in the
MeghreJb. and to some countries of Western Burope and is
gradually extending its exploration to certain Arab states,
above all Yemen. In natural gas the Algerian enterprise
will soon be firmly established at the international level;
in all probability exports to France will develop normally.
Shipments to Britain by supertanker are increasing, add
463. Sonatrach op. cit. p.42.
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the U.S. authorities have finally agreed to allow the
valuable contact made with £1 Paso (15 thousand cubic
metres a year for 25 years). There is such a shortage
of natural gas in Europe as well as an even greater
one in the United States of America that industrialised
countries are^j^likely to neglect any source of long
term supply".
This engagement in the direct exploitation of natural
resources is not peculiar to the Algerian state company} many
465
others have taken the same line of action. The emergence
of state companies is the beginning of a new relationship
between African states and foreign companies working natural
resources in these territories. The establishment of state
companies is the only solution for a state wishing to engage
in the development of its natural resources beyond the exploration
stage. The effectiveness of control of natural resources by
the state will be realised more easily if the task is assigned
to a special agency, which, though controlled by the state and
closely bound by government directives, nevertheless has the
administrative autonomy and flexibility of a private enterprise.
464. Mendlin op. cit. note 450, pp. 106-107.
465. The Zairlan Government's state company (Gecomines),
created in July 1967, is by far the largest mining
company in the Republic. In 1972 the company's exports
generated over 80$ of Zaire's foreign exchange earnings.
In the same year the to-tal sale of all metals was £503.8
million, and provided £170 million revenue to the
national treasury (30$ of the total).
Zaire-Etan, incorporated as a Zairian Company in 1969,
acquired the assets, rights and concessions of Gacomines,
its Belgian owned predecessor. The company produced
804 tons of cassilente with a 70$ tin content.
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It is aily states which can guarantee that the resources
will be exploited to the full without recourse to restrictive
practioes. Through their companies states can themselves
receive mining rents, and devote them to the purpose of
national interest. By delegating the power of exploitation
of natural resources to their companies, states have put a
stop to groupings of harmful private interests that may
exert dangerous pressure on the life of the nation.
Moat countries prepare for a rainy day, that is for
periods of crisis. Should such a crisis lead to stoppage of
work and supply of any products to local markets, by foreign
companies, the state companies can act as substitutes. The
creation of state companies in this event may be regarded
as a reaction to the undue influence exercised by some large
companies, or producer countries, occupying a position of
politico"economic power as a result of which they were or
are in a position to threaten the sovereignty of a particular
k-66
country. The fear of foreign economic domination was
reflected in the speech made by a representative of Chile to
466. The lesson of Chile is an example - International Telephone
and Telegraphs' attempts to persuade other companies,
and the U.S. State Department, to enter into a campaign
of economic sabotage aimed at preventing the confirmation
of Allende as President were a total failure. There is
no evidence that ITT got any other companies to support
its campaign; upon exposure of the relevant correspondence,
there was seen to be virtually unanimous condemnation
of the company's methods within the U.S. business
community. See the Vorld Today, 1974, p. 396.
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tlx* XI Convention of Mining Engineers of Peru, which took
place in Eiiaa on November rjO - December 6, 1969} he said that)
"We neither wish, nor shall we accept, to repeat the
sacrifices of the past, when the legitimate revenue
of our countries were limited, whereas the purchasing
countries imposed on us their industrialized products,
always at a much higher price."
Obviously where a state company is producing any goods
that were previously imported the supply from abroad may be
reduced, and the local market is assured of the availability
of the given product. Again the impending danger arising
from speoific groups of countries holding a monopoly or
dominant position in a key sector, such as energy, is averted.
If there is a failure to act in such a situation, a nation's
debts could pile up very quickly, and if suoh a trend Is not
brought under control, there will be increased dependence
on the few countries whose currencies rule the international
market.
The establishment of state companies in Africa is another
measure to prevent the opportunity for abuse provided by
domination of markets if there are only a faw operators.
Therefore the use of state companies in the exploitation
of natural resources is the African version of the Western
Anti-trust philosophy. Its purpose is to provide counter-
467. XI Convention of Mining Engineers of Peru Nov ,30-Pec. 6,
1969, reported in CIPEC boo. INFO/89, at p.11 .
463. Dr. Frank©! has argued that the public enterprise,
especially in the oil sector, is the Europeans version
of the American Anti-trust philosophy in his "Oil and
Power Politics", 1969, p. 159.
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vailing measures against an agglomeration of economic and
political power in the hands of big international companies.
Xt is the function of state companies to take care of specific
matters which are of importance to the nation and which might
otherwise be ignored. These include security of supplies»
competition in the market and hence the securing of better
prospects for the customer} stimulation of private enterprise
by challenging its hegemony. reducing the trade gap. and
creating the possibilities of a better balance of payments.
However the creation of state companies does not alter
the fact that states have a more general role in legislation
and control of natural resources. Xt should be borne in
mind that whatever advantage states gain by entering into
the natural resources industry as private entrepreneurs an
additional bonus is obtained by the exercise of their power
to govern events, i.e. economic activities regarding the
exploitation of natural resources can be directed and controlled
by ministers of the states concerned. In the light of the
above, it can be concluded that whether state companies are
those of developing or developed countries, they are regarded
as a special means of implementing state policies to achieve






States have taken various steps to ensure efficient
management of mineral resources. Among these steps are the
formation of economic co-operatives or alliances of producers
of a particular mineral with a view to unifying their policies
to effect a better return from the product of that particular
mineral industry. The Interest behind the formation of such
associations or organisations is always to strengthen the
producers bargaining position, so as to realise high prices,
which will help then in other aspects of their development
plans. ,
These types of economic groupings or eo-operatives are
often found among states, especially the weak developing
producing countries - Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For
producers of particular minerals, economic co-operation offers
them not only tho solidarity which they need for joint bargaining
action, but enables them to learn from one another's experience
of a given mineral Indus try with a view to improving their
position at the global level. Sometimes the association gets
for its members what each state cannot acquire for itself
acting individually, or singly especially in price negotiations.
The above considerations might account for the reasons why
African states have joined different producers organisations
for various minerals.
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1. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Many authorities have written about OPEC. It was founded
in 1960 by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
and has gradually exapnded to include African state Oil
Exporters of importance - Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Gabon
(as an Associate Member). OPEC was established as a reaction
to the oil oompanles reduction of posted prices for crude
oil (the reference price for calculating government revenue)
which was itself a response to the slide in realised oil
prices in the late 1950's caused by over supply.
OPEC member countries agreed to try to raise prices to
the previously prevailing levels and to insist on justification
by companies of proposed price changes, to stand together
in considering the policies of the companies and generally
to unify their petroleum prices policies and determine the
best means of safeguarding their common interest. In
implementing the above policy African states have co-operated
in strengthening the solidarity, the efficient organisation
(in fact at the time of writing, the General Secretary is a
Nigerian) of OPEC in an attempt to strengthen the economic
sovereignty of its member countries which was one of the
Objectives of the organisation which are described as follows)
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"that tuo members are implementing much, needed develop¬
ment programmes to be financed mainly from the income
derived from petroleum export;
"that members must rely on petroleum income to a large
degree in order to balance their annual national budgets;
"that petroleum is & vesting asset and to the extent
that it is depleted, it must be replaced by other assets;
"that all nations of the world in order to maintain and
improve their standard of living must rely almost entirely
on petroleum as a primary source of energy generation;
"that any fluctuation in the price of petroleum necessarily
affects the implementation of members1 programmes and
results in a dislocation detrimental not only to their
economies, but also to those of all consuming nations;
Have decided to adopt the following resolutions;
"that members shall demand that oil companies maintain
their prices steady and free from the unnecessary
fluctuations, that members shall endeavour by all means
available to them, to restore present prices level
prevailing before the reductions; that they shall ensure
that if any new circumstances arise which in the estimation
of the oil companies necessitates price modifications,
the said company shall enter into consultation with the
member or members affected in order to explain the
circumstances.
"that members shall study and formulate a system to ensure
the stabilisation of prices by among other means the
regulation of production with due regard to the Interest
of the producing and consuming countries, and to the
necessity of securing a steady income to the producing
countries, an efficient economic and regular supply of
this source of energy to consuming nations, and a fair
return on their capital to those investing in the
petroleum industry.
"that if as a result of the application of any unanimous
decision of this Conference any sanctions are employed,
directly or indirectly, by any interested company against
one or more of the member countries, no other member
shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment, whether
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in the form of an increase in exports or in an improvement
in prices, which may be made to it by any such company or
companies with the intention of discouraging the application
of the unanimous decision reached by the Conference."
From the above resolution it is clear that the main
objectives of OPEC are to co-ordinate and unify the petroleum
policies of member countries and determine the best means for
safeguarding their Interests individually and collectively,
and to devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization of
prices in international crude oil markets with a view to
eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.
An inference can be drawn from the above objectives that
the oil ' .1 was not established with a view to creating
scarcity of oil supply in the world markets. In other words
it was not intended to inflict any economic ills on consumer
countries; it is only intended that the consumer countries
should be encouraged to look to, and husband, their own
resources. In fact this is what the exercise of the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources is all about.
Another angle worth examining is whether the oil cartel
has succeeded in achieving the above objectives, which are
geared towards the economic independence of the member countries.




mainly on their different economic philosophies. Again
^ f^ 0vniS«\^AAhr\
the oil ' * 1 has not yet existed long enough for its failure
or success to be determined. Nevertheless one may deduce
that, had the OPEC not been established, posted prices would
have probably continued to decline in response to market
factors. In this respect the achievements of OPEC in
strengthening the economic sovereignty of member countries
are noticeable.
The importance of OPEC to the realisation of Economic Sovereignty
Despite the occassional disagreements among members of
the oil cartel, it has helped its members to achieve notable
gains, and has played an increasingly significant role in
the petroleum industry especially in matters relating to
471
petroleum prices. "
By pooling the strength of individually weak oil producing
countries OPEC attempts to match the economic powers of its
"adversaries" and use novel machinery for collective bargaining,
so as to reduce the superior bargaining position of the
470. The difference in the economic philosophy of member
countries is very often noticable, For Instance the
oil cartel passed a Resolution in 1968 against a Japanese
firm yet shortly after that a Japanese firm was seen
drilling oil in Qatar. See Mekadashi "The Community
of Oil Exporting Countries" 1972, p.2.
471• 8ee Guidelines for Petroleum Policy in Member Countries
Resolution XVI 90 j - See also International Legal
Materials, Vol. 7. 1968, p. 1183.
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companies to more manageable dimensions. It must however
be mentioned that OPEC was not interested in restoring the
effective control of its member countries over their natural
resources for political reasons, Rather the economic
objective of furthering the most efficient and rewarding
development of their resources became their dominant aim.
Through the oil c -I, the producing countries had a chance,
for the first time, to determine posted prices. This is an
indication of the member countries' consciousness of their
rights over their natural resources. It was also a lesson
to the major oil companies which had started seeking power
by increasing their reserves, diversifying sources of production,
and flooding the world market with low cost oil extracted
from those reserves.^2
The flooding of the world market with cheap oil by the
companies was much disliked by the producing countries because
it was an abuse of their natural resources and undermined their
sovereignty. Accordingly, they prevented it by adopting the
following methods of dealing with problems related to prices
based on a study of oil prices and revenue. No sooner was
the producer's oil ' — -^1 established that it conducted an
472. Relative bargaining power of the Arab countries and oil
companies in detsrmining the financial conditions in
oil concessions, a Report submitted by Shamgky Labib
to the Third Arab Petroleum Cengrese, 1961, p.52.
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extensive study of crude oil prices and revenues, and capital
investment in oil production. It consulted two established
and veil known consultancy companies - Arthur D. Little of
the United States of America, and Economist of United Kingdom
of Great Britain, which conducted studies for them in
accordance with the OPEC resolution that:
"in pursuance of paragraph 3 of the resolution 1.1 the
Conference having made a tentative study of the prevailing
prioes, hereby resolves that a detailed study is to be
made by the Board of Governors concerning this matter
in order to arrive at a just pricing formula, supported
by a study of international prorationing, should that
prove necessary."
The Arthur D. Little study revealed essential statistical
473
facts concerning the returns on the oil investments of the
leading oil companies in some Middle Eastern countries and
Venezuela. These facts gave the oil producing countries an
insight into the price system and the previous company
practices.
Establishment of New Price Structure
The OPEC resolution IV;32 of April, 19^2, drew attention
to specific methods which member countries should follow to
restore the prices of crude oil to their pre-1960 level.
473. The Report revealed that during the four years, e.g.
1956-1960, of the creation of OPEC, the rate of return
on net assets was 71$ in Iran, 62$ in Iraq, 14$ in
Qatar, 61$ in Saudi Arabia, 20$ in Venezuela. See
OPEC Bulletin 1973, p.11.
2b6.
In this approach the conference recommended to the members
of OPEC that they should .negotiate with the oil companies
with the aim of ensuring that tax payments on the basis of
posted prices were not lower than those prevailing in i960.
To strengthen the resolution the OPEC member countries adopted
the following further resolution which was addressed to any
company which might fail to comply with the OPEC members *
requesti
"If within a reasonable period after the commencement
of negotiation no satisfactory arrangement is reached,
the member countries shall consult with each other
with the view to taking such steps as they deem
appropriate in order to restore prices to the level
that prevailed prior to August i960.*
above threat is so vague that one may wonder whether it
would have had any effect at ail on the companies' practices.
The mere fact that producing countries abandoned the
above resolution and focuseed attention on more realistic
issues such as royalty and the expansion of malicet allowances
is evidence that the members of OPEC are determined to pursue
every avenue whioh will yield to them the maximum economic
benefit. Hence an element in the price structure was the
linking of the crude oil prices to the prices of imported
474
goods from member countries.
474. At the Fourth Arab Petroleum Congress held in beruit,
OPEC presented a paper, the theme of which was "The Price
of Crude Oilt A rational Approach*• The most significant
part is paragraph 4 which reads 1
HXn determining the level of posted prices, these prices
should in one way or another incorporate provisions to
compensate for increases in the prices of manufactured
goods imported by oil exporting countries*.
237.
fQr a ffyptem ?f Prprfitlgnfog
When the oil companies opposed the price raising system
on the pretext that it would affect the factors of demand and
supply in the market, the OPEC member countries adopted the
idea of strengthening prices by absorbing surplus supply or
excess production capacity through the programming of production
475
by prorationing production. This idea was sponsored by
Venezuela. It was thought that the best way to approach the
above system was by formulating a joint production programme
for the OPEC member countries to meet the increase in the world
demand and this plan was to be submitted to members for
approval.
There may be economic advantages in prorationing but one
should not overlook, the difficulties inherent in pursuing such
policies. The most obvious is that member countries have
different economic needs, which no doubt play an important
role in their oil policies. Equally significant is the
disparity in the oil reserves of member countries. It is
therefore very unlikely that prorationing of production will
be strictly adhered to by the producing countries. In the
opinion of the writer, prorationing will not produce a lasting
effect in achieving economic sovereignty.
475. The OPEC Conference held in Libya decided on a joint
production programme. Resolution X 6*3, 15 December, 1965,
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Sffifltyol 9f Pj.§9Qunt by pjl Compaq9
The OPEC observed at one time that the downwards trend
in price in the world oil market was due to the practices
adopted by private oil companies, which were determined to
make their presence felt in the market, or rather to promote
their sales through discounting prevailing oil prices. Since
1965 the OPEC member countries have protested against sales
of oil at discount prices, because it affects not only the
economic stability of member countries but also the standard
of living of their citizens.
When Libyan Government confronted the independent oil
companies, which operated in Libya and had also been discounting
the prices which the Libyan Government ought to receive for
its crude oil, the Government of Libya received the support
of OPEC member countries. The confrontation of the
independent oil companies by the OPEC member countried ended
in resolving that no member countries should grant any petroleum
licence, or enter into economic development agreement with
independent oil companies for the development of new resources,
except where such arrangements embodied taxes and royalties
477
calculated on the basis of posted price. The effectiveness
476. Ibid.
477. OPEC Resolution XI, 72, 25th-28th April, 1966
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of the stand of OPEC member countries on this issue could
be seen by the companies subsequent adoption of payment of
478
taxes on the basis of posted prices.
The importance of OPEC in the petroleum industry is
differently assessed by experts. Some experts belittle the
impact of OPEC and thus attribute developments in the petrol¬
eum industry to external factors not directly related to the
organisation. Others tend to magnify its role. Certain
individuals may sometimes be found making different statements
at different times. For example. Professor Edith Penrose,
an expert in petroleum economics, in one of her lectures
said that:
"With the establishment of OPEC the bargaining power
of crude oil countries vis-a-vis the oil company increased
tremendously"•
Yet in another lecture, she is reported to have said:
"despite its studies, public relations, influence and
presence in all concerns of the world. OPEC was not an
important factor in the charge that occurred in the
petroleum industry during the past ten years or which
may happen in the future."
478. Rouhani, op. eit., pp. 208-209.
479. Professor Edith Penrose, "The Role of Major International
Firms", a lecture delivered in Cairo in 1968 and published
as a supplement to the Middle East Economic Survey,
2nd August, 1968, p.10.
480. Professor Edith Penrose, "OPEC and Changing Structure of
the International Petroleum Industry", a lecture delivered
at the American University of Beruit in March, 1969,
and published as supplement to the Middle East Economic
Survey, Vol. 7» 1969. p.3.
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Professor Penrose might be correct in both her assessments
depending upon the angle from which she based her conclusions.
Apart from that, one thing seems obvious • It is only after
the establishment of OPEC that the big oil companies have
realised that they are facing a union of enlightened and
business-minded host countries determined to make optimum
use of their resources.
For a legal assessment of the role of 0PECt one question
seems particularly pertinent. Can OPEC, as an international
organisation, make a binding decision for the member states?
The answer to the above question can be found in Art. 2(a)
of the Statute of OPEC, which specifies the aim of the
organisation as that of acting as co-ordinator of member states
policies, and as a determiner of the best means of safeguarding
them. In which case whatever decision the organisation might
make is subject to the policies of member states and their
ratifications} without which such a decision is not binding.
In the light of the above reasoning, it may be said that
the achievements of OPEC depend mainly on the individual
member states of the Organisation, rather then OPEC as an
independent international organisation as such. However this
does not rule out the importance of OPEC in harmonisation
of member states' petroleum policies.
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2. Conseil in tergouveramental des Pays Exportateurg
de Cuivro iCXPKOi
CXPEC was formed following the ministerial meeting or
conference of the Copper Exporting Countries which met in
481
.Lusaka in June, 19t>7» and was attended by representatives
irow Chile, Zaire, Peru, and Zambia, and observers from
Botswana, and Uganda, its headquarters are in Paris. C1PLC
consists of four Organs t
i. The Conference of Ministers
ii. The Governing board
iii. The Executive Committee and
iv. The Copper information Secretariat.
The founder members are Chile, Zaire, Peru and Zambia.
It was stated at the C1PEC Conference in Lisa, that Australia,
482
Indonesia and Papua Mew Guinea were to bo admitted as members}
while other copper countries expected to send observers
included Canada, Iran, Bolivia, the Phillipines, Mauritania,
Uganda, Yugoslavia and Malaysia. Apparently the distinction
between producers was based on the fact that the founder
members were keen on looking for states with identical convictions}
who would also fight together in solidarity to improve their
bargaining power. In fact one of the ideas of inviting many
481. CIPEC Doc. Info•157/Appandix 2.
482. West Africa, 17th Nov., 1975, p. 1384} See also CIPEC
Doc. CM/37/74, Art. 2, for the conditions of membership.
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countries as observers was to enable them to study the
objectives of the organisation, make up their minds, and join
the copper organisation.
The first conference at which the four founder members
met ended in the signing of an agreement, the preamble to
which sums up the signatories concerns as follows:
"recognizing the exceptional importance of copper to
their economies|
considering the need to prevent excessive fluctuations
in the price of copper for both producers and consumers!
believing that this situation can be improved by
Increased cooperation and concentrated action by copper
exporting countries;
conscious of the importance of implementing the findings
of the intergovernmental Copper Conference held in
Lusaka, Zambia, from 1st to 3th June, have agreed as
follows:
to set up a consultative intergovernmental Organisation
to be known as the Intergovernmental Council of Copper
exporting Countries (CIPEC)
There is no doubt that fear of price fluctuation was
the main reason for forming CIPEC. This is brought out in
Art. 1 of the agreement, which stated among other things that
481
the objective of CIPEC was as follows:
i. to coordinate measures designed to foster, through
the expansion of the industry dynamic and continuous growth
of real earnings from copper exports, and to ensure a real
forecast of such earnings;
483. The Agreement is contained in CIPEC hoc. (34/37/74 Art.1
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Ax. to promote the harmonization of the decieione of,
and policies of, the member countries problems relating to
production and marketing of copper;
iii. to obtain for member countries better and more
complete information and appropriate advice on the production
and marketing of copper;
iv. in general to increase resources for the economic and
social development of producer countries bearing in mind the
interest of consumers;
v. to promote the solidarity of the member countries
concerning the problems facmd by these countries in the
copper industry;
vi. to promote the coordination of their policies
with other organisations of the same type as CXPEC.
The effect of the above measures was to provide a legal
focus for solidarity in CIHSC at the precise time when unity
over a Joint economic policy on copper production was under¬
going strain. Copper price had tumbled during 1970 and
were to remain depressed until 1973* Xt is suggested that
measures against price fluctuation were therefore embarked
upon in order to strengthen economic sovereignty.
Where price fluctuation is not prevented, the economic
sovereignty of CXPEC member countries may be undermined.
This is so because the copper industry is the biggest foreign
29k.
exchange earner in those countries. With a fall in the price
of copper the development plans of such states will be
frustrated. This may have adverse effects not only on
importing capacity and balance of payments, but may also
reduce the standard of living in those countries. In this
connection it can be said that economic independence
constitutes a means and not an end towards which all efforts
must be directed. Economic Independence in such cases
necessitates control of the source of economy (copper prlctt).
This is the only way to preserve economic sovereignty.
A. Structure
For the achievement of the objectives of CIPEC, the
agreement established the organisation*s structure in the
form of four Organs.
484
The Conference of Ministers.
This Organ is made up of ministers from each of the
member countries. It is also the highest organ in the
copper organisation (CIPEC). It holds ordinary meetings or
sessions once every two years. An extraordinary conference
can be held also within that time, but must be approved by
50$ of the member countries. The location of the ordinary
conference is established by the agreement of the member
countries and each conference fixes the date and place of
484. Ibid, p.2.
295.
the next* The location of the extraordinary conference is
fixed by unanimous agreement. The significance of the
conference is that it is the only forum in which each
minister presents the problems of his country as it falls
within the competence of CIPEC,
The Governing Board**^
The Governing Board is made up of delegations representing
the member countries. The head of each delegation must hold
a high level position in his country with responsibility for
the formulation or implementation of government policy for the
copper industry. The Governing Board is responsible for the
coordination and submission to the governments of the member
countries of individual and collective measures concerning the
copper industry, including production processes, expansion
of consumption and any other measures tending to realise the
objectives laid down by the conference under the direction
of which it acts.
It attempts to implement technical and administrative
cooperation between the member countries to develop human
resources in technical, scientific, and administrative fields
and to find solutions for personnel problems, as well as
other problems posed by the copper industry. The Board is
intended to harmonize the positions of the member countries
485, Ibid, p.7, Art.8
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in international meetings as far as the production and
marketing of copper is concerned. Its ordinary meetings
take place whenever necessary and at the request of 50/fc> of
the member countries. Evidently the Board*s action is geared
towards promoting members goals for achieving better terms
from copper production, which in turn is necessary for the
achievement of economic sovereignty.
The Executive Committee
The Executive Committee is made up of one permanent
representative from each country. In effect the representative
must be a citizen of the country which he is representing.
This is the only way a check is conducted to see that any
person attending the meeting has the interest of the copper
e_r._l at heart and leaves no room for persons or representatives
who may reveal the copper cartel*s secrets or strategy to the
other party i.e. the foreign companies producing copper. A
simple majority of the representatives is sufficient for
convening meetings and making decisions. The Executive
Committee functions under the direction of the Governing Board,
and has responsibility for coordinating and submitting to
member countries all measures related to the copper market
- production processes, increases in consumption and all
measures for the realisation of the objectives fixed by the
Governing Board.
k86. Ibid, p.8, Art. 12.
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The Executive Committee is responsible for the super¬
vision and evaluation of the functions and studies of the
Secretariat and it decides upon the technical studies to be
undertaken and is responsible for the distribution of the
reports and conclusions to the respective governments of
member states. This is one of the forms by which actions
to implement sovereignty over copper resources is coordinated,
so that each member takes advantage of the others* strategy,
where it proves successful in dealing with the companies.
487
'"he Peeper Information Secretariat.
The Secretariat is a permanent organ of CIPEC; its
headquarters are in Paris, and it is under the direction of
the Executive Director. Tts staff members are international
functionaries, and the official languages are English, French,
and Spanish. The Secretariat supplies information to the
member countries concerning copper consumption and production
by means of studies on demand structures, trends, substitute
productions, new copper uses, forecasts of future demands,
expansion programmes for presently existing mines, new production
projects, scrap offers, evaluation of reports on supply and
demand, marketing operations, stock movements, sales, contract
forms, copper market prices, information on international
agreements, tariff quotas, production, subsidies, and strategic
487. Ibid, p.8, Art. 15#
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reserves, technical advances in extraction, treatment and
the uses of copper, factors concerning the labour force,
transport, and other elements relative to the economy of
the copper industry, and concerning all problems related
to the market for, and marketing of, copper and copper
semi-products.
Previously, i.e. before the existence of CIPEC, there
was no such coordination among member countries. In fact
most of them knew very little, or nothing, about the industry.
The best knowledge was possessed by the companies. This
lack of knowledge of the copper industry obviously put the
host countries at a disadvantage. With the establishment
of CIPEC and its Secretariat, where every aspect of copper
industry is studied and members informed about all they
should know about their economic mainstay, they (the host
countries) can now bargain, and seek the most advantageous
economic benefits they can realise from copper production.
It is only a thorough knowledge of the industry that makes
it possible for the host country to exert effective control,
and effective control of copper resources and their exploit¬
ation are the prerequisite to economic sovereignty.
The fact that thorough knowledge of the working of any
industry is necessary for effective control is demonstrated
488




This Committee is charged with the implementation of a
marketing policy. For CIPEC to fight against price fluctuat¬
ions it must have a marketing or price policy, without which
it cannot counteract its opponents, the foreign companies
engaged in copper production. Knowledge of market operations
enables member states to know when to demand more or less in
pricing their products.
dotaait^ee on Production and Investments
This Committee is charged with the responsibility of
coordinating the action of the state corporations concerning
supplies, engineering, projects, technical investigations,
and training of porsonnel.
Juch exchange of views among the members makes unification
of action possible. Where members have unified action it
becomes difficult for companies to take advantage of their
disunity, again there is more chance of success when members
act jointly and collectively in every aspect of the copper
industry, especially in laatters concerning development and
capital investment. It will equally be appreciated by
companies if members have a specified policy. This clears
away any fear of uncertainty and harmonizes foreign investment
as well as promoting the attainment of economic independence.
The financing of the Copper Organisation is the collective
concern of its member countries. As regards financing the
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Copper- Cartel, the Executive Committee is responsible, on
advice of the Executive Director, for preparing an annual
budget. A budgetary statement is submitted to each represent¬
ative on the Governing Board not less than thirty days before
the date of the meeting at which the budget is approved. The
meeting usually takes place not later than 30th November of
each year. The budget is in most cases approved by the
Governing Board and such approval constitutes the authoris¬
ation of the Executive Director to incur obligations and
make the expenditure which it envisages. In exceptional
circumstances a supplementary budget is submitted by the
Executive Committee to the Governing Board.
The contribution to the annual budget is paid in freely
convertible currency into CIPEC*o bank account in two equal
instalments, (which are usually due in January and July of
each year). When a member fails to pay its full instalment
to the annual budget within sixty days of the date on which
the instalment is due, its voting rights on all organs of
CIPEC are suspended until the instalment has been paid. Any
member whose voting rights have been suspended under tho
CIPEC agreement nevertheless remains responsible for the
490
payment of its contributions. At the end of each financial
489. Ibid, p.12, Art. 26.
490. Ibid, p.13, Art. 28.
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year, the Governing Board usually publishes the receipts
491
and expenditure of the Organisation. Contribution to
the purse of the Copper C-,»L 1 is necessary because without
finance, it cannot maintain the Secretariat and other Organs
whose functions are vital to realisation of the economic
sovereignty of member countries by acting together as a team.
Membership of CIPEC is not perpetual. Any member can
withdraw at will. However none has yet withdrawn. It seems
that each member is satisfied with the objectives. Although
no state has resigned its membership there is a formula laid
down that any member country that wishes to withdraw its
membership must give this intention in a written notice.
Such notice is to be submitted to the Executive Director, who
492
should then circulate the information to other members.
Most probably members consider it wise to remain in
CIPEC because they can then exert influence collectively
rather than individually when negotiating with the foreign
companies. Any indiscriminate withdrawal or resignation
may to some degree undermine their objectives thereby
offseting the overall plan to achieve economic sovereignty
which under normal circumstances would be promoted fey acting
Jointly in a well organized body such as CIPEC.
491. Ibid, Art. 29.
492. Ibid, Art. 30.
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CIPEC is an organization of sovereign states whose main
idea is to got the best economic benefits from their natural
resources# The fact that they are acting collectively does
not in any way affect their sovereignty, rather it strengthens
each individual country's effort to control its natural
resources and thereby attain economic sovereignty#
achievement of Gh
The impact of the Copper Organisation is more noticeable
in individual member countries than on the international plane#
Individually the founder members have made tremendous efforts
to achieve economic sovereignty# This effort took various
493forms - from nationalisation of foreign copper companies
494
to participation in exploiting copper resources# * Equally
important is the fact that most members have modified their
mining legislation in order to include various clauses, which
will enable them to realise the objectives of the Copper
£iq«5
Organisation#
493. CIPEC Doc. Info/53, p.1.
494. Ibid, Appendix 1.
495# E.g. the Mining Law of Peru was amended by the Decree
No. 18 225 of 4th April, 1970. The main modifications
and innovations contained in the new law are as follows:
i. Marketing of metal after the transition of 18 months
thus assuming direct control of marketing of metals
through the State Company (Empresa-Mlnera du Peru).
Copper is now sold at Peruvian producer price. The State
has also contemplated refining metal itself.
In Zaire there have been great changes# Apart from the
state take—over, which occured in January 19^7, new mining
laws have been enacted to replace the Belgian mining law
of 1937# See CIPDC Doc, CO/ll/68, Appendix III, for the
summary of new Zairian Mining Laws of I967.
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The Copper Organisation is also trying to exert
influence on the international plane. CIPEC member countries
demonstrated their solidarity in 1973 when the Rhodesian
Government closed its frontiers with Zambia. CIPEC member
countries regarded the Rhodesian measure as economic aggression
(against the main transport route for Zambian copper exports)
and enumerated strategies whereby the CIPEC members would
fight jointly any assault on the copper interest of member
countries by undertaking the following measures:
i. severance of contact with the aggressor by other
member states;
ii. refusal to sell copper to a buyer who has in any
way acted against any member country;
iii. joint sales policy;
iv. cliannelling of economic aid to the victim by the
CXPEC member countries.
One may conclude that by coordination member countries
will be able to use more effective sanctions against any
person, government or company which may threaten to undermine
any of the members targeiit for the realisation of their
ecnnomic sovereignty.
496. Financial Times, 2nd February, 1973, p»8.
See also CIFEC Doc. CM/37/74, Fin. 2.
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One can appreciate the need to attain economic sovereignty
at the international level by developing the solidarity of
weaker producing countries, but what casts doubt on CIPEC»s
future success is whether its member countries can successfully
maintain the same cohesive policies as OPEC. The main factor
is that both copper and oil have peculiar characteristics,
that is to say, copper producers differ from oil producers
in that the former have proportionately touch greater difference
in production costs and face a pool of potentially reusable
metal i.e. the metal already used, in the hands of their
customers. This does not undermine the exercise of sovereignty
over this resource, but it does indicate that in contemplating
certain liaes of action, the nature of tho resource must be
taken into consideration.
Action with regard to Prices
The location of CIPEG in Paris, which is near London,
is an advantage for it can keep an eye on the price trend
of the London Metal Exchange Marketj if necessary and possible
enables it to intervene. However unlike the International
Tin Council, CIPEC has not yet sought to influence prices.
This is apparent from the situation that developed at the
end of 1970, when copper prices fell to £420—430 in London
(i.e. 40^< lower than at the beginning of the year). A CXPEC
Conference of Ministers ended in confusion following conflicts
of views and contradictory statements by the Chilean and
305.
fyg7
Peruvian Ministers. However, the awareness of CIPEC
member countries of their dependence on copper has since
made it necessary for them to formulate specific policies
498
relating to intervention in the price trand.
To achieve the above objectives various actions have
been recommended to CIPEC. They are as follows:
i. the establishment of a control system similar to
that of the International Tin Agreement i.e. stock piling
10'ji> of primary production (equivalent to the tin buffer
stock) would represent at least £536 million (at a low
price of £450 per tonne). It is inconceivable that the
Organisation should bear such an outlay alone. Therefore
other bodies must inevitably be approached for finance,
such as the Vorld Bank or the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). It is also suggested that cooperation with other
copper producing countries would be necessary. Any action
by CIPEC alone would result in subsiding the big Copper
International Corporations. The same may happen with any
controls on exports or any other stock-piling scheme.
497. Ibid, Doc. Info. 157 Appendix 6.
498. In April 1975 the CIPEC member countries cut down
production by 15^1 the cut back was geared towards
increasing copper price. See Mining Journal, 11th
June, 1976, p. 475.
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ii. The elimination of* the London Metal Exchange from
CIPEC transactions, which would place in issue the relations
between any CIPEC producer price and two other prices - London
Metal Exchange, and the U.S. price.
The existence of CIPEC, the London Metal, and the U.S.
prices in the same market would raise problems for both
producers and consumers and is contrary to good economic
theory and general business practice. If supplies are normal,
then CIPEC*s cannot be the lowest price, since, if it was,
then demand for copper at this price would increase. This
would in turn lead to a drop in demand for metal at the
other prices, and thus to a drop in demand for these prices
(at least in that of the London Metal Exchange Market).
Moreover the developing countries (the Copper Cartel, CIPEC)
anxious about the level of their revenue would not want to
lose the advantages of the difference between prices.
Likewise the CIPEC price could not be the highest, since
part of the demand would then turn towards London, thereby
making the prices there rise to an equal or higher level
than that of the CIPEC price.
This line of argument, in the opinion of the writer,
shows why CIPEC, the International Copper Companies', the
U.S., and the London prices must vary in the same direction
499. CIPEC Doc. CM/37/74, Pin. 2, Appendix 6,7,8,9.
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by the same amount, even if under certain circumstances (a
shortage of metal in particular) these prices are temporarily
separated,
The London Exchange, which is subject to the daily
pressure of speculation, plays a particularly unsettling role
in a market on which the CIPEC countries would like to enforce
their producer price. The importance of the Exchange is
attributable to the transactions which take place there. If
no transactions were effected there and producer prices were
to be found, then the London Metal Exchange would disappear,
and with it this element of uncertainty. The establishment
of a producer price outside the U,S,A, would become possible.
For this it would bo necessary to obtain the cooperation of
consumers by drawing up contracts with them directly at the
producer price, and also that of International Copper Companies
who sell via the London Metal Exchange, or at its price, which
includes in fact practically all of them.
Further the writer is still of the opinion that the
CIPEC member countries are still not capable on their own of
controlling the copper market. Any fixing of the producer*}*
price must be in collaboration with the big copper producing
companiesf such cooperation does not affect the soverdL gnty
of CIPEC member countries. It only facilitates the realisation
of maximum benefit from the copper industry to member countries
308.
3. International Bauxite Association (IBA)
Like OPEC members the Bauxite producers want to unify
their policies with a view to getting the maximum benefit
from the industry. Accordingly a meeting of bauxite exporters
was held in Belgrade in 1973» and a draft agreement was
drawn up for the establishment of an Inter-governmental
Bauxite Association. Consequent to the agreement, the
International Bauxite Association was established at a further
meeting in March, 197^» in Conakry, Guinea, attended by
the Caribbean producers, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia
and Australia.''*®
Addressing the conference, the President of Guinea
(Seketoure) summarized his policy aspiration for the producers.
He called for the creation of an international Association,
the adoption of a policy of local processing and achievement
of solidarity so as to extend help to those producers who
did not possess the means of processing. As far as consumers
were concerned the industrialised nations should continue to
obtain a raw materials supply system on fair terms, but he
stressed that producers called upon to maintain the raw
materials supply system should take as their criterion of
fairness the mutuality of advantage gained from the system
by both the producers and consumers.
500. African Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and
Technical Series, 15 Feto-1* March, 197*», P. 3027.
501• Guardian, 3th March, 197^# P«17*
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Most likely the Association will grow stronger on the
basis of its discussions, shared concepts, and information
and the issue of orchestrated demands for better tax and
price terms and more indigenous processing. It must be
said that the prospect for Bauxite producers emulating the
peak of OPEC achievements In Jointly controlling production,
increasing prices and negotiating participation would depend
on many factorsj firstly the ability of producers to agree
on a conation front without having opposition within the campj
secondly agreement on a method of controlling production!
thirdly a relative consumers* response, and fourthly whether
or not action by other resource producers, along the same
lines, was proceeding simultaneously, by accident or plan.
An instance of the apparent difficulties can be seen in
the inability of the Bauxite Association to agree on a single
minimum bauxite price formula, when its council of ministers
502
met at Kingston, in Jamacia." At that Conference it was
agreed that members should fix their 19f6 price on the basis
of a standard minimum price policy. However the council of
IBA approved the selection of a base, or standard, grade
bauxite to be used in the determination of a future bauxite
price and approval was also given to a method by which
variations in price would be agreed to cover differences in
502. Mining Journal, November 28, 1975, P.^05.
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qualities of ore.
There is no doubt that the price-fixing of bauxite
could be effective if the five main producers so agreed.
But this would probably be a weapon of last resort failing
agreement on improved prices, the location of processing
plant, and other productive Joint ventures; it would be
a weapon of much decreased effectiveness. Assuming a delayed
market price response to hypothetical production cuts, the
ability of the producers to sustain the lost revenue would
vary widely as between Australia, the Carribean and African
members. The length of delay in price response would reflect
the ability of consumer country economies to readjust consump¬
tion and bring forward scrap supplies or alternative materials.
The above reasoning does not disapprove of the formation
of the Bauxite Associations, as a means of unifying the
policies of the producing countries, but it suggests that
in framing the control policy certain factors should be
considered,
4, International Iron Ore Producers Association fllOPA)
Although somewhat overshadowed by the developments
concerning oil, copper and bauxite, African producers of
other commodities are also increasingly urging co-operation.
This is true of the iron ore producers association. In order
to establish the Association, a meeting of 11 nations (the
main producers) was held din Geneva in April, 1975» attended
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by Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Chile, India, Mauritania,
503
Peru, Sierra Leone, Sweden and Tunisia.
These 11 nations accounted for 270 million tonnes of
iron ore output in 197^» which represents about 33$ of global
production. The rest is accounted for mainly by the U.S.
and France. It is very likely that the membership of the
Association will cover the Western world*s iron production.
The Association's prime aim is to provide a forum for
the exchange of views, between importers and exporters, and
to be a centre for the collection and analysis of data on
production, exports and marketing of iron ore on a world
wide basis. The headquarters of the Association is at the
moment in London.
Evidently the formation of an organisation by producer
states with aim of controlling- a particular mineral resource
is now popular among both developing and developed states
to the extent that one can say that it is now an accepted
approach to the exercise of sovereignty over natural resources.
5. International Phosphate Producers Association (IPPA)
The changes in supply and pricing policies introduced by
the oil exporting countries have encouraged a tougher and less
compromising attitude in other producers of raw materials in
developing countries. This is particularly obvious among
Phosphate rock suppliers. The strength of developing country
503. Mining Journal, 11 July, 1975» P. 21.
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phosphate rock producers at present lies in the fact that
they alone are able to meet the world-wide increase in import
requirements. Although the U.S. and U.S.S.R, are the two
largest producers of thi3 rock in the world, accounting for
60>i of global production, the output of these countries is
504
presently earmarked for their own domestic market.
The above situation leaves Morocco, Tunisia, Togo
and Senegal as the only countries able to increase the export
of phosphate rocks. The principal beneficiary of high
phosphate rock price was Morocco in 197** I she received an
estimated revenue from phosphate of $ 1000 million in 1974
505
compared with only 250 million in 1973. 'fhe realisation
that such high prices can be obtained is an incentive to those
African producing countries gearing their efforts towards
closer co-operation, in order to strengthen their economic
self-determination.
6. International Association of Mercury Producers (lAKP)
The management of natural resources on the global level
- through an association of veak developing and developed
countries is becoming another state practice in the control
of natural resources. A typical example of such an association
can be found among Mercury producers, which include Algeria,
Spain, Italy, Mexico, Turkey, Yugoslavia. Very surprisingly
at the first meeting of Mercury producers in Algeria, they
504. Mining Journal 28th June, 1974, p. 537.
505. Ibid, p. 518.
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decided to sell Mercury at prices below $ 350 flasks f.o,b»
It is not Intended to discredit any association because
it tries to get for its members the best price in the market}
but one criticism does seem to be pertinent. For an exercise
of control to be effective the producers must study the
relative importance of their products, before imposing any
particular legal regime. For example, the market for mercury
does not favour the maintenance of higher prices. Producers
are known to have substantial stocks with holdings in Italian
hands alone put at more that 50,000 flasks, Fven with
prices at their present level there has been little sign
that demand is growing stronger, though there could be
temporary improvements as buyers take advantage of the
relatively low price market. The fundamental problem for
the producers is that there is no shortage of metal to
underpin a free market. However in the long term, the
producers could exert a stronger control over the level of
supplies to the market, and the decision of Algeria to
convene a meeting to form a producers association could be
a first step in this direction.
Significantly Algeria, an African country, is the third
largest producer after Spain,But the above position is
now changed by the West Sahara dispute, Spain has lost the
phosphate to Morocco and Algeria is at loggerheads with
506. Mining Journal, 24th May, 1974, p, 405
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Morocco over the phosphate in Western Sahara, This
position does not seem to be good for IAMP for the present,
C, Study Groups
1, Tufagsten
53/° of the western world supply of tungsten comes from
11 mines, all of which have considerably depleted total
KAg
reserves, and some of which have only short remaining
lives. Output from small mines making the remainder of the
world supply was also seen to be declining. The reliability
of supply was also in question due to the possibility of
withholding of critical supplies from the non-U,S, sources
as political weapon, and interruption in production due to
increasing expropriation of mines owned by national corpor-
509
ations, and lack of indigenous sltills,'
With the above difficulties in mind the primary Tungsten
Association held a series of meetings in Geneva to seek
consensus on pricing policies, and access to markets. In
order to accomplish the above task, a UNCTAD study group
recommended talks on the feasibility of creating an inter¬
national Tungsten agreement. In 1972 6';o of the world trade
in Tungsten ores and concentrates came from developing
countries - Bolivia, South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Peru -
507. Ibid, 6th Feb. 1976, p. 93.
508. Time Magazine, Feb. 9» 1976, p. 19.
509. Mining Journal, 23rd 1976, p. 325.
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the rest comes from the EEC, Japan and the U.S.A. African
states are actively participating in the discussions of the
* 510study group.
The study group has presented its report based on
intensive ad hoc intergovernmental consultations on Tungsten.
Among other things the group stated that it vast
"important to undertake as a matter of urgency an in-
depth examination of the special characteristics of
the tungsten market and of the feasibility of alternative
effective measures for bringing about greater price
stability, and a growing level of supply and demand","3
In i art X of the report, the study group presented its own
tentative assessment of the considerations relevant to the
formulation of price stabilization measures for tungsten and
the possible alternatives. This is intended to provide merely
a starting point for discussion since it would be for state
governments, taking into account all factors which they
consider relevant, to reach conclusions on the question of
the feasibility of alternative measures for bringing about
512
price stability in the world market for tungsten. The
bulk of the report was given over to an account of those
teciuiical and economic characteristics of tungsten and the
tungsten market'.which appear to be essential to the achieve¬
ment of the objectives of states. It was ,also concerned with
510. rij/BCl/Tungsten/3» 1st August, 1975.
511. See Report of Committee on Tungsten, 7th Session, 29th
Oct, 1973f TD/B1/143 — TD/B/Ct Tungsten, paragraph 29.
512. TD/B/C1 Tungsten COMM/hfG, p.3, 25th June, 197^.
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the feasibility of price stabilisation measures for the
tungsten which again is a main concern of the primary
Tungsten Association,,
When closely examined member states of the resources
associations and the study groups differ in many things -
politics, religion, geography, economic strength, and
development status* Yet there are certain things easily
recognisable as being of common concern among thein, such
as increased national ownership and control, increased
revenue, Increased processing and so on. The tactics
to increasing bargaining power by forming associations
has been learned by all concerned, and each association is
aware of the existence of the others, and their relevant
activities. In Africa where almost every state Is disposed
towards planned economies the special role of natural
resources industries, as being usually the most important
sector of the economy, and at the same time, one based on
wasting assets, necessitates a similarity of planning
policies and the formation of associations,
111 • Legal status of International Organisations/ sPClations
Most of the International Organisations are inter¬
governmental combines with specific economic objectives.
They are not supranational organisation® with powers enforceable
directly in the territories of member states. They can neither
be classified as international commodity agencies within the
definition of the Economic and Social Council Resolution 30(iv)
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of 28th March, 19^7, nor within Art. 5^ of the Havana Charter
of 19^8, which provides for the participation of both
producing and consuming countries in relation to a specific
commodity. However study groups do not fall into the above
category! for example the UNCTAD study group for Tungsten
is made up of producers and non-producers.
The international organisations, except the study groups
may be better seen as an economic alliance with the object
of ensuring for their members better bargaining terms. Hence
they employ every possible avenue open to them to consolidate
economic sovereignty over this aspect of natural resources
on the basis of collective bargaining. They have legal
personality. This is evidenced by the powers given them for
their purposes, membership and respective functions.
Most of the international organisations are recognised
by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
the United Nations Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Apart from this.contacts are maintained officially with the
following bodies: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), United Nations Industrial Develoiraent
Organisation (UNTDO), The London Metal Exchange (LHE) and
the United States of America Bureau of Mines.
The employees of some of the organisations, for example
OPEC and CTPEC, have international status - i.e. are inter¬
national civil servants answerable only to the organisations,
not their respective state-governments.
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If it is remembered that there are various ways in
which countries or states exercise jurisdiction over their
natural resources, the purpose of forming an economic alliance
by African states with other developing and developed oountries
will be understood. In international law it is within the
right of every state to engage in any form of association,
or even to limit its sovereign rights by concluding treaties.
This comes within the principle of international law relating
to the right of every state to decide its political status,
including its economic and trade relations.
The desire to attain economic independence has necessitated
the adoption of many control schemes, under which the production
and distribution of resources have been organised on the
national and international scale. The primary purpose of
such control schemes has been to stabilise prices in the
markets and to guard against the fluctuations likely to
occur under free market conditions. The African countries
have achieved success in the above objectives through the
establishment of state companies and alliances with other
weak developing and developed producing countries to form
producers organisations or associations.
One important feature of international organisations
and associations is that they provide a forum which facilitates
comparison of producer and company arrangements in different
countries, thereby speeding up the process of change in
various aspects of their relationship with the companies.
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In this process for example, the sixty to eighty year
agreements of the old concessions gave way to periods of
513
around twenty five years, fcr newly acquired licences,''
It became universal for companies to be obliged to surrender
up to 80$ of the original concession area,^^ within a fairly
short time limit. Arbitration provisions became restricted
to local courts, various forms of state participation were
introduced, and there was a general policy of taxation and
fiscal provisions.
At the global level it has become state practice to
enter into multilateral agreements under which countries
accept restrictions on their sovereignty over certain *
natural resources in return for the possibility of realising
common ends or of securing common benefit. Undoubtedly such
an idea was also behind the formation of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC),^^ The European Economic
|f 4 /
Community (EEC)7 and the European Atomic Energy Consaunity
(Euratom) ,^*7 g6neraq aim af these three bodies is to
contribute to economic harmony, expansion and development to
513. See Chapter Three III (1) of this Thesis,
514. See Chapter IV 1(c) of this Thesis.
515. United Nations Treaty Series Vol. 261, No. 3?29» P. 140.
516. Ibid, Vol. 298, No. 4300, p. 11.
517. Ibid, Vol. 298, No. 4301, p. 167.
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increase stability and improve standards of living in their
member countries. This is to be achieved in the case of the
"SIS >510
EEC and ECSC by the creation of a common market. In
the case of Euratom the ptr pose Is to create conditions
necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear
520
industries:" including the creation of a common market.
It may not be wrong to say that it is the European type or
structure of development that Africans and other developing
countries are emulating. On this premise, one may also be
justified in saying that the alliance of African countries
with other weak producing countries to form an organisation
aimed at Improving their economic backwardness is within the
law.
The new and detailed knowledge acquired by the African
states, both non members and members of international
organisations concerning the various aspects of the petroleum,
copper and other industries, not only made them well informed
and harder bargainers, but it also made them extremely careful
not to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Their
understanding of the complexities of the market and the unique
518. Treaty of Luxembourg, 27th Oct. 1956, amended by Treaty
of Rome, 25th March, 1957# Art.2.
519* Treaty of Rome, 25th March, 1957# came into force 1st
January, 1958, Art. 2.
520. Treaty of Rome of 25th March, 1957# Art.1»
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needs and requirements of the natural resources industry
is reflected in the reasonableness of their demands and
the extent to which they are ready to put pressure on the
companies to implement such demands. In fact nothing could
be more conducive to the attainment of economic sovereignty
by weak developing countries than the above strategy.
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CONCLUSION
Natural resources, especially minerals play a major
part in economic well-being of a nation. The consciousness
of the above fact necessitated African nations stringent
control over mineral resources, before the advent of
Europeans in the continent. Although the right to effective
control was lost to the Powers under whose sovereignty
African nations fell, the right to sovereignty over natural
resources was revived on the attainment of independence.
As the concept of economic sovereignty developed in the
United Nations, African states, in collaboration with other
developing countries, initiated the reconsideration of the
orthodox views on the issue of nationalization or state
take-over of private property, the purpose for state take¬
over, forms of payment of compensation in the event of
state take-over, and the inevitable conflicts of the
principle of acquired rights and the right of states to
utilize their resources.
In order to achieve economic sovereignty, the African
states have formulated mineral policies, repealed colonial
laws and introduced new legislation. In pursuit of national
objectives, they have modified the terms of old contracts
to suit the new requirements, established standards whereby
both the public and private sector whether domestically or
foreign-owned are expected to operate.
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While adhering to the minimum standard of international
economic law in the form of protection of foreign investment
and peaceful settlement of disputes, African states impose
the following obligations on the licenseest the incorporation
of foreign firms in the host country, employment and training
of local personnel, partial relinquishment of the concession
area, conservation of mineral resources, implementation of
safety measures, and prevention of environmental pollution.
Apart from that the African states have engaged in direct
exploitation of mineral resources through state-owned
corporations, and also in Joint venture with foreign
companies,
.Equally significant is the financial control by which
African states regulate foreign investment, tax on profits
of foreign companies, payment of rents, premiums, and royalty,
African countries ask for reinvestment of profits in the
host countries and at the same time allow repatriation
of profit on capital to the country of original capital
investment, and some economic privileges are available to
foreign investors in the mineral industry.
On the international level, African states have formed
associations for economic co-operation for better utilisation
of their mineral resources, particularly in the form of
regulation of production, formulation of common policy on
324.
price, and exchange of information through various study
groups.
Finally it is concluded that the exercise of sovereignty
over mineral resources, like other spheres of state
activities (exercise of political sovereignty) involves
diversities of state controls in the form of legislation,
organisation of mineral industry, and international co¬
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jjocuments of International Organisations
United Nations General Assembly
G.A. Kes. 5451 5th Feb. 1932, Committee on Human Rights
G.A. Off. Rec. 9th Sess . A/C.3/SR.570 Recommendations of Third
Committee on Human Rights
G.A. Res. 421 (IV) - Recognition of Self-determination as
Fundamental Human Rights
G.A. Res. 1314, 12th Dec. 1958 -Concept of Permanent
Sovereignty accepted as a constituent part of self-
determination
G.A. Res. 1888(VII) General Assembly reaffirmed the
637A (VIII) principle of self-determination
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For detailed study of occasions in which the Assembly
invoked the principle of self-determination see the
following
G.A. Res. 1819 (XVII) 18th Dec. 1962 on Angola
Ibid 1573 (XV) 19th Dec. 1951 on Algeria
Ibid (XVIII) 11th Dec. 1955 on Fiji
Ibid 1807 (XVII) 14th Dec. 1962 on British Guinea
Ibid (XVIII) 11 Dec. 1963 on Northern Rhodesia
U.N. Doc. E.2573 Annex 1, 9th Session - Committee on Human
Rights included
Permanent Sovereignty
G.A. Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural i source#
G.A. Res. 626 (VIII) 21st Dec. 1952
Ibid 1515 (XV) 15th Dec. 1960
Ibid 1803 (XVIII) 14th Dec. 1962
Ibid 2158 (XXI) 12th Nov. 1966
Ibid 238b (XX1I1) 19th Nov. 1968
Ibid 2692 (XXV) 11th Nov. 1970
Ibid 3016 18th Dec. 1972
Ibid 3167 (XXVIII) 17th Deo. 1973
abid 3171 (XXVIII) 5th Feb. 1974
G.A. Res. 3201 - (S-Vl) programme of action for the
Establishment of New International
Economic Order, May, 1975
U.N. Doc. E/CM.14 INR 28 Rev. 2 - Investment laws of African
Countries
U.N. Doc. K/5170 - Report by Sec. General on Implementation
of Sovereignty over Natural Resources
U.N. Doc. Sales E.73 II B.I, 1973 - UNIDO Study on foreign
investment
U.N. Doc. ST/T.A.O. Ser. 60 p. 91 - Article by Rouhani
International Agreement
and Contract in the field
of Petroleum
33^.
U .N. Doc. Dales 1954 XI - Foreign Capital in Latin America
U.N. Doc. Sales 68 II 2, 1968
U.N. ECOSOC Official Rec. 1178 Meeting - Arguments on status
of self-determination
U.N. ECOSOC 14th Sess. Supp. No. 4, E/2256 - 1952 -
Report of 8th Sess. of Commission on Human
Rights
U.N. ECOSOC Off. Rec. m.7 36/E/25/73, 1954 -
Report of 10th Commission on Human Rights
U.N. Security Council S/4835, 31st July, 19<>3 -
Reaffirmation of self-determination
UNCTAD Doc. E/Con/46/141 , Vol. 1 - General Principle III, 1964
UNCTAD Doc. TD/B/85 Rev.1, paragraph 5
other International Organisations
organisation of African Unity ^O.A.U.) Art. XIX, 1964
Conseil Intergovernmental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre
C.X.P.B.C.
C.I.P.E.G. Doc. CM/Lus/3/74 Vth Conference of Ministers
Lusaka, 1974
Ibid. Doc. CM/73/74 Fin. An Agreement to establish CIl'EC.
Ibid. INFO/53 - Agreement on Nationalisation of Copper
Industry in Chile, 1 2/8/69
Ibid. LEG/14 - General Law of Peruvian Indus try
Ibid. INFO/82 - Agreement on Terms whereby Zambian Govt,
takes control of its Copper industry 1/12/69
Ibid. INFO/89 - XX Convention of Mining Engineers in ieru
Ibid. LEG/15 - Evaluation of the Mining Legislation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)
Ibid. LEG/16 - Fiscal policy in the Republic of Zaire 23/11/71
Ibid. INFO/157 - Role of underdeveloped countries in determining
prices of non ferrous metals 5/9/72
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Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC
OPEC Resolution 1.1 - objective of the Organisation
OPEC Res. XVI-90 - Guidelines for Petroleum policy in member
countries
Ibid. X.6.3, 15th Dec. 1965 - joint production programme
Ibid XI .72 25-28 April, 1966 on posted price
Ibid XVI-70 C1.1, 1968
international Tunggten Group
U.K. TD/DCl/Tungsten/3> 1st August 1975 - members of the
study group
TD/iil/143 Report on Committee on Tungsten 29th October, 1973
TD/B/C.1 Tungsten 5. paragraph 9
TD/J3/C.1 Tungsten Comm/WG P.3, 25 June 1974
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Mining Legislation in Africa
Algeria
Petroleum operations In Algeria are regulated by a
complete body of legislation consisting of Ordinances, Decrees,
Orders, Model Concessions and Administrative Instructions of
primary importance:
Ordinance No. 71-22 of 12th April, 1971, which specifies
the conditions under which foreign companies exercise their
activities in the exploration and exploitation of liquid
dydrocardons.
Decree No. 61-1045 of Sept. 16th 1961 as amended by
Decree No. 71-100, 12th April, 1971 , establishing the model
convention for concessions of liquid gaseous hydrocarbon
deposits.
Botswana
Mines and Mineral Act No. 50, 1967.
however oil, water clay and stone are not covered by this
act. If the materials are required by agricultural purposes.
For Precious Stone Act, 1969
Cameroun
Law 64 LF.3 of april 1964, established the Mining Code
for the Federation. See Decree No. 64 DF.163 which applies
to strategic raw materials, other than hydrocarbons, but
without prejudice to the individual. Conditions provided in
each mining right granted by the convention Hydrocarbons are
governed by 64 DP. of 16th May, 1964.
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Central African Republic (AAR Lav)
Law 61208 of 1961, the legislative provision governing
petroleum is similar to those of the Sahara Petroleum Code
and reference is also made to the Petroleum Summary of
Algeria in this volume.
Chad
At the time of this research, the mining operations in
Chad are goveacsied by the base law for French Overseas
Territories as contained in Decree 54-1110 of 13th Nov.
1954 Petroleum is governed by 7-F.C.Tp.MH. of 3rd Febr-uary
1962. The petroleum provision is identical to that of Algeria.
Congo Brazzaville
Both mining and petroleum are regulated by the law
29-62 of June 16th, 1962, as amended by law 35-65 of 12th
August, 1965 and the regulation promulgated thereunder
Decree 62-247 of 11th August 1962. The provision governing
petroleum is similar to those of Shharan Code. Oil, gas,
uranium, thorrium, littzum, lellum and. beryllium are classified
as strategic materials and are subject to specific legislation.
The investment code law 39-61 of June, 1961, is closely
parallel to that of Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic
Dahomey
At the present the Republic of Dahomey like Chad, rely
more on French Colonial Decree No. 54-110 of 13th November
1954 as modified by 55-658 of May 20th, 1955-57, 42 of
24th February 1957, and 57-857 of July 30th, 1957.
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Mining proclamation No • 282 of 1971 » and Mining
Regulation issued in pursuance thereto.
Gabon
haw 15/62 of June 2nd, 1962 is the principal mining
code. Provision of the code may be modified by the
Establishment Eaw 55/61. The Labour Code is also applicable
to mineral operations.
Gambia
The controlling Mining legislation is Mineral Act of
195^ as amended, Chap. 121 of the revised Law 1965. Petroleum
operations ar e regulated by the Mineral Act of 1 955 as amended
and Mineral Oil Regulation of 1960 (as amended) Chap 122
of the Laws 1965. Law No. 2 1965 extended Gambian juris~
diction to the continental shelf which was not specifically
defined in the legislation. The territorial sea of
Gambia was extended to 50 nautical miles in 1971•
Ghana
The Mineral Act No. 2 126 of 1962 and supplemental
regulations issued thereunder, govern all mining and petroleum
operations in Ghana. See for example Mineral Rights
Regulation Ordinance Cap. 153? Mineral Regulations 1962;
(L1.231) Mineral Regulation 1963 (L1 .253); Mineral Amendment
Regulation 1962 (L1 .284); Mineral Offshore Regulation 1 963
(L1.257)? Mineral (Oil, Gas) Regulation 1963 (L1.258); Oil




Petroleum Law Decree 54-1110
Ivory Coast
The basic legislation governing the development of
Mineral Resources is the Mining Code of July 3rd 1964
Law 64-249• The Ivory Coast lias not enacted a separate
Petroleum Code; however the Mining Code authorizes the
development of hydrocarbons under special decree. Supplement
legislation relevant to the application of Law No, 64-249
to petroleum operations includes Decree 65-96 of 26th
March 1965 and Arret 806 of 26th Aprilel965• Offshore
legislation in the Ivory Coast claims a territorial sea
of 6 nautical miles under Decree 67-334 of 1967* This
decree also established the Republic's jurisdiction to
the subsoil of the ocean floor lying between the low water
link.
Kenya
The contoolling mineral legislation in Kenya is
Mining Act Chap. 306 Laws of Kenya 1962 as amended by Legal
Notices 142/1963 and 56/1965 and by Act No. 21 of 1966 and
by Mining Regulation and Mining Safety Regulation made under
the Act. Additional relevant legislation contain in the
Trading in Unwnought Precious Metals Act of 1962 Chap. 309;
the Diamond Industry Production Act 1962 (Chap. 310) and
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Gold Minos Development Loans Act 1962 as amended. The
controlling petroleum legislation is the Mineral Oil Act
Chap 307 of the Lavs of Kenya 1962 as amended by Act No. 21
of 1966. Supplementary Petroleum Legislation is contained
in Oil Production Act, Chap 308 of the Laws of Kenya as
amended in 1962. An important piece of legislation from
the point of view of potential investors is the Kenya
Foreign Investment Protection Act 1964, which guarantee?-
the assets of foreign investors in Kenya.
.Lesotho
Mining Right Act 1 967 and Mining Rights Amendment Act
1968, The Mining Act is also the controlling legislation
with respect to liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. The .reclous
Stone Act No. 24, 1970, regulated the precious stone tru e
and provided for Diamond protection and security areas.
See also Lesotho Natural Development Corporation Act 1957
Lesotho Development (state Mining) Act 1968 G.N. 73 of 1 )6ti
G.N. 11 of 1968.
Liberia
Title 24 Chap. VI of the Liberia Code of 1956 is the
basic Mining Law of the Republic. Section 179 of the Liberia
Code of Law, as amended and supplemented by Diamond Industry
Operation Circulars 1 -1960 of April 1st and No. 16 of 19^0
deal with the regulation governing mining claims and settlement
of disputes between prospectors respectively. Hydrocarbons
are regulated by the Petroleum Act of April 18th 1969.
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Special provision for Diamonds section 179 of tlie Laws of
Mines dealing with Diamonds lias been supplemented and amended
by the Act of March 20, 1958 to restore the Diamond industry.
Libya
Mining operations in Libya are regulated by the Mineral
Law 1953• Petroleum Law No. 25 as amended by Law No. 17
of 1970, Law No. 30 of 1971. Law No. 32 of 1971» and various
Royal Decrees and Supplementary Regulations.
Malagasy
The Mining Code of 1962 (Ordinance No. 62-103) and
Petroleum Code of 19^2 (Ordinance No. 62-105) regulate mining
and petroleum operations in the Republic. These Ordinances
are supplemented by Law of July 4, 1963» which clarifies
mineral substances. These laws contain provisions similar
to those of French Decree, French Overseas Territories. The
Investment Code of 1962 (Ordinance No. 62-024) offers special
tax and other concessions to the mineral industry.
Lalawi
Mining operations in Malawi are regulated (by Ordinance)
by the Mining Act of 1968 (Chapt. 61-01 of the Laws) as
amended by the Mining (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 1971 and
Mining Legislation G.N. 38 of 1937» 209 of 1952, 192 of 1953.
73 of 1964, and 131 of 1967. Exploration and production
of oil is regulated by the new Mining (Amendment) Act No. 22




Milling operations in Mali are regulated, by Ordinance
Mo. 34(CMLN of Sept. 30, 1970, the Mining Code of Mali.
1-etroleuw operations are regulated by Ordinance No. 3O/CMCN
of 3rd May 1969, the Petroleum Code of the Republic as
amended by Ordinance No. 21/GMN of April, 1970*
i iauri tania
The basic mineral legislation, Law No. 59-060 of July
1 939 provides for long term investment programmes for J.i'on
ore concessionaires in Mauritania. This legislation is
supplemented by Laws No. 59-661 of July 1959, No. 60-006
of I3tb January i960, No. 60—005 of 9th January i960,
and No. 60-121 of 13th July i960. The basic petroleum
legislation in Mauritania is Law 61-106 of 12th June 1901,
which provides for long term investment programmes for
exploration and development of hydrocarbons. This statute
is supplemented by Law No. 61-106, 61-110 and 61-111 of
June 1961. All mining and petroleum is also subject uo
investment legislation. Most recent version was approved
in January 1971.
Morocco
Decree of 16th April 1951 as amended by Joint Decree
No. 781-69 of 31et December 1969. Previous one regarding
petroleum was superceded by Dhair 1-58-227 of July 21st
1956, which now governs all petroleum activities. Other
laws of Importance to foreign investors in Morocco include
the December 31st, 1969, especially to encourage foreign
investors in Morocco as amended by Royal Decree No. 270-47
of 13th December 19<>9.
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Mirer
Mining Regulation is regulated by Law 61 -8 of 29th
May 1961 as supplemented by the Decree of January 1970
governing the exploitation of quarries. Petroleum Code Law
61-4 of May 9th, 1962, which is similar in many respects
to Saharan Petroleum Code of Algeria. The Investment Code
Law 68-24 of July 31, 1968 provides special investment
provisions applicable to mineral industries; Law 63-6, 1st
Febi*uary, 1963, dealt with separation of foreign capital
investment.
Nigeria
Mining operations in Nigeria are regulated by Mineral
Ordinance of 1946 (as amended) the Quarries (Decree of 1969
No. 26, and Mines and Quarries Control of Buildings) Decree
of 1969» Petroleum Operations are regulated by Decree No . 51
of 1969. Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulation of 1 6>.
Important tax regulation - Industrial Development Act of 1956
and Petroleum Profit Tax of 1959 as amended in 1967. Nigeria
mineral jurisdiction is defined in the Mineral Oil Amend; ert
Ordinance, 1969.
Rwanda
Mining in Rwanda is regulated by the Law of January 30
1967, and the mining regulation contained in Presidential
Order 55-10, 2nd March, 1967.
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Senegal
Basic mining law is Decree No. 61-357 (Mining Code)
of September 21st 1961. Petroleum operations are regulated
by Ordinance 64-261 , Petroleum Regulation of March 24th 1964,
Decree No. 64-363 - Model Concession Agreement of May 1964.
sierra Leone
The legislation governing petroleum operations consists
of the Mining (mineral Oil) Act 1958, Chap 197 as supplemented
by Mining Mineral Act 1 960 and the Mineral Oil Amendment
Regulation of 1970; Diamond Agreement and Licence (Ratification)
Act, Cap. 207; Diamond Industry Profit Tax Cap. 200
Concession Act, Cap. 121; Tonkolili Supplement Agreement
Cap. 204; Protectorate Mining Benefits Trust Fund, Cap. 201;
I inoral (Prospecting for Diamonds Prohibition Order in
Council)
Minerals (Bnclosed areas) Rules;
Mineral (Rivers Sewa, Moa Closed Areas) Order in Council;
Mineral (Application of Section 60-67) Order in Council;
Mineral '^Closed Area) Carbonaceous Mineral Order in Council;
Alluvial Diamond Mining Act, Cap. 198;
Alluvial Diamond Mining Rules, 1956;
Alluvial Diamond (Prospecting) Rules, 1957;
Diamond Industry Portection Act, Cap. 199;
Machinery (Safe Working and Inspection) Act, Cap. 218;
Machinery Woodworking Safety Rules, 1957;
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Machinery (Safe Working and Inspection) Fees for boiler
Testing Rules, 1957;
Explosives Act Rule, 1959}
Explosive Act, Cap. 235}
Chap 196 (Mineral Act Arrangement of Sections)
Sudan
Mining and Exploration Laws in the Sudan, Bulletin No.
1974.
Somalia
Law No. 77 of 22nd November 1970, Annex A;
Decree of the President of the Supreme Revolutionary Council
of 3rd April, 1971 » Law No. 1 of 21st October, 1969.
Swaziland
The basic mining legislation consists of Swaziland
Proclamation of 1958 and the Law No. 8 19^9.
Tanzania (Tanganyika)
Cap. 123, Supp. 58; Chap. 123 of Law revised, the principal
legislation, Government Notice No. 395 published on 3rd July
1964 - Mining Amendment Regulation - Made under Section 100.
Mining Order under Section 9(1).
Uganda
Mining Activities in Uganda are Regulated by the Act
Chap. 248 Revised edition 1964 as amended. The Act covers
all minerals in Uganda.
346.
Upper Volta
Mining is regulated by the Code of* 26th June 1965»
Petroleum Act continues to be governed by the Decree 54-1110
of Nov. 13, 1954, which govern French Overseas Territories.
Zaire
La Legislation Miniere Nationale Congolaise Tome 1-101
Miniere Nationale - Ordinance Loi No. 67-231 du 11 Mai 1967.
Portent Legislation generale sur les Mines et Hydrocabures.
Tome II Le Reglement Miniere Ordinance No. 67-416 du 23rd
Septembre, 1967*
Zambia
Tho Mines and Miner Act No. 46 of" 1969 in force 1st
Jan. 1970. The Mines and Mineral Act 1969; Mineral Tax
Act, 1970.
(See also Economic Report No. 26, 1970).
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